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"Every individual in each generation has 
every day his own troubles and enough to do 
in taking care of himself, and does not need 
to embrace all the contemporary world with 
sovereign and parental concern, nor to make 
an era or an epoch begin with his book " 
The Concept of Dread, p. 5. 
C O N TEN T S 
Page 
I KIER:UGr1RD' S LIFE AND +J0RKS : 11 
"DEFENSE" OF MAN . 1 
II TEE DEVELOPTAT,MT OF RATIONALISM: 
DESCARTES TO EEGEL 69 
III KIERKEGAARD'S CONCEPTION OF RATIONALISM 99 
IV DISSOLUTION: 'TEE CROWD' 131 
V RECONSTRUCTION: 'THE INDIVIDUAL' . 170 
NOTES TO TEXT . . i 
BIBLIOGRAPHY . xxxiv 
"This preface contains nothing but a solemn 
supplication that the reader will first put him- 
self in training by laying aside a considerable 
part of his customary way of thinking. For 
otherwise the problem here presented will be 
non -existent for him -- -and that, strangely 
enough, because he ha;:< already disposed of it 
long ago, but in an opposite sense." 
The Present Age, p. 79. 
Chapter I 
I'_ IPLíEGi3AR1) t S LIFE AND JORKS : 
A "DEFENSE" OF :MAN 
Introduçtory 
Is it necessary to preface a strictly philosophical 
investigation such as 'Kierkegaardts Critique of Rationalism' 
with a reference to his life and works? Such a question may 
be unhesitatingly answered in the affirmative. There are for 
Kierkegaard no strictly philosophical questions. The problems 
with which he is concerned are primarily his own personal 
problems. "The stimulus, the primary stimulus, of all of his 
thinking does not come from books or other men's theories, 
but from his own personal life.... "l "It is his life which 
forms his thought. "2 
,With respect to his critique of rationalism the 
need for such a reference may be more specifically stated. 
His relationship to Hegelianism (or rationalism, to understand 
that word in a transformed sense) was essentially his relation- 
ship to his own imminent past, his attack upon rationalism his 
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attack upon that past. The 'dissolution' of the age he had 
personally experienced as a process both engendered and ex- 
pressed by Iiegel ian ism. 'The individual', the category with 
which he attacked both that dissolution and the System, was 
essentially the end to which the whole of his life and works 
were planned.' Briefly stated, Kierkegaard's was an ethical 
or spiritual ra _,her than an intellectual critique of rational- 
ism and it was, as such, an intensely personal one. The very 
basis of that attack was his discovery of himself as a sinner 
before God, his experience of himself as a free and responsible 
individual. The entire authorship was, in a sense, his care- 
fully formulated endeavour to promote that same discovery and 
experience within the life of his reader. Far from being a 
mere preface such a reference to his life and works becomes 
therefore integral to the entire investigation. 
But is it necessary to set forth a recapitulation of 
those facts of his life and those broad interpretations of his 
work which have by now become the common property of all who 
are even vaguely interested? Inasmuch as I have already 
insisted that these matters are not irrelevant the questioner 
perhaps assumes that they have already been fully understood. 
And such an assumption would certainly not be surprising. On 
all sides one hears the protest that our age is better able to 
understand Kierkegaard than were his own contemporaries. More 
surprising perhaps but even more gratifying is the assertion 
that those of us who have been born on this side of "the dawn 
of analytical consciousness "1 (surely a most marvellous dis- 
covery;) have, by virtue of their supreme good fortune, a much 
more perfect understanding of Kierkegaard than he had of him- 
self. Between .these two protests, hovering awkwardly in the 
nether region between fact and fiction, scarcely knowing what 
or how much to claim for itself, there emerges the revolution- i/ 
ary and all - important discovery thai, Kierkegaard was a hunch - 
back.2 Ergo.... Nor have his works escaped the ministrations 
of those kindly but hardly Socratic midwives who, scarcely 
remembering that the communication of the truth continues to 
be a very difficult problem, have proceeded to reproduce his 
thought in what has amounted to a flood of studies, summaries, 
surveys, sketches, etc., etc. Indeed,there seems to be no end 
of ways in which to discover in capsule form a problem which 
its author was not able to formulate in less than a score of 
works. And, in truth, it does seem natural to suppose that 
'the secret' has by now been discovered -- especially in an age 
which has discovered it so often. So too it seems natural to 
suppose that his thought has by now been completely understood 
-- especially in an age which "refuses to understand that there 
is something which it cannot understand ".3 Ours is truly a 
fortunate age: 
But all of these cl.amourous protests notwithstanding 
it must be said that this recent torrent of scholarship has 
served not to bring our age closer to a true understanding of 
Kierkegaard but rather to make even more remote the possibility 
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of such an understanding. ?nor can it be claimed that the 
contemporary schools of Existentialist philosophy have been 
any more helpful. The elaborate fortifications which once 
guarded both his life and works have been besieged: he whose 
life and thought were directed against the paragraph has him- 
self been incorporated in the paragraph.' Instead of personal 
appropriation we now have reflection about personal 
appropriation: instead of inwardness we can now have know- 
ledge about inwardness. Instead of one whose experience of 
freedom and responsibility, of true humanity, led him to reject 
the Hegelian philosophy we now have one who is neither free 
nor responsible. Instead of one whose thought was carefully 
formulated in order to force the reader to exist in the truth 
by himself, in order to prevent results, we now have one whose 
thought has itself become a result. Instead of one who could 
be understood by only a very few, instead of one who could be 
understood only by those who spiritually understood themselves, 
we now have one who can readily be understood by an entire age 
--and in half an hour.2 Instead of one whose life and thought 
were a critique of rationalism we now have one whose life and 
thought have been rationalistically emasculated. And this is 
precisely the sum of our fortune: 
Tot for one moment do I wish to deny the value 
which many of these works have had and which, with due care, 
they may continue to have. Nor do I wish to deny or even to 
call'into question the standards of their scholarship. The 
question which must here be pressed is not one of scholarship 
but rather of the limitations of scholarship. It is the 
question of the limitations of the understanding or, to pass 
over the intermediate stages, it is the question arising out 
of the fact that Kierkegaard not only directed his life and 
works against the understanding but he explicitly rejected 
the claims of the understanding to deal faithfully with the 
essentially human. As we shall see he insisted that science 
can neither help one to choose freedom nor to understand the 
life which chooses freedom.1 These judgments were based upon 
his own experience of the opposition between freedom and 
philosophy, between humanity and Hegelianism. His own life 
he Understood as that of an upward struggle from 'man' to 
man, from necessity to freedom, from that mode of being which 
is perhaps the legitimate concern of the scientist to that 
realm or extremity of human existence into which the scientist 
as scientist, the scholar as scholar may not pass. This 
boundary he formally expressed both in his refusal to allow 
the psychologist to trifle with the spiritual life of man2 
and in his insistence upon the inability of the System to 
properly comprehend the historical.3 The expression of this 
choice, or rather, the consistent invitation to make this 
choice, for that'is more properly the manner in which the 
authorship is to be regarded, had itself to break with the 
traditional modes of thought. To this end he devoted more 
than a score of works nor did he at any time concede that the . 
problem could be expressed in briefer compass. His life he 
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understood as one lived against his own understanding and he 
also understood that that life could be understood only by 
another life which was itself lived against the understanding. 
His life he understood as a truly spiritual existence and he 
believed that such an existence could only be understood by 
another truly spiritual existence. It is this rather than 
the quality of the works themselves which is the real reason 
why even a flood of learned scholarship cannot in itself 
bring anyone, much less an entire age, appreciably closer to 
a true understanding of his life and thought. And this, I 
believe, is what Professor Swenson, himself the most faithful 
of all of Kierkegaard's interpretors, really had in mind when, 
in the midst of his own interpretation he said of Kierkegaard 
that "...he is his own best inter.) retor, nay, perhaps his 
only interpretor.... "1 
A brief comparison of Kierkegaard's understanding ar 
his task with that undeztaken by Kant in his Critique of Pure 
Reason will serve to indicate both the direction of 
Kierkegaard' s departure from the main stream of Western 
thought and the nature of the transformation which is 
required in order to understand that departure. It will 
also, I believe, serve to call attention to the radical 
nature of his attack upon rationalism. 
The profundity of its criticisms notwithstanding 
Kant's first Critique operates at least in large measure 
within an acceT)ted framework. It assumes both the relative 
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validity of that which it attacks and the stability and mean- 
, ing of the terms wh.ich it employs. It assumes that when 
something has been written it has been written. It is an 
appeal to the abstract intelligence. It is an intellectual 
critique of rationalism. Its general viewpoint is not in- 
adequately described as that of critical rationalism. If for 
the moment we were to forget that Kierkegaard's is not a 
philosophy of results it would be possible to draw many 
intereting parallels between the conclusions of the Kantian 
critical philosophy and those which Kierkegaard himself 
appears to have reached. But as soon as this has been said 
it must im ediately be added that while Kant's is quite 
properly a philosophy of results Kierkegaard's is rather a 
philosophy about the way in which each man is to arrive at 
those results for and by himself. "The communication of 
results ", he says, "is an unnatural form of discourse 
between man and man.... "1 His is an attempt not to impart 
knowledge but rather to stimulate "the self- activity of 
personal appropriation.... "2 His is both a critique of 
rationalism and a critique of those assumptions upon which 
the more traditional critiques, and this is not to exclude 
the Kantian, are founded. 
Normally at least Kant's criticism does not spring 
from his own personal life nor does the validity of its 
kitiz 
argument depend upon the moral nature of Lie who repeats it. 
=nor Kierkegaard the only finally valid critique of rationalism 
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is the moral and spiritual repudiation of the rationalist 
conception of man within the life of man. Kant assumes the 
reality of an objective and, comparatively speaking, non- 
human world and his works have, in a sense, their end within 
themselves. Kierkegaard, however, moves within a strictly 
human world which is rich in Its variety, perversity and in- 
stability and his works have their end only :within the life 
of their reader. Their appeal is directed not to the 
abstract intelligence but rather against that intelligence. 
Kierkegaard' s is an appeal to the whole man to live the whole 
life of man and finally it was intellectualism alone which he 
felt compelled to attack. In this sense at least Swenson's 
reference to his "anti -intellectualism "1 is less misleading 
than the initially unsuitable title which I have purposely 
adopted. 
Again, to understand Kant is primarily an 
intellectual task: to appropriate Kierkegaard is primarily 
a moral and a spiritual one. In principle at least it is 
possible to understand Kant by means of a resume of his 
thought. Neither in principle nor in practice is this true 
with respect to Kierkegaard. The most valuable statement 
which is ever made in any resume is the admission that 
Kierkegaard cannot be understood merely by meals of such a 
resume.2 The only way in which it is possible to understand 
Kierkegaard is to understand his central problem and the only 
,,way in which it is possible to understand that problem is to 
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understand oneself. It is to understand oneself, or rather 
to understand man through oneself, as a free and responsible 
"oeing. It is to understand man as something more than the 
rationalist conception of man. 
But my principal concern is to call attention to 
the manner in which I propose to undertake the present 
study, to the manner in which, as I believe, such studies 
ought properly to be undertaken. I regard it as axiomatic 
the Kierkegaard's thought ought not at any price to be 
presented in the form f what he himself has already con- 
demned as a "doctrinizing treatise ".l Both Kierkegaard's 
life and works were shaped to the end of assisting the 
reader to in the truth by himself: they were shaped 
to the end of refusing to furnish the reader with something 
within which he could exist. They were designed to destroy 
knowledge and to create inwardness. This was not an 
accidental feature of his thought but it was rather his 
first and last thought. It was something much more sub- 
stantial and profound than mere romantic fancy which prompted 
him at the end of the Postscri-mt to beg "that no half -learned 
man would lay a dialectic hand upon this work, but wold let 
it stand as now it stands: "2 Again, and this too is neither 
romanticism nor obscurantism, the only way in which 
Kierkegaard's thought can be presented faithfully is by the 
adoption of some form of the method which he himself 
employed. ';There this is neglected there can only be 
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knowledge about inwardness, reflection about personal 
appropriation, confusion without end. 
This is to insist that Kierkegaard's thought is 
essential poetic thought: it is to insist that there must 
be no prose rendering of that poetry. It is to insist that 
when the distance of poetry is destroyed so too is the near- 
ness which is born of that distance. It is to'insist that 
Kierkegaard in the form of results is not Kierkegaard. It 
is to insi.- t that that I have called his 'critique of 
rationalism' is itself poetic in both form and content: it 
is to insist that a point by porn. t, an objectively valid 
presentation of that critique is not his critique but 
rather a rationalist perversion of that critique. It is to 
insist that only through inwardness, only through personal 
appropriation is it possible for anyone to understand how a 
literature which scarcely employs the term tra ionalism'l 
nevertheless concerns itself with rationalism. Ideally at 
least the present study, were it to be truly faltt1Ifl to its 
inspiration and truly loving towards its reader, would 
mention neither Kierkegaard's name nor the word 'rationalism'. 
It would remember iihat Kierkegaard hims °lf remembered: it 
would remember to speak in parables and myths, to speak so 
that those who had eyes to see might see, so that those 
whose minds could not understand might not understand. It 
world maintain its own poetic distance so that it might 
achieve something of the original nearness. It would speak 
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ithout authority ".1 I say all this, I would repeat all 
this, not because I myself expect to attain to such faith- 
fulness but because I recognise that this is the only way in 
which this study ought properly to be done. I say all this 
because should I be at all faithful it will require at least 
some degree of personal appropriation, of inwardness, to 
understand the manner in which Kierkegaard understands 
rationalism or even to understand the relevance of his 
critique. I say all this for the same reason and with as 
much reluctance as Kierkegaard wrote The Point of View for 
lily Work as an Author.2 And except to confess that I have 
not been able to show the same love towards my red.er, except 
to say that I have not so long been able to refrain from 
speaking, perhaps no more ought to be said. 
His Life 
Kierkegaard understood his as a life of freedom 
and responsibility made possible only by God. It was this 
understanding of himself which led him to the denial of 
necessity within both the historical order`' and the life of 
man4 and which finally prompted him to insist that no man 
co).1d either destroy or create another? s faith in 
Christianity.5 .1.1d it was this same experience of freedom 
and responsibility, this discovery of himself alone before 
God which formed the basis of his attack upon rationalism. 
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The fact of human freedom, he believed, was the stone over 
which science and philosophy, over which human thought as 
such, had inevitably to stumble. And that he was :perhaps 
not altogether wrong is in our own day ironically expressed 
by the fact that practically every study of his life and 
thought has manifested the same general proneness either, as 
in the case of the majority of the historical reconstructions 
toimplicitly ignore or, as in the case of those physio- 
logical and psychological investigations to explicitly deny 
that freedom and humanity which was both the very breath of 
his life and the central concern of his works. -part from 
Levints protest that Kierkegaard! s life is "so full of con- 
tradictions",) apart from Druts remark that "his life has 
really raised more problems than it has solvedi2 - --a remark 
which has already been sold in the service of a not too 
worthy cause - -- apart from the whole of Swenson's writings, 
the single exception to this general tendency has been 
Haecker's last work3 and this exception, itself directed 
against one of these attacks is, I believe, unfortunate in a 
number of respects. 
It is no less than misleading when a scientist of 
some sort or other attempts to raise the question of whether 
or not Kierkegaard was a free and responsible individual. 
There are, I believe, but two methods of dealing with such 
intrusions and these are either to welcome them as "lies in 
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the service of the truth" which is certainly what Kierkegaard 
would have done or, and this is just as certainly :.hat I pro - 
pose to do, to let their proponents stand condemned as 
tumultuous scientists who have invaded the sphere of the 
existential.1 But even more if less obviously misleading is 
the attempt to defend Kierkegaard's freedom in what are still 
intellectual terms and it is particularly so when, as in the 
case of Haecker's defense, this is done in terms to the formal 
presuppositions of which Kierkegaard is finally as unalterably 
opposed as he is to those of Hegelianism.2 If science insists 
Upon asking the wrong questions it is at least the duty of 
those who would 'defend' Kierkegaard not to answer those 
questions in the spirit in which they are asked.3 It is per- 
haps granted that Kierkegaard's freedom ought not to be in- 
tellectually denied but if this is so it must also be insist- 
ed that it certainly ought not to be intellectually defended. 
for him freedom was not an intellectual question and, at least 
with reference to his life, it ought never to be permitted to 
become such. .end I would emphasise that the problem with 
which we are here concerned --with which, I believe, any real 
'defense' must be concerned - --is not the abstract, intellectual 
and ultimately irrelevant question of whether or not 
Kierkegaard was free, not whether or not he rightly under- 
stood himself but rather with the ;problem of whether or not 
there is some way in which we can understand Kierkegaard in 
the way in which he understood himself, with the problem 
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whether or not there is some way in which I can understand 
man through myself in the way in which Kierkegaard under- 
stood himself and man through himself. It is to this end 
that I understand Kierkegaardts criticism of those tumultuous 
scientists as having its most import.nt relevance. 
While every historical reconstruction and every 
scientific exposition of that life implies a threat against 
the reality of that life the real danger lies, I blieve, 
not in these studies themselves, and this is certainly true 
of the former group, but rather in that misinterpretation of 
man of ihiahthese studies are but the natural expression. In 
disregarding Kierkegaardt s freedom and responsibility or, as 
the case may be, in ultimately attempting to discredit his 
real humanity these studies are an expression of the 
projection of truant, perhaps even of modern man, into the 
life of one who is essentially both an anticipation ,J.n;_ a 
conscious denial of that man. _end as ouch they are an 
indication of the direction in which, from Kierkegaard's 
point of view at least, a corrective must be applied. 
Ideally I should prefer to press neither one of 
these charges. Not that against the historical reconstruct- 
ions of his life because I am fully aware both of the value 
which such studies have had and of the extreme difficulty of 
expressing in any other manner the course of what was very 
much an historical existence. Not that against these 
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scientific and pseudo -scientific intrusions because Kierkegaard 
has already condemned them and because in whose eyes they are 
not thereby condemned they ought not, at least in his name, 
to be condemned. But both are directly opposed to the way in 
which Kierkegaard understood himself, to the way in which he 
insisted that the life of man must be understood, they 
must therefore be made to confess if not their ovm guilt then 
at least that of an entire way of thought of which they are 
the typical representatives. 
It is with a deftness of statement which says neither 
too much nor too little that Swenson has described the facts 
of Kierkegaard's life. 
"(His)personal life...was the outwardly uneventful 
life of an unattached student and man of letters, 
an observer of his fellow men and a critic of his 
life and of theirs. A gifted, strict and melan- 
choly father; a discipline in a Christianity that 
centred about Christ on the cross, mocked, scorned, 
derided, spit upon; a classical school; desultory 
studies at the University continuing for ten years 
or so; a brief excursion into dissolute ways of 
life; an engagement of marriage, broken after a 
year upon his own initiative; a collision with a 
popular journal of satire, resulting in his being 
caricatured for the mob; and finally an agitation 
that shook his little country to its depths, con- 
ducted with weapons of the spirit about things of 
the spirit -- -such were the chief outward facts of 
his life."' 
It is in these facts - --in the 'great earthquake', the break - 
ing of his engagement with Regina, the affair of the Corsair, 
the clash with the established Church, -- -or rather, in his 
own intensely personal problems arising out of these facts, 
that Kierkegaard's thought has i =,s immediate genesis and 
apart from a prior understanding of the nature of these 
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facts it would, I believe, be very difficult to grasp either 
the initial implication or the ulti.ate significance of that 
thought. 
But the temptation which attends both the writing 
and the re-ding of every historical reconstruction of that 
life is that ,4allowing the Present active tense of human 
experience to slip back into the perfect passive tense of 
history. It is to neglect Kierkegaard's insistence upon the 
freedom which prevails within the realm of the historical. 
It is to fail to distinguish between fact .and event. 
"Before my real activity as an author began there 
was an occurrence, or rather a fact (factum - --to 
use a word which etymologically implies that I 
had an active part to play), since presumably an 
occurrence would not have been sufficient, for I 
had to be the active agent in the affair. "1 
lar from denying the reality of these occurrences Kierkegaard 
affirms that reality, hut it di ould be noted,Zboeines4n that 
which is not event, between Gsod and his own nature, within 
a context which translates those events into facts. 
"If I were asked how I was educated to be an author, 
my relation to God apart, I should answer: by an 
old man whom I thank most of all, and by a young 
girl to whom I owe most of all -- -and to that which 
must have existed as a possibility in my nature: 
a mixture of age and youth, of the sexerity of 
winter and the mildness of summer - - -" 
Corresponding to the denial of these two aspects of occurr- 
ences there are two misinterpretations of history, or rather, 
two forms of the same misinterpretation and just a: in his 
own personal life Kierkegaard sought to maintain both his 
of/ 
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responsibility and his freedom, so too in his interpretation 
of history he sought the middle road between one meaningless- 
ness and another. 
"...the mocers and unbelievers...hold that the 
whole of human history hinges, upon pure 
trivialities, upon a 'glass 6f grater'. 
Speculative philosophy represents the opposite 
position, since after depriving him of his soul, 
it attempts to transform the historical 
individual into a metaphysical determination, a 
sort of categorical designation for the relatipn 
between cause and effect, immanently conceived. 
Both are in error; the mocker does man an in- 
justice, th. speculative philosopher does God an 
injustice." 
History, for. Kierkegaard, is composed not of those events 
which are the blocks with which the historian constructs his 
castle but rather of the interpretation which the individual, 
claiming his freedom under God, is able to give to those 
events. Of that foreboding or dread in terms of which 
Kierkegaard himself accounted not only for his own sin but 
also for original sing he forthrightly declares that "...just 
as it can act as a deterrent so too it can act as a temptation 
... "3 A shadow of this same thought he cast again in The 
Concept of Dread,4 and, in even more basic terms, in The 
Point of View.5 Speaking of the necessity which character- 
ised the System Kierkegaard satirically remarked that "it is 
lucky for the System that it has to do only with the dead, 
since it must be intolerable for a living individual to be 
understood in this manner. "6 
It must be confessed that these occurrences are of 
tremendous importance. They are the stimulus of his thought, 
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occasion' for his giving permanent form to to .t thought. 
But they are neither its cause nor its explanation. >nd this 
is precisely what every historical reconstruction is constant- 
ly being tempted to sugg st. Every such reconstruction of a 
human life contains a threat against the reality of that life. 
In such a reconstruction "everything is understood behind - 
viand... it is forgotten that the dead were once alive. "2 It 
comprehends the past by viewing it as though it hadrever been 
a real Present. It includes what it calls the person but 
excludes the reality of that person. It dbliterates the fact 
of freedom. Both the threat and the degree of violence is 
increased in manifold proportion as freedom is the essential 
ingredient of that life. I-uch more important, therefore, than 
an understanding of these occurrences is the recognition that 
they are nmt necessary occurrences, that when they have been 
understood yet in a truly human sense nothing has been under- 
stood. Unless this is firmly and fully grasped Kierkegaard's 
life becomes that which neither it nor any other truly human 
life ever was: it becomes merèly a stage upon which a cruel 
and tragic drama is played out to its bitter and pre- 
determined end. 
This is not a refusal to make these events decisive 
but it is a refusal to make them finally decisive: it is not 
a denial of their importance but it is an insistence that 
there was something about that life infinitely more important. 
It is, insofar as this is possible and legitimate, an attempt 
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to insinuate the fact of freedom withln Kierkegaardts life. 
It is an attempt to suggest that a life which was itself 
free could hardly become other wise by the mere fact of its 
having become a part of the past.' It is an insistence upon 
his own distinction between life as it is lived and life as 
it is systematically understood.2 It is the protest that 
freedom forever bars its doors against the mere retrospective 
historian. It is an attempt to set a limit against the 
determinism of the scientist, a mark beyond which inter- 
pretation, if it is to remain a faithful servant rather than 
to become a tryannical master, must not pass. It is the 
assumption that Kierkegaard was a real person, that, under 
God, he was a free and responsible individual. But it is 
also the suggestion that he who understood himself in 'fear 
and trembling' can perhaps only be understood in 'fear and 
trembling'. 
IL very different approach to the problem of 
Kierkegaard's life has recently. been attempted in the form 
of an analysis of what, in that attempt, is designated as a 
'psychological personality'. I refer of course to Friedmann's 
short sketch.3 This "study' manifests a singular lack of both 
modesty and perception. As an absolutely complete misinter- 
pretation of Kierkegaard which nevertheless is able to provide 
some show of evidence on its own behalf it is an interesting 
document. It is even more important as an example of the 
inability of the 'scientific' attitude to deal with this or 
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any other truly human life. 
Despite the fact that he "came before the dawn of 
analytical consciousness"' Kierkegaardts own works present a 
much more realistic and convincing account of the ?psycho- 
logical personality+ in the proper sense of that tern -- -if 
indeed thre is such a sense. This is due perhaps not so 
much to the fact that Kierkegaard had personally known such 
a way of life as to the fact that he had overcome that way 
of life or, to state the matter in his own terms, not so' much 
to the fact that he. had doubted as to the fact that he had 
attained that point of view from which it was possible for 
him to view that doubt as despair.2 It was after Kierkegaard 
had crossed the threshold of this new life that he wrote The 
Concept of Dread which he described as "a simple psychological 
deliberation ". This work sets the boundaries between dog- 
matics and psychology, between Kierkegaard and his own past, 
between that which is the province of the scientist and that 
which is not. Perhaps i +riedmanu was not aware of the,sig- 
nificance of this work? Perhaps he was not conscious of its 
relevance? Perhaps he did not understand th...t it is Kierke- 
gaard's express repudiation of the very kind of advance which 
he has made? In any event without either answering its 
argument or accepting its guidance he has presented Kierke- 
gaard wholly in the light of a past against which the remainder 
of his life and thought, against which the essential Kierke- 
gaard, was consciously directed. Significantly enough not one 
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of the works which followed this t delibera_` ion T a_e mentioned 
in this sketch. On behalf of such a chicaneur, to employ a 
word which Ki- rkegaard reserved for those who ,; o yid prove to 
be his perverse in6erpretirs,1 it can only be said that he 
has had the unknowing wit to account also for the relation- 
ship between God and Jesus Christ in terms of their homo- 
sexual rivalry:2 In anyone who understands anything of 
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either Kierkegaard or Christianity this entire analysis will 
excite exactly the same reaction as the escape of a trustee 
from a reform school. 
Kierkegaard had his own secret understanding of Why 
his contemporaries could not understand him: he ascribed it 
to their "rudeness, obstinacy, envy ":3 I do not know that 
such a judgment will satisfy the psychologists of our age but 
I do know that this is essentially the judgment which Kierke- 
gaard stands ready to tiring against these psychologists. It 
is, in fact, the charge which he brings against both his age 
and our own: it is the charge which he brings against every 
age which denies the spiritual nature of man. 
just as in a passionate age enthusiasm is the 
unifying pr incide, so in an age which is very 
reflective and passionless ena is the negative 
unifying principle. The idea of reflection 
is, if one may so express it, envy.... "4 
But while, as Kierkegaard says, this "must not....be inter- 
preted as an ethical charge "5 he goes on immediately to in- 
sist thet "The further it is carried the more clearly does 
the envy of reflection become a moral ressentiment. "6 In our 
own age, and this I believe is the outstanding significance 
of Friedmann's analysis, that envy of reflection has been 
carried to the point where it has become a moral resentment. 
Infinitely more subtle and infinitely more cruel than the 
ressentiment of the Greeks' that of our age has expressed 
itself in a moral resentment against real persons, in an 
analytical resentment against those who accept freedom and 
who demand repponsibility that they might keep that ' freedom. 
Like the ostracism of the Greeks such psychological 
studies are,. from Kierkegaard's point of view, "a self - 
defensive effort ..,. on the part of the masses to preserve 
their equilibrium in the face of the outstanding qualities of 
the eminent. "2 They are, as such, ultimately personal attacks 
against personal reality. If a scientific age finds it 
difficult to conceive how such a judgment may be urged against 
a study which employs the apparently objective and impersonal 
language of science it is necessary only to reply that the 
very employment of such language with reference to the 
specifically human is itself, at least for laerkegaard, an 
expression of antipathy towards real humanity.3 It is almost 
as if unknowingly Friedmann had quoted Schrempf4 who, without 
seeking the benefit of such disguise, openly conducted a 
bitterly personal attack upon Kierkegaard. Friedmann's 
analysis is a personal attack which has garbed itself in the 
cloak of scientific terminology. ris such it says absolutely 
nothing about Kierk.gaard but ,.a very great deal -about, .. }= 
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Friedmann,' nothing about the life of r °al man but a great 
deal about an age which too often resents the presence o.î 
such man. 
But it is perhaps fortunate that there is now in 
English, and in a book which can easily be perused during 
the afternoon nap ",2 a sketch which refuses to believe that 
Kierkegaard is not a fit subject for the analytical,psycholo- 
gist. fortunate in the sense that having refused to heed every 
warning which Kierkegaard has given it has succeeded in render- 
ing him completely meaningless and even demonically perverse. 
Fortunate in the sense that, conveniently to parody his own 
ci-uotation of Schrempf's now (in)famous judgment 'he reduced 
Kierkegaard ad absurdum and (against his will but :u ite 
conclusively) ( ? ?) handed him over to the museum of ps;;-cho- 
logical curiosities where, like all other curiosities, he is 
nothing more than interesting.'3 Fortunate in the sense that 
no one else should ever again have excuse to comit such a 
folly. Fortunate in the sense that it is perhaps no longer 
so difficult to agree that, as Kierkegaard said, he himself 
is really the -only one "who is competent to furnish a real 
criticism of (his) work ".4 
Xli such studies are based upon the naively 
optimistic assumption that objective or scientific thought 
is able to pierce the innermost secret of man's existence. 
:mss such they are based upon a complete misunderstanding of 
r_ierkegaard's life and a fundamental repudiation of his 
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thought. Kierkegaard charted the course of his life in the 
following remark taken from a letter which was written when 
he was but twenty -two years of a:ce. 
"Enthusiastic as I have been and still am about 
the natural sciences it seems to me, however, 
that I shall not make them into my principal 
study. Life has interested me most in virtue 
of reason and freedom, and to elucidate and 
solve the riddle of life has always been my 
desire."' 
Three years later this opposition between the natural 
sciences and 'the riddle of life' had been deepened and 
extended so as to include that between the true life of 
freedom and philosophy itself. 
"The fact that God could create free beings 
vis -a -vis of himself is the cross which 
philosophy coun d not carry, but remained 
hanging from."' 
To this discontinuity between scientifically comprehensible 
existence and truly human existence Kierkegaard gave formal 
expression in his works. Science, he said, can neither help 
one to choose freedom nor to understand that life which 
chooses freedom. Respecting the former of these incapacities 
he wrote: 
"Now how are the sciences to help? Simply not 
at all, in no way whatsoever. They reduce 
everything to calm and objective observation 
- -- -with the result that freedom is an in- 
explicable something. Scientifically Spinoza 
is the only one who is consistent. "3 
Again respecting the inability of science to assist in the 
understanding of freedom he wrote: 
"And this is the wonderful thing about life, 
that every man who gives heed to himself knows 
what no science knows, since he knows what he 
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himself is; and this is the profundity of the 
Greek saying r Y4, a-eavrór(know thyself) i1 
`These are the warnings which are forgotten by the biographer 
who, jealous for the accuracy and completeness of his 
historical reconstruction, forgets that in such a reconstruct- 
ion "the dead are not recalled to life, but only summoned to 
a fantastic -objective life, "2 These are the warnings 
which are perhaps not understood by the psy.choloist, or, if 
inadvertently understood, are, like the protest that 
"psychology must stay within its limits ",3 conveniently and 
hurriedly set aside. And because this has too often been the 
case, because these warnings have too often been neglected, it 
has become necessary to allow Kierkegaard to declare once 
again that "all such scientific methods become particularly 
dangerous and pernicious when they encroach upon the spiritual 
field. "4 
There are, Kierkegaard says, two orders of causation 
which are appropriate to human life: thlt which is relevant 
to man as flesh and that which is relevant to man as spirit. 
That man who is only flesh, he who is the once -born man, is 
indeed the prisoner of necessity but he who has become spirit, 
he who is the twice -born man, has already broken these bonds. 
"....the man who really becomes spirit....takes 
over his whole being (by choosing himself, as 
it is put in Either /Or) and reduces propagation 
to nothing but the lowest side of human nature.i5 
This is the man who attains his freedom under God through 
the surrender of his 'freedom' to God. A scientific account, 
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whether historical, physiological or psychological is a pagan 
account: it lacks "the spirit's definition of the self": 
it lacks an understanding of freedom. A scientific account 
of a truly human life is no account at all. The essentially 
human life of freedom and responsibility does not fall within 
the scope of the sciences. It is only in the synthesis of the 
physical and the psychical, only in the relm of the spirit, 
only where there is dread, and sin, and finally salvation that 
the true freedom is to be found. And it is only where there 
is freedom that the .essentially human emerges. 2 
Our own age has manifested a tremendous interest in 
Kierkegaard's life and personality. This is precisely what 
Kierkegaard strove to avoid. It is, from his point of view, 
the reconstruction of the intellectual relationshiA it is 
sheer idle curiosity. In this of course it resemblesKierke- 
gaard's own age a fact which perhaps explains the heavy 
defences which he has already wheeled into position. It will 
be noted that this array includes both offensive and defensive 
equipment. 
"...: :y facsimile with portrait, etc., like the 
question whether I go abroad with hat or with 
cap, could be the object of attention only for 
those to whom the indifferent has become important 
-- perhaps as compensation for the :r :ct th.t the 
important has become indifferent. "4 
"And then only one thing more. It goes without 
saying that I cannot explain my work as an author 
wholly, i.e. with the purely personal inwardness 
in which I possess the explanation of it. And 
this in part because I cannot make public my God - 
relationship. It is neither more nor less than 
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the generic human inwardness which every man 
may have, without regarding it as an official 
distinction which it were a crime to hide and 
a duty to proclaim, or which I could appeal to 
as my legitimation. In part b-cause I cannot 
wish (and no one can desire th-t I mi ht) to 
obtrude upon any one what concerns only my 
private person - -- thouh naturally there is much 
in this which or me serves to explain my work 
as an author." 
"Ior an author, like any one else, must have his 
own private personality, but it must be his oven 
á$Urov ; (i.e. Holy of Holies); and just as the, 
entrance to a house is barred by the crossed 
bayonets of the guards, the approach to a man's 
personality is barred by the dialectical cross 
of qualitative opposites in an ideal ecru it ibrium. "2 
Into this house, into this private personality, none may 
enter. Not the retrospective historian, not the physiologist, 
not the psychologist, not one of these may enter. or none of 
these will the word be spoken. Only for he who has his own 
house, only for he who has his own private personality, only 
for he who, sharing in that "generic human inwardness ", does 
not doubt that another shares will the word be spoken. The 
way is not O3;: not on to the discovery of a new secret, not 
on to the dawn of a new consciousness. The way, like the 
direction of Kierkegaard's life and the authorship itself, is 
BACK :3 back to the simple, back to what the simple man knows 
and the simple wise man knows that he knows,4 back to the 
religious, back to the altar.5 Back to man, back to God, 
back to man within God, back to 'the individual' "which 
corresponds to God;16 
Kirkegaard himself stated the pre -c .nditi on for 
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an understanding of his life and works. 
"Only the man who knows in his own experience 
what true self -denial is can solve my riddle 
and perceive that it is self -denial. For the 
man who in himself has no experience of it must 
rather call my behaviour self -love, pride, 
eccentricity, madness --for which opinion it 
would be unreasonable of me to indict him, since 
I myself in the service of the truth have con- 
tributed to form it. There is one thing un- 
conditionally which cannot be understood either 
by a noisy assembly, or by a 'highly esteemed 
public', or in half an hour --and th-t one thing 
is the character of true Christian self- denial. 
To understand this recyuires fear and trembling 
silent solitude, and a long interval of them." 
This demand has not been relaxed. for will it be relaxed. It 
is true, it will continue to be true that "only by closely 
attending to myself, can I arrive at an understanding of how 
an historical personality conducted himself while he lived.. H2 
It is true, it will continue to be true that "...only 'fear 
and trembling', only constraint, c ->n help a man to freedom.. "3 
It is true, it will continue to be true that the understanding 
of Kierkegaard is essentially and necessarily a Christian task. 
The problem confronting anyone who world understand Kierke- 
gaard's life is not primarily an intellectual problem. It is, 
instead, a moral and a spiritual problem. It is to understand 
oneself. And with respect to this problem, as indeed with 
respect to Christianity, all men are born e_,ual.4 It was a 
most honest clue which Kierkegaard gave when he said "Ty need 
of Christianity is so great.,..th :t is why I am not under- 




Kierkegaard understood himself as the God -given 
'corrective' to an agelwhich was characterised by its 
rebellion against God2 and by its dissipation of the real 
life of man.3 It was to the fulfillment of this end that 
his life and thought was directed and it is in the light of 
this end that both he and his works must be understood. The 
historical setting of his task he set forth in the Journals, 
the Attack Upon "Christendom ", The Point of View and The 
Present Age. These works record his critique of rationalism 
regarded as a social phenomenon - - -and that is finally how he 
did regard it -- -and so furnish the context within which his 
more specifically philosophical works -- -the 
Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript -- -must 
be interpreted. But The Point of View also describes the 
inner structure of the early authorship and it is to this 
that we must first briefly turn. 
The progress of the authorship Kierkegaard has 
described in the following manner. 
"The movement described by the authorship is this: 
from the poet (from aesthetics), from philosophy 
from speculation), to the indication of the riost 
central definition of wha' Christianity is---FROM 
the pseudonymous ' _:zither /Q,r' , THROUGH 'The Con- 
cluding Postscript' with my name as editor, TO 
the 'Discourses at Communion on Fridays', two of 
which were delivered in the Church of our Lady." 4 
This was not a simple temporal progression. For the protest 
that he was "first and last a religious author" 5 Kierkegaard 
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found support both in the 'Two Edifying Discourses! which 
-had accompanied 'either /Or'1 and in the purely aesthetic 
piece 'The Crisis and the Crisis in the Life of an rictress'2 
which had accompanied the final devotional works. The 
dominant theme of the early authorship was the strictly 
religious and it was to this end that the pseudonymous works 
were subservient. The aesthetic works were, he said, "a 
necessary elimination "3, "a deceit in the service of 
Christianity "4. The Postscript was also an elimination but 
it was the last elimination: it prepared the ground so that 
the machinery of warcould be wheeled into positions: it 
cleared the stage for the final presentation of 'the indi- 
vidual'. It was the work which "set the problem, which is 
the Problem xar' É oXrív , of the whole authorship, namely 
'how to become a Christian"6. 
This movement 'from philosophy' to the religious 
he describes as "essentially the same movement as from the 
poet to religious existence "7, again as "the same movement 
in another sphere "8. But the following statement accounts 
more fully for the complexity of this relationship. Speak- 
ing of the 'Postscript' he says: 
"Having appropriated the whole pseudonymous, 
aesthetic work as the description of one way a 
person may take to become a Christian (viz. away 
from the aesthetical in order to become a 
Christian), it undertakes to describe the other 
way (viz. away from the System, from speculation 
etc., in order to become a Christian)." 
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This description reflects somet:,ing of Kierkegaardts under- 
standing of the real relationship bet. een the aesthetic and 
the speculative. It makes allowance for the fact that the 
'Postscript' "draws or edits the whole aesthetic production 
to its own advantage"1. This it is able to do because the 
speculative or that to which it is opposed is itself an ex- 
pression of the aesthetic. But at the same time this 
description neglects the fact that the Postscript is "the 
turning- pointi2 of the entire authorship. It neglects the 
fact that not only dóes this work describe "the other way" 
to become a Christian but that it describes what for Kierke- 
gaard is the only way, that not only does it set the problem 
of the authorship but that it is the only work which can set 
the problem. 
7e have already sketched the course of the early 
authorship from the aesthetic to the philosophic and we may 
now turn to a consideration of the pseudonymous and indirect 
form of these works and of the relevance of that form in 
terms of his critique of rationalism. The importance of this 
apparently preliminary consideration stems from the fact that 
there is in the majority ofierkegaard's writings an integral 
connection between the content and the form or, more 
specifically, from his own belief that he had found in the 
category of 'indirect communication' the means whereby to 
liberate both himself and his reader from the last trammels of 
aestheticism and intellectualism, of Hegelianism and 
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rationalism.1 Buu before passing on to this matter it is 
.necessary first to call attention to the fact that although 
the Postscript was originally the concluding volume of a 
specifically religious authorship it now stands as, in 
several senses, the central volume of a larger and specifically 
Christian production. The later addition .f the devotional 
and Christian writings has, however, served to emphasise 
rather than to alter the position of this work within the 
authorship in the same manner as the form of these later 
works has served to cast light upon the meaning and importance 
of the form of the e::.rlier authorship. In discussing the 
relevance of the form of these works I shall therefore 
reference to the Postscript both as the highest expression of 
an authorship wlaich is essentially Socratic in form and as 
the central expression of an authorship which is essentially 
Christian in form. That this anticipates the very nature of 
Kierkegaard's critique of rationalism springs from the fact 
that, as I have already said, there is an essential connect- 
ion between what is said and the way in which it is said. 
All of the major works of the early authorship with 
the exception of the Edifying Discourses are pseudonymous and 
all of these works with the exception of The Concept of Dread 
employ indirect communication. Of that authorshi- Kierke- 
gaard says: 
"It began maieutically, with aesthetic works and 
all of the pseudonymous works are maieutic. That 
indeed is the regson why these works are 
rno pseudonyu s - --" 
33 
These two features are, as Kierkegaard suggests, integrally 
-related. They are, in fact, two aspects of the same problem, 
That this is so is suggested by the fact that the pseudonymns 
are the medium by which Kierkegaard attempted to detach him- 
self from his works while indirect communication wés the means 
by which he hoped to personally relate his reader to these 
works or rather the means by which he hoped to relate, the 
reader to himself (i.e. to the reader) through these works. 
It is most important to keep this relationship in mind as we 
turn to a consideration of the form of the works. 
Kierkegaard described himself as a "religious 
author who....has never written anything aesthetic "l. In the 
"dust -cover" which to the Postscript 
that "...in the pseudonymous works there is not a single word 
which is mine... "2 In this same declaration he asked that 
any Quotation from these works should be accompanied by the 
named' the respective pseudonymous author.3 .end it was not 
without conviction that Kierkegaard later protested that he 
was misunderstood because people "confounded (him) as a 
matter of course with the pseudonymns u4. Similarly, the 
importance of the form of statement is repeatedly stressed 
by Kierkegaard in The Point of View and by Climacus in the 
Postscript. In that work Climacus protested that a dogmatis- 
ing abstract gives "the most distorted impression of the book 
(i.e. of the 'Fragments ?) that it is possible to havei5. 
Again, he said, "...the abstract takes away the feature of 
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greatest importance and falsely transforms the book into a 
doctrinizing treatise.... "1 These remarks certainly apply 
to the Postscript itself and perhaps with equal relevance 
to the remainder of the pseudonymous authorship. The form of 
these works is an essential part of the works and these 
-orotests, far from being mere declamatory remarks, are, I 
believe, specifically intended to c all attention to this 
form. They are signposts whose purpose it is to indicate 
what is at once both the distance and the proximity of Kierke- 
gaardts thought_ from the works in which that thought is ex- 
pressed. end if, as I believe, this is the case it remains 
only to add that there is a considerable amount of evidence 
to the effect that he who misses the signpost also misses the 
way. 
But all of Kierkegaard's warnings notwithstanding 
it must be ©onfessed that the form of these works has too 
often been regarded as of mere trifling importance. Dru has 
dismissed the pseudonymns as an "elaborate mystification" 
having "a purely ideal significance "2. Allen has apparently 
failed to see that they have any real significance whatso- 
ever.3 This latter view is essentially that of these German 
interpreters who see in Kierkegaardts employment of the 
pseudonymns nothing more than conformity with the - omantic 
fashion of the day.4 There is no need here to pause over 
these outstanding failures except perhaps to remark that 
Kierkegaard, having already anticipated such failures, has 
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quite forthrightly and explicitly ascribed them to the per- 
versity of the interpretor.1 
But while it tad finally misunderstands the sig- 
nificance of the form of the authorship, Patrick's study can 
at least claim to have avoided identifying the remarks of the 
pseudonymns with the thought of their cre-tor. He justly 
professes to have observed the request thL:t each word of the 
pseudonymous works should be accompanied by the name of its 
author.2 But although he has formally acceded to this 
request --a request which Kierkegaard elsewhere describes as 
a "precautionary measure "3 - -his failure to understand the 
importance of indirect communication which, as I have said, 
is but the other aspect of this same problem, suggests that 
he h..s not ;;rasped the basis of this request. It was surely 
nothing less than such a failure, a failure perhaps signified 
by the absence of any specific reference either to the problem 
of the pseudonymns or the use of indirect communication, which 
prompted him to present the pseudonymous works in the form of 
an "exposéi4. That he should have commented upon the form of 
his presentation in connection with his exposition of the 
works of Johannes Climacus, although in one sense obviously 
the result of Kierkegaard's inclusion of his 'Declaration' at 
the end of the Postscript, is, in another and deeper sense, 
perhaps a matter of no merely accidental irony. Not only 
does such a resume transgress Climacus+ own explicit warn- 
i 5 ngs but it is entirely contrary to the spirit of the 
pseudonymous works. It may be: however, and this quite 
fre 
Seriously, that the length of this work combined with its 
extensive quotation will produce the desired 'eliminations 
and thus compensate for the literal and somewhat heavy 
rendering of those signposts which are almost as poetic as 
the authorship to which they point. 
The form of the authorship is of central importance 
and no real benefit can accrue from treating it either as an 
eccentricity or as a mere device. To forget this fact, to 
effect an easier solution, to misinterpret rierkegaardt s 
warnings offers itself too rep. dily as an escape from a prob- 
lem which at one and the same time obscures and reveals both 
Kierkegaard's and the reader's relationship to these works. 
This problem, I believe, may be stated from either direction 
but perhaps most clearly from the side of the pseudonymns. 
Although the relation of Kierkegaard to his pseudonymns, 
again of their thought to his thought, is one which, properly 
speaking, is almost infinitely dialectical,1 it is neverthe- 
less necessary to formulate some positive view of Kierke- 
gaard's relationship to the various pseudonymns. Apart from 
such a view there can be no ground for the interpretation of 
Kierkegaardts t in these works. Under such 
circumstances it is necessary either to accept the entire 
pseudonymous production, including those views expressed in 
the first volume of Either /0r, as an ex -press ion of Kierke- 
gaard's thought or to reject this production, including the 
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two works of Johannes Climacus, as having no essential 
relationship to that thought. The former of these equally 
unsatisfactory alternatives neglects the importance which 
Kierkegaard attached to the pseudonymous aspect of his work: 
the latter neglects the importance of these works themselves. 
It remains therefore to attempt such a formulation. 
The pseudonymns represent Kierkegaard's attempt to 
destroy his own authority in the eyes of his reader.l They 
are his means of preventing an essential discipleship.2 They 
are his refusal to accept responsibility for his works in order 
that the reader might accept that responsibility for himself. 
They are his attempt to prevent the intellectual relationship3 
between man and man and to promote the inward relationship of 
a man to himself. They are his endeavour to prevent knowledge 
and create inwardness.4 But they are also "peionalities who 
thinkand speak for themselvesi5. They are the ideal rep- 
resentation of a point of view developed and delineated with 
such consistency as to produce in the reader a definite moral 
judgment. They are the expression of a carefully formulated 
Socratic attempt to free men through inwardness rather than 
to enslave them through the knowledge by which they are 
'freed'. They are the expression of his attempt to make each 
man exist in the truth for himself.6 
Kierkegaard chose the indirect form of communication 
because it was the only one which properly expressed that which 
he was attempting to coney.? Objective knowledge may be 
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directly expressed because, as Climacus says, it is not in 
the stw' ict sense of the word a form of communication at all" 1. 
The expression of the objective does not involve the essential 
human realty of either the instructor or the instructed. It 
requires only the transference of knowledge from one intellect 
to another so tht the emphasis is shifted from the world of 
man to that of abstract ideas. The expression becomes an end 
in itself. But Kierkegaard is concerned with ethical or 
ethico- religious knowledge and such knowledge is something 
not merely to be known but rather to be done. It is something 
to be achieved in the life of the individual, something to be 
appropriated by him in inwardness. Here the expression, far 
from being an end in itself, has but a relative status and 
the recipient, far from being a mere vanishing point, becomes 
the end in whom the communication is achieved. The appeal is 
not to the abstract intelligence but rather to what Swenson 
terms the "emotive will"2. To the end of preventing his 
works from being interpreted as a mere addition to knowledge, 
to the end of promoting self -concern and inwardness within 
the reader, to the end of destroying the illusion that one is 
a Christian as a matter of course,' to the end of completing 
the task undertaken by the adoption of the pseudonymns it 
was necessary to employ the maieutic method. Only thus did 
it seem possible to respect the individual's God -relationship, 
only thus did it seem possible to prevent the communication 
being transformed into a non- communication.5 
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The Postscript is the fullest expression of the 
early pseudonymous authorship: it represents the culmination 
of what may be best described as a developing assymptotic 
approximation to Kierkegaard's thought. While the relevance 
of this description can only become finally apparent in the 
light of a somewhat similar approximation within the later 
authorship it is at least possible at this point to suggest'the 
distinctive status which belongs to the Postscript and to 
Johannes Climacus who is its pseudonymous author. 
There are innumerable minor indications of the 
singular role accorded to Climacus and his works. This has 
already been suggested in the three -fold division of the author- 
ship and the unique position assigned to the Postscript within 
that division. This may be further seen in the fact that 
although as "a third person" who was "incapable of knowing 
anything about the aim of a work which was not his own "1 
Climacus was nevertheless able not only to draw the aesthetic 
production to his own advantage but also to review their works 
and even to make minor corrections and adjustments in their 
statements.2 Furthermore it was with the Postscript that 
Kierkegaard had originally intended to conclude the author- 
ship, an intention which he had signified in the title of the 
work itself. To the works of Climacus Kierkegaard appended 
his own name as 'responsible for publication'3 something 
which, he remarks, he did not do in the case of the aesthetic 
works.4 And this not surprisingly for the Fragments and the 
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Postscript were made to stand as the corrective to a 
philosophy which Kierkegaard regarded as the product and the 
distinctive expression of the age. Nor is there lacking an 
essential continuity between the Johannes Climacus who had 
originally been intended as the title of a proposed auto- 
biographical novel' and the Johannes Climacus who undertook 
the elucidation of the central struggle of Kierkegaard's own 
life: a struggle which Kierkegaard had originally viewed as 
that between speculative philosophy and Christianity and later 
as but the core of the struggle between man and God. 
The centrality of the Postscript is further reflect- 
ed both in the problem with which it deals and in the form of 
communication which it employs. Like the earlier pseudonymous 
works it maintains a perfectly consistent attitude toward the 
objects of its concern: it employs indirect statement in the 
strictest sense: it is a negative elimination. But at the 
same time it moves within another and an essentially deeper 
sphere and while it does not intrude upon the reader's freedom 
it does suggest thoughts which ultimately take their place in 
the strictly religious works. It is, both factually and 
poetically the turning -point of the entire authorship. 
Climacus described his task Ls that of discovering 
"where the misunderstanding lies between speculative philosophy 
and Christianity "2. In this he was really carryLLg on the 
work of those earlier "pseudonymous authors (who) constantly 
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had existence in view, and thus maintained an indirect 
polemic (of their own) against speculative philosophy "1. But 
while his attack was carried out at a higher level the form 
which he employed was essentially the same as that of the 
earlier works. His explanation of the necessity and value 
of that form is therefore valid with respect to these works 
as well. 
"...finally it became clear to me that the mis- 
direction of speculative philosophy...must be 
rooted deeply in the entire tendency of the age. 
It must, in short, doubtless be rooted in the 
fact that on account of our vastly increased 
knowledge, men had forgotten that it means to 
EXIST, and what INWARDNESS signifies. 
"When I understood this, it also became clear 
to me that if I desired to communicate anything 
on this point, it would first of all be necessary 
to give my exposition an indirect form. 2or if 
inwardness is the truth, results are only rubbish 
with which we should not trouble each other. The 
communication of results is an unnatural form of 
intercourse between man and man, in so far as 
every man is a spiritual being, for whom the truth 
consists in nothing else than the self -activity of 
personal appropriation, which the communication of 
re.ults tends to prevent." 
"If anyone were to say that tais is mere 
declamation, that all I have at my disposal is 
a little irony, a little pathos, a little 
dialectics, my reply would be: ,:that else should 
anyone have who proposes to set forth the ethical ?' 
Should he perhaps set, ii. objectively in a frame - 
work of paragraphs and get it smoothly by rote, 
so as to contradict himself by his form? In my 
opinion irony, pathos, and dialectics are 
precisely quad desideratu', when the ethical is 
quod erat demonstrandum." 
The Postscript, and this applies equally to the other 
pseudonymous works within their own spheres, does not attempt 
the intellectual refutation of speculative philosophy. It 
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does not endeavour speculatively to prove that Hegelianism is 
in need of correction or adjustment. It seeks rather to dis- 
entangle the life of its reader from the moral and spiritual 
implications of that philosophy. Or, to state offensively 
its purpose with respect to rationalism, it seeks to effect 
such a transformation in the life of its reader that rational- 
ism becomes the untruth. 
But although the entire pseudonymous authorship was 
oriented in the direction of Christianity, although at its 
culmination it was able to raise the problem of Christianity, 
it was nevertheless essentially Socratic in its method. iit_nd 
Kierkegaard intended that this should be so. 
"The..e cannot really be the least doubt that 
what Christianity needs is another Socrates, some- 
one who could existentially express ignorance with 
the same cunning dialectical simplicity i1 
The situation within 'Christendom' was, he believed, 
fundamentally analogous to that which Socrates had encountered 
in Athens. It differed only in that, as he believed, those 
same trends had assumed even more monstrous proportia s in his 
own day. This Kierkegaard attributed to the pow of the 
anonymous press. But although he never failed to seize the 
opportunity for private conversation Kierkegaard secretly and 
reluctantly understood that the process of "dissolution "2 had 
gone so far that it could no longer be arrested merely by such 
means. He resigned himself to the fact that he lived in the 
age of the printing press and believing that an instrument 
which had been used for the enthronement of 'the public'3 
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coi ld also be used for its disenthronement he became a 
Socrates in print. And it was to the Socratic end of calling 
forth 'the individual' from out of the mob that the entire 
pseudonymous literature was directed. 
The pseudonymous authorship does not give results: 
it refrains from offering 'positive' assistance: its con- 
fession is essentially that of ignorance or helplessness on 
the part of its author. It assumed that the truth lay within 
man and required only to be called forth: it was designed to 
promote inwardness and to prevent knowledge: it attempted to 
turn the re-der in upon himself. suite significantly these 
works were accompanied by the Edifying Discourses the stand- 
point of which is that of immanent religion.' This early 
authorship was essentially Socratic and in itself constitutes 
what is essentially a Socratic critique of rationalism. It 
was not until after the Easter experience of 18482 that Kierke- 
gaard concluded that the indirect form was "ultimately rooted 
in human intelligence "3. And when he understood this he also 
understood that it was not the final form for a critique of 
rationalism. Nor was it unull after this experience that 
there appeared a specifically Christian authorship which 
provided the new context within which the Postscript now 
stands or, as I believe, the context within which Kierkegaard 
had alr ays hoped that it would be understood. But the most 
suitable point of departure for a discussion of the significance 
of these specifically Christian and often devotional works is 
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the person of Johannes Anti -Climacus who, as the pseudonymous 
author of Sickness Unto Death and Training, in Christianily 
signalises the appearance of a new and deeper kind of indirect 
communication and who, "being a Christian in an extraordinary 
degree"' is to Johannes Climacus the "opposite extreme "2 
within ierkegaardt s own nature. These are, of course, but 
two sides of the same problem but it is from these two sides 
that the solution of the problem must be undertaken. 
Let us first consider Anti- Climacus' significance 
as a pseudonymnous author. The explanation which Lowrie gives 
for Kierkegaard's early use of the pseudonymns and indirect 
communication is basically a psychological one.3 It is true 
that in his later work Lowrie briefly touches upon the 
maieutic aspect of the authorship4 but he does not integrate 
this into what, as it appears, he regards as the real 
explanation. suite naturally, therefore, he sees in the 
Easter experience a metamorphosis which made it possible for 
him "to speak out clearly "5, to renounce "essentially the use 
of the pseudonymns "6, to indulge in "plain speaking "7. -gain, 
he says: 
"It needs to be understood that S.K. wrote 
all of these later works in his own person and 
intended to publish them in hiA own name. Anti - 
Climacus was an afterthought." 
It must certainly be said that the Journals provide ample 
evidence for this view. Perhaps it might even be said that 
this is the explanation which they tend to stress, but at 
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the same time both the Journals and many of Kierkegaard's own 
works 'present quite another picture within which this psycho- 
logical explanation attains whatever significance it is able 
to claim. In terms of this larger picture, a picture w hich 
because it is much more in keeping with Kierkegaard's thought 
is much more adequate to deal with that thought, Kierkegaardts 
use of indirect communication cannot finally be attributed to 
"his introversion "l. Unfortunately it is not possible to 
provide at this point the complete basis of this objection 
but it can be said that, in the fullest sense, Kierkegaard 
understood himself as a Socrates living within 'Christendom'. 
His problem, to state it in what are at best but unsatisfactory 
terms, was not merely that of overcoming a personal intro- 
version but AAAr that of overcoming a social extraversion. 
It was the problem of establishing essential communication 
and truly human relations between man and man in an age in 
which, as he understood it, man had become 'not -man'. 
Lowrie says that "the Easter experience was a 
radical cure he never again resorted to 'indirect 
communication', nor to the use of pseudonymns in the sense in 
which he had hitherto used them "2. In itself this statement 
is not factually incorrect but as preparatory to the View 
that the later works are non -pseudonymous and direct in nature 
it cannot pass unchallenged. It is true that this experience 
led Kierkegaard officially to renounce the form of the early 
authorship. 
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"The communication of Christianity must 
ultimately end in 'bearing witness', the maieutic 
form can never be final. For truth, from the 
Christian point of view, does not lie in the 
subject (as Socrates understood it) 'ojt in a 
revelation which must be proclaimed." 
But this 'renunciation' must not be misunderstood. From the 
side of the pseudonymns its nature is illustrated both in 
Kierkegaard's repudiation of the pseudonymns as devices 
behind which he could escape personal responsibility2 and in 
his subse(yuent employment of Anti -Climacus as the pseudonymous 
author of two of his works.. The relationship of Anti -Climacus 
to these two volumes is accidental not in the sense in which 
Lowrie understands it but rather in the sense that his name 
might as appropriately have been appended to almost any of 
these laté± :works. The fact of the matter is that all of these 
writings are pseudonymous and that they are pseudonymous in 
precisely the same sense as are the writings of Anti -Climacus. 
(To this extent at least Geismar is justified in situating the 
writings of Anti -Climacus between the 'Christian DiScoursest 
and thc'Edif iy nL Discourses' .3) .anti-Climacus is a most 
valuable sign -post and it is a great mistake to dismiss him as 
an "afterthought "4. The nature of this 'renunciation' may be 
stated again, and this time from the other side, in Kierke- 
gaard's own words. 
"It may truly be said that there is something 
socratic about me. 
"Indirect communication was my natural 
qualification. As a result of all I experienced, 
all I went through and thought out last summer on 
the subject of direct communication, I have made 
a direct communication (the thing about my literary 
47 
activity with its category: the whole thing is 
my education) and at the same time accyuired a 
deeper understanding of indirect communication, 
the new pseudonymity. "1 
The later authorship was, I believe, both indirect and 
pseudonymous and to state the sense in which this is so is 
the next problem. 
The 'introversion' which Lowrie is concerned to set 
aside is, in reality, merely Kierkegaard's modification of 
the Socratic maieutic. It is not true that Kierkegaard either 
forsook Socrates or believed that he had done so.2 Rather is 
it true that the essentially Socratic aspects of the early 
authorship were taken up into his later writings where they 
were transformed in the light of the Christian revelation. 
Listen: 
"Socratic ignorance, but nota bene modified 
by the Christian spirit, is maturity, is 
intellectually speaking what conversion is morally 
and religiously, is what it means to become a child 
again.i3 
The possibility of this transformation may be expressed in 
the following terms. Within the Socratic framework essential 
communication is possible only by means of maieutic instruction. 
Within the Christian framework, where there is the p7 omise of 
a 'before God', essential communication becomes possible for 
a single individual who addresses his communication to the 
individual. The pre -supposition and end of the former is. 
ignorance, that of the latter is faith.4 ;ithin paganism, 
Kierkegaard says ignorance is the highest expression for the 
truth but Within Christianity it is G Dd who as the Truth makes 
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possible the communication of the truth. 
"The truth can neither be communicated nor be 
received except as it were under God's eyes, 
not without God's help, not without God's being 
involved as the middle term, He himself being 
the Truth. "1 
It is God, for Kierkegaard faith in the Christian God, which 
makes possible the reconstruction of essential communication 
between man and man. 
Both the reality and the direction of this trans- 
formation may be expressed by the following comparison. The 
earlier authorship had employed "indirect communication" in 
order to place the reader before himself. The later author- 
ship continued to employ this method in order to place the 
reader before God. The essential nature of the pseudonymous 
aspect was preserved in the Christian framework within which 
his thought was presented. Similarly the essential nature of 
the maieutic aspect was preserved in these works, and 
particularly in the devotional works, whose aim it was to 
change the life as opposed to the mind of the reader. The 
Socratic method was taken up into his teachingof Christianity 
where, from Kierkegaard's point of view, it was not destroyed 
but rather fulfilled. 
These later works are of paramount importance for 
an underztanding of Kierkegaard's thought. Stressing this 
fact, Swenson has written. 
"No one can understand Kierkegaard who does not 
understand these devotional works, or assimilate 
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their content; they constitute the most adequate 
expression for his central tho grit,. the centre of 
gravity for his authorship. "1 
,lith respect to his critique of rationalism their importance 
is two -fold. They 72rovide a new context within which the 
earlier works are given a fuller significance and, not at all 
unmindful of the value of the Socratic cazegories, they never- 
theless bring new and sharper weapons to the battle. pith the 
first of these matters we may deal very briefly. Climacus 
had undertaken the examination of speculative philosophy. The 
standpoint which he adopted was not that of the immanental 
religion depicted in the accompanying 'Edi Discourses' 
but rather that of Christianity. These later works therefore 
in expressing the assumptions of the earlier provide the proper 
context in which the Postscript, indeed, in which the entire 
early authorship ought properly to be understood. 
The later authorship is to the earlier as a Christian 
literature employing a transformed Socratic method is to an 
essentially Socratic literature oriented in the direction of 
Christianity. Its attack upon rationalism is no longer merely 
Socratic, it is no longer "rooted in human intelligence ": it 
is based upon the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. It does 
not seek merely to lead its reader to make a choice but it 
seeks rather to lead that reader to choose that which, in the 
history of the race, has already been chosen for him. It 
does not seek merely the transformation of a life (although 
this it certainly does) but it proclaims (and not 
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unSocratically) that every life has, in the person of Christ, 
been transformed. It does not look merely to a life in which 
rationalism becomes the untruth but it looks backward, and 
forward, to a life in which rationalism has become the 
untruth. 
But the pseudonymns ar important not only as a 
signpost for the interpretation of Kierkegaard's work, not 
only as an indication of what is at once both the proximity 
and the distance between the views expressed in those works 
and Kierkegaard's own thought, but also as an expression of 
the same relationship between their persa ality and Kierke- 
gaard's personal reality. I employ the term 'personality' 
in connection with the pseudonymns in order to suggest that 
in themselves (and it should here be remembered that these 
works each have their own polemic against speculative 
philosophyl) they constitute an unspoken challenge to the 
psychological misinterpretation of that term. I employ the 
expression 'personal reality' in connection with Kierkegaard 
in order at once to set him above and behind any and all of 
the pseudonymns. It is in the light of Kierkegaard's own 
thought, in the light of the relationship of the individual 
to the race, ultimately in the light of 'the individual', 
that his personal nature must be understood. Personality, 
when ith is employed in the narrow or exclusive sense, is ins 
adequate to describe that nature in precisely the same way 
that individualism is inadequate to describe 'the individual'. 
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It was one of the "dialectical opposites "1 of this nature, 
one of the 'world-ward' shadows of this self, of a self which 
in being a real self could, under God, become more than a mere 
self, which he discovered in Anti- Climacus. 
"In the pseudonymous works ", Kierkegaard said, "there 
is not a single word which is mine. "2 In contrast to this he 
said, "....I am quite literally the author of the Edifying 
Discourses, and of every word in them. "3 But this distinctimi 
although quite valid in itself does not constitute a distinctioi 
between those works wich present Kierkegaard's thought and 
those which present what may be described as his essential 
thought. This distinction I understand as approximately 
parallel with the earlier one between personality and personal 
reality. No more than the earlier pseudonymous persa alities 
are to be equated with Kierkegaard's personal reality is their 
thought to be equated with his essential thought. suite 
properly Swenson, speaking of the later devotional works, says 
only that "they constitute the most adequate expression for 
his central thought.... i4 -hat all of these works do present, 
and this they do in varying degrees, is an aspect of, or 
rather, an approximation to that reality. Thus it is that at 
once they both reveal and obscure that rich multiplicity out 
of which they are produced. And Kierkegaard knew that it must 
be so. It was "the law governing (both) artistic productiai " 
and human relationships.5 "For an author ", he said, "like 





must be his on i1 w was precisely this private 
personality which he had attempted to preserve in the 
pseudonymns. 
"If in this way anybody who is unaccyuainted with 
the educative effect of companionship with an 
ideality which imposes distance, has perverted 
for himself the impression of the pseudonymous 
books by an ill -c )nceived intrusion upon my factual 
personality, if he has made a fool of himself, 
really made a fool of himself by having to drag 
the weight of my personal reality instead of having 
the doubly reflected, light ideality of a poetically 
actual author to dance with, if with paralogistic 
insolence he has deceived himself by senselessly 
extracting my private singularity out of the 
dialectic duplicity of the qualitative contrast-- - 
then this surely is not my fault, who becomingly and 
in the interest of the purity of the relationship 
have for my part decidedly done all that I could to 
prevent what a curious portion of the reading world 
(God knows in the interest of whom) has done every- 
thing to attain.i2 
Nor did the Easter experience of 1848 serve to change his mind. 
More than a year later, and in a statement which was as 
prophetic for the future as it was true for the past, he wrote: 
"But nothing about my personality as an author. i3 
This is certainly not to say that the pseudonymns 
are irrelevant to Kierkegaard's personal reality. Indeed, 
they are shadows4 cast by that reality and it was within the 
penumbra of two of these shadows that Kierkegaard found an 
anticipation of his real self. 
"To me there is something so inexplicably happy in 
the antithesis Climacus--- Anti- tlimacus, I recognise 
myself, and my nature so entirely in it that if some 
one else had discovered it I should have thought he 
had spied upon me." 
It was within the antithesis, within the penumbra of these 
two 
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shadows, rather than within either one of its constituents 
that Kierkegaard found the first substantial indication of his 
real nature. 
"...Johannes Climacus...said he was not a Christian. 
Anti -Climacus is the opposite extreme, being a 
Christian in an extraordinary degree - -- whereas I 
manage only to be quite a simple Christian." 
It is within this antithesis that the secret, so far as it has 
been or will be revealed, is revealed. Clinacus - -- nti- Climacu s 
forms "the dialectical cross of qualitative opposites in an 
ideal equilibrium "2 which bars the approach to Kierkegaard's 
personal reality. In themselves they are 'personalities' bear- 
ing witness to a personal reality. So intimately are they and 
their works related to Kierkegaard's personal reality, to his 
essential thought that they stand in open contrast to the other 
pseudonymns and their productions. They are, from either side, 
an approximation to that reality and their works reflect that 
approximation. They are, in fact, "essentially autobiographical 
But this description has yet to be placed within a much broader 
context. 
It remains now to return briefly to the earlier 
descr. intion of the movement of the pseudonymous authorship as 
that of a developing assymptotic approximation to Kier kegaardt s 
thought and nature and to the Postscript as the culmination of 
this movement. 'Approximation' because, like the later works, 
L 
it merely approaches but does not attain. 'Developing' 
because, it contrast to the later authorship, it provides many 
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variauions upon that approximation. 'Assymptotic' because 
Climacus and Anti- Climacus themselves meet not at the axis of 
the graph but rather at infinity.l This construction emphasises 
rather than denies the centrality of the later devotional works 
which, in fact, give spiritual expression to those same thoughts 
to which Climacus and Anti-Climacus have already given what is 
by comparison an intellectual expression. And, for Kierkegaard, 
it is the devotional which is the higher expression. And it is 
this which Swenson implies when he says that these devotional 
works constitute "the center of gravity for his authorship "2. 
Thus I reject Geismar's arrangement3 whereby he 
relegates the early pseudonymous works to a place "very much 
lower" than the later writings together with the static view 
of Kierkegaard's personality which such an arrangement both 
presupposes and implies. To a large extent I also reject 
Hirsch's suggestion that "if the ideas of Johannes de Silentio 
and Johannes Climacus cannot be attributed to Kierkegaard at 
least those of Vigilius Haufniensis and of.Anti- Climacus are 
his very own "4. It is not possible to discuss the matter 
fully here but it certainly must be said that "the ideas of 
Johannes de Sill ntio" were the very bases upon which Kierke- 
gaard refused to heal the breach with Regine. The ideas of 
Climacus and Anti -Climacus, their relation to the ideas of 
Kierkegaard and their affinity to each other we have already 
discussed. But with the suggestion that "those of Vigilius 
Haufniensis...are his very own" there can certainly be no 
argument. And this precisely because the ideas expressed 
there were first not his own. But therein lies our next 
problem. ' 
The Individual and the Race 
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Thus far I have attempted merely to suggest the 
manner in which Kierkegaard understood his own life and works, 
or perhaps rather, the manner in which he believed that these 
ought properly to be understood. rind having the problem of 
his critique of rationalism particularly in mind I have 
suggested that he is to be understood as a free and respm Bible 
individual, that he is to be viewed as the pe -sonal reality 
out of whom were produced the various pseudonymous personalities. 
It remains now only to sketch the context within which Kierke- 
gaard understood his own life and that may most briefly be done 
by outlining his conception of the relationship of the 
individual to the race. This conception is important for any 
study of Kierkegaard: it is of particular importance for the 
present one. That importance may perhaps be suggested by the - 
fact that this conception is itself a preliminary formulation 
of 'the individual', the category which constitutes the 
essential core of his offensive against rationalism. Further- 
more it provides the perspective Within which Kierkegaard 
understood himself, within which he believed that he had 
achieved his own freedom and, at least by implication, the 
perspective within which his reader must understand himself, 
within which he must achieve his own freedom and achieving 
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that freedom not deny it to another. That the importance of 
this conception is so repeatedly denied by the contemporary 
mind perhaps suggests somethinr2. of Kierkegaard' s judgment upon 
that mind and tflis in turn something of the manner in which a 
traditionally rationalist (or is it now romantic ?) view of 
human nature must be altered in order to comprehend both the 
depth and the height of a life which was itself directed 
against such a view. 
In contrast to both the Renaissance affirmation of 
the autonomy of the individual and the Hegelian denial of the 
reality of all merely individual existence Kierkegaard insisted 
that "the individual is himself and the race "l. And this, he 
says, "is man's perfection, regarded as a state "2. "The 
essential characteristic of human existence" he describes 
thus: 
"...man is an individual and as such is at once him- 
self and the whole race, in such wise that the whole 
race has part in the individual, and the individual 
has part in the whole race." 
Again, he says, 
"Man is distinguished from other animals...qualitatively 
by the fact that the individual is more than the species. 
it is perfection to be the individual. "4 
It is being the individual, it is understanding oneself as 
having a share in the race which constitutes that "perfection 
in oneself" which means "the perfect participation in the 
whole "5. It is this too which makes identical the history of 
the individual with that of the race. 
"No individual is indifferent to the history of the 
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race, any more than is the race to that of the 
individual. .. hile the history of the race goes 
on, the individual regularly begins afresh, 
because he is himself and the race, and hence 
in turn his is the history of the race."' 
The individual is related to the race as Adam is related to 
the race because both the individual and Ac.m is "himself and 
the racei2. And since "what explains Adam explains the race, 
and vice versai3 it is also true that what explains the 
individual explains the race and what explains the race explains 
the individual. 
For Kierkegaard it is sin, more precisely, the first 
sin, itself inexplicable,4 which explains both the individual 
and the race. It is this same sin, or rather consciousness of 
this sin -- -"the category of sin is the category of the 
individuali5 -- -which makes the individual to be the individual, 
which makes him aware of-himself as the individual and it is 
through this sin, through his responsibility for his own sin, 
that he relates himself to the race. The basis of this 
relationship is pre -figured even within the immanent religion 
of the Edifying Discourses,6 but there the account is in terms 
of ideas rather than facts, there the "generation" or the age 
is made intermediary between the individual and the race. For 
Kierkegaard the primary relationship is that of the individual 
to the race and it is through this relationship that the 
individual is able properly to relate himself to the age. This 
prerequisite of real community is most decisively presented in 
Christianity which begins "by making every man an individual, 
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an individual sinner ...."1 
"Every man is himself a sinner. He is related, 
tiD refore, not as a pure man to sinner4  but as 
a sinner to sinners: for this is the solidarity 
of all manknd in the fundamental relationship 
to Christ." 
It was, he believed, this 'fundamental relationship' alone 
which properly forged the bonds between man and man, between 
the individual and the race, between himself and his age, And 
it was in this relationship, in the discovery of himself as a 
sinner before God, in the confession of his solidarity with 
the human race3 that Kierkegaard discovered the possibility 
of real freedom and humanity. 
Although it is only poetry or mythology which can 
faithfully present this conception the view that the history 
of the individual is identical with that of the race is neither 
a poetic intuition nor an abstract dogmatic proposition: it 
is the result of neither a pantheistic diefication of man nor 
of a mystical fusion of man with God or of man with the race.4 
It is rather the reflection of Kierkegaard's own discovery 
that the Biblical categories were the categories of r.l 
humanity. It is the statement of his conviction that the 
spiritual history of the race is the true psychology, that 
freedom and responsibility have a divine rather than a human 
genesis. It is the result of his experience of himself as a 
sinner before God. It was his experience of sin which twice 
marked the boundary within his own life between Christianity 
and Hegelianism. He first embraced the Hegelian philosophy 
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when, in revolt against both his father and his father's 
faith, he rejected the essentially rationalist) view of sin 
as sensuality2 and it was not until he personally experienced 
the relevance of the Christian view of sin as the opposite of 
faith3 that he broke with his Hegelian past and returned to 
Christianity. Then it was that reflecting upon his own past 
he was able to write: 
"Every life has its Genesis and then its Exodus 
(when it goes out into the world) , its Leviticus 
when the mind turns against heaven, its Numbers 
when it begins to count the years, its Deuteronomy. u4 
But the Christian faith provided him not only with the proper 
categories wit'ï which to understand and to attack his past 
but, in its insistence upon the essential solidarity of the 
human race in sin before God, it also provided the vantage 
point from which he was to understand and attack his age. 
I have already said that Kierkegaard's attack upan 
rationalism was an attack upon his own past. It was an 
attack upon a past which was both a particular past and more 
than a particular past, upon a past which was interpreted in 
the light of the spiritual pilgrimage of the human race. He 
had understood himself and the age through himself in terms of 
the race, in terms of the life of the whole man. He had lived 
through the age not at the level of the merely historical but 
rather at that of the "essentially historical ", at a level 
where the age is known and judged in terms of cate -ories which 
belong first to the race, at a level where the Cartesian doubt 
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is experienced as a form of despair' and the Hegelian 
philosophy as a subtle expression of spiritual suicide.2 Thus 
it was that, as Kierkegaard believed, when in an age in which 
it was "a poetic and philosophic nature" which had to be put 
aside "in order to becoae a Christian "3 he was chosen for that 
task because he had himself first to put aside such a nature. 
"The thing is this, what our age needs is education. 
find so this is what happened: God chose a man who 
also needed to be educated, and educated him 
privatissime, so that he might be able to teach 
others from his own experience." 
The authorship he understood as the reflection of his own 
personal education and it was t.. is which he expressed when he 
wrote, "...my ideas are always made out to the payee, not to 
the bearer; they are made out in a particular name even when 
I am anonymous. "5 
Speaking of his own age Kierkegaard said that it 
lacked "religious education (understanding this word in the 
broadest and deepest sense)`, And, he said, "....I am he 
who himself has been educated, or whose authorship expresses 
what it is to be educated to the point of becoming a Christian'? 
But while these quotations not inaccurately describe Kierke- 
gaard's early view of the need of the age and the essentially 
Socratic authorship by means of which he endeavoured to answer 
that need they do not express his later conviction that it 
was somethL ir:g much more than education which the age required. 
;.hat was required, he came to understand, was someone who had 
rediscovered the essential framework of humanity, someone 
who 
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in his own life had related ,.dam and Christ to the age, some- 
one who could testify to the fact of sin and salvation, some- 
one who could step forth as a "witness to the truth "l. ';ïhat 
was required was someone who could relate the age to the race, 
someone who understood himself first in terms of the race and 
who was therefore truly able to understand the age in terms of 
the race. 
"The human race, like individuals, also needs 
examination or examiners in order to preserve 
its continuity. Geniuses are really the 
examiners. They develop much more slowly than 
other men, they really go through all the 
fundamental forms of existence. rind therein lies 
their significance as correctives. /bile geniuses 
prophetically show the future they do so in fact 
owing to a _profounder recollection of what has gone 
before. Development is certainly not a step back 
but a return, and this is originality. "2 
t.Ji.at was required he came to understand was that he should be- 
come the individual, the one who was both himself and the race, 
the one who understanding himself within the race was able to 
relate the age to the race and to God. 
Of his relationship to Regine Kierkegaard confessed 
that it had always been kept ih so vague a form that he had it 
in his power to give it any interpretation which he wished.3 
lfid in a sense the whole of his life was itself so vague that 
it seems possible to give it almost any interpretation which 
one wishes. But this certainly does not mean that one inter,- 
pretation is as valid as another. It was finally a deeply 
religious interpretation which Kierkegaard gave to his 
relationship to Regine4 and it is only such an interpretation 
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which ië adequate to comprehend the whole of his life. Kierke- 
gaard's was a religious existence, it was a religious existence 
quite consciously directed against the threat of a merely 
aesthetic or intellectual existence,' and it cannot properly 
be understood in aesthetic or intellectual categories both of 
which are premature expressions of the religious. The religious 
is not comprehended by these categories but rather comprehends 
them and this not merely because it appears upon a higher plane 
but equally because it is grounded in a lower, not merely 
because it comes to flower in the life of the individual but 
equally because it has its roots in the life of the race, 
because it is nourished by God. Aesthetic and intellectual 
categories are inadequate to comprehend such a life because 
failing to rel ch its depths they cannot possibly attain to its 
heights. 
Again, Kierkegaard understood his as a specifically 
Christian task and it is only the language of Christianity, 
the language of sacrifice and propitiation, which is adequate 
to describe that task. He was to be to his age as both Adam 
and Christ were to the race. He was to win again the fact of 
sin and salvation for an age which had "hoaxed" God2 which 
had refused the task of humanity, for an age which, if not 
more deeply perverse than any other, was perverse in what was 
at least a significantly different direction, for an age which 
belonged to the race in its sin but which yet was in some 
measure at least distinguished by the nature of its sin. It 
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was an age which had denied the reality of the individuals and 
of the sin. which in Christianity marked him as the individual. 
And understanding himself as the 'corrective' to this age or 
rather as the 'sacrificed'2 for such an age he resolved that 
he should himself become 'the individual'. It was to this end 
that his life was directed and it is in the light of this end, 
an end which has its genesis in the relationship of the 
individual to the race and its fulfillment in he who becomes 
Han or, more accurately, Son of man, that his life must finally 
be understood. 
It is of course possible to 'understand' Kierkegaard's 
life and works in terms of some other end or principle. It is 
possible to forget his understanding of himself as a sinner 
before Cod, to neglect his sense of solidarity with the human 
race, to deny both the basis and the reality of his freedom 
and humanity. And it is perhaps not even permitted to insist 
that such 'understandings' are wrong. But it certainly is 
permitted to say that the Kierkegaard who is thus 'understood' 
is not understood in the way in which he understood himself, 
in the way in which he understood that he must be understood. 
And equally it is permitted to say that the Kierkegaard who is 
thus portrayed is not and cannot be the Kierkegaard who 
attacked rationalism but he is rather a Kierkegaard who has 
been attacked by rationalism. 
It seems perhaps neither unnatural nor immodest to 
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assume that our own age should understand Kierkegaard better 
than any previous one. Such an assumption appears even to 
find support in Kierkegaard's own repeated insistence that he 
was merely a 'corrective' to the age. But this description, 
when understood apart from his deeper understanding of his 
task implies both too much and too little. Too much because 
secretly at least he understood that his primary task con- 
sisted in becoming the real individual, in establishing a 
barrier against his own past. Too little because he also 
understood that a profound criticism of one life was at the 
same time a relevant criticism of every other life, that a 
fundamental corrective to one age was at the same time a 
pertinent corrective to every other age. He was a 'corrective' 
to his own past, to his age, to every age because he was a 
'corrective' to man's conception of what it is to be a man, 
of what it is to be a single existing individual. He was a 
'corrective' to every age because his one problem is the 
single problem which is given to every man.in every age and 
the age which better understands Kierkegaard than any previous 
age is an age which better understands itself than any previous 
age. 
One more word in this same connection. Kierkegaardts 
is the genuinely existential formulation of a problem which 
every man must devise for himself, of a problem which is 
completely altered when its formulation is no longer 
existential. His life and works are a reflection upon this 
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problem, upon the problem of hat it :,eans that he- --that man 
a single existing individual. To this problem he brings 
no answers (at least not in the objectively valid sense of 
that word) : in the world in which he moves there are no 
answers. He will not, for example, insist that man is free: 
he will not prove that God exists. He will not even grant 
that these are subjects for intellectual deliberation.1 Put 
neither will he leave t :ese problems witho._.t an answer. The 
answer which he gives - --the answers which }.e is giving -- -are 
the answers which belong in the mouths of his readers; they 
are the answers of his interpretors. His is the genuine 
formulation, the formulation which compels the reader to give 
his own answer, to defend his own way of life. It is scarcely 
surprising that Kierkegaard has become the one in whom the age 
has declared itself, the one in whom Barth and Buber, Swenson 
and Lowrie, Haecker and ahl, even the one in whom lalen and 
Friedmann have declared themselves. Nor does the adopt ion of 
the 'objective' attitude deliver the interpretor from the 
necessity of making his own confession. From such a one, from 
both the curious and the dispassionate, Kierkegaard will have 
an answer which is not less an answer merely because it 
happens to he the wrong reply to the proper cuestiac. It is 
Kierkegaard's works alone which give fair -promise of explain- 
ing his life and thought and that because they turn the 
reader's attention in upon himself, because t'heir's is the 
genuine formulation. Their promise is neither to the 
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credulous nor to the callous, neither to he who finds on 
every page a secret nor to he who finds for every secret an 
explanation. It is instead to he who comes to find himself, 
to he who knowing that he is not man asks ".:hat is man ? ", to 
he who knowing that he is not free asks "what is freedom ? ", 
to he who knowing that he cannot ask another asks iL of him- 
self. 
It remains only to turn very briefly to to other 
problems, to one which has already been raised and to one 
which has thus far been purposely neglected. Just as white 
light is diffused into its constituent elements by being 
passed through a glass prism, just as the Nord of God, the 
Holy Bible, falls into its Genesis, its xodus....its 
Revelation simply by becoming the Word of God for man, just 
as the history of the race is divided into its separate move- 
ments by having happened within time so too is the history of 
the single individual (The history of the race is the history 
of the true individual. "The myth represents as outward that 
which occurred inwardly. "1) broken and diffused into its 
disparate phases by being viewed from the world's side, by 
being understood by man within time. So too simply by virtue 
of its appearance in the world of factual existence is personal 
reality, cradled as it were in God, broken and diffused,- --for 
Kierkegaard, 'broken and diffused into his many pseudonymns, 
into that multi -hued splendour the extreme phases of 
which 
border once again against the white light out of which 
they 
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were formed. Such were Climacus and Anti-Climacus the two 
pseudonymns which I have described as "essentially auto - 
biographica.l "1. It is only in the light of the relationship 
of the individual to the rL..ce or rather of the individual to 
the age through the race that this description c:;.n achieve 
its full significance because the antithesis thus formed (the 
antithesis Climacus -- Anti -Climacus in which Kierkegaard 
'recognised himself'2) was the antithesis in the life of his 
own age even as it is the antithesis in the life of every 
thinking man in our own age. It is the antithesis of the race, 
an antithesis which is at least inadequately e_.pressed by the 
words 'East' and ' Jest' .3 Climacus --Anti- Climacus represents 
the true union of the strongest elements of these two traditions, 
the happy marriage of Socratic wisdom and Christian responsibility 
a marriage which both preserves and unifies.4 In this it stands 
in open and marked contrast to those two other unions of these 
traditions, to the Thomist concubinage of Aristotelian science 
and Hebraic legalism and the Marxist prostitution of Judaic 
prophetism to modern positivist science. 
Now only to add something resembling the Platonic 
'good geneology' . It was when the account of Genesis had been 
replaced by a myth of the understanding,5 when Socrates had been 
systematised,6 when Christ had been taken for granted,7 it was 
when the absolute had entirely disappeared from life,8 when the 
Concept of sin had been totally dissipated,9 when "'grace' (was) 
introduced as a matter of course" ,l) it was when the errors of 
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Descartes had become explicit in the philosopi_y of Hegel, it 
was in the year 1813 that he wL:,s born. It w;..s of a breed 
which had outlived the native vigour of its youth , of a 
melancholy and morose father, of an almost unwanted mother, 
it was of a union which was indeed not a marriage that he was 
born. He spent almost the whole of his life within his own 
small land of Denmark, within his native city of Copenhagen, 
within a compass so small that he was able to observe at first 
hand the "demoralisation" toward which the whole of Europe" 
was working its way).- Indeed, he spent much of that life 
within his own family, within a family which itself expressed 
that "demoralisationi2. He spent all of his life within him- 
self and because he had himself early achieved that demoral- 
isation the remainder of that lift, was spent in making the 
return journey, in repenting himself back into the family, 
into the race, into God.3 And having accomplished this end 
he died in the year 1855 and thus fulfilled his own prophecy 
that he was an author "who historically speaking died of a 
mortal disease, but poetically speaking of longing for 
eternity, where he desires naught else but uninterruptedly 
to give thanks to God "4. 
"No, the thing is thaw when 'science' is 
undoubtedly the highest then.religion has as good 
as completely disappeared. Those are the two poles 
and one can certainly cast the horoscope of any 
generation with regard to their ethics and religion 
by discovering what they think about 'science' in 




TIC DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALISM: IO
DESCARTES TO HEGEL 
If for the moment we forget riot only the word 
'rationalism' but also .those connotations which are 
traditionally associated with -that word and if, to speak 
symbolically, we recall instead the original purpose for 
which Kierkegaard intended Johannes Climacus, we will more 
readily understand the sense in which it is proper, and 
equally the sense in which it is not proper, to speak, of 
Kierkegaard as haviig been concdrned with rationalism. 
Johannes Climacus, who finally came to birth as the author of 
Kierkegaard' s tiro, outstanding polemics against the Hegelian 
System, had originally been conceived us the title of a pro- 
posed work?- which was to have been. directed against the 
followers of Descartes. 'De omnibus dubitandumt, the 
alternative title of this work,2 in affording Kierkegaard the 
basis of his attack upon the Hegelian professors of philosophy 
of his own day3 further reflects this association. This 
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connection is, as we shall see, implicitly signified in the 
parallel criticism which he urges against both of these 
-philosophies and particularly in his charge of their scep- 
ticism) and his criticism of their failure to include an 
ethic within their systems.2 On -the basis of these facts we 
may therefore proceed with our examination of the period from 
Descartes to Hegel. This period may most conveniently be 
divided in the following manner: 'Descartes to Kant', '?he 
Romantic Movement', and 'German Idealism'. This division is 
particularly appropriate.with respect to the relationship of 
this period to Kierkegaard's thought and I would emphasise, 
it is from the point of view of that thought that I intend to 
trace this development. 
Descartes to Kant 
Descartes' discovery of analytic geometry and the 
elaboration of his famous ' cogito ergo sum' may be said to 
mark a new beginning in the history of Western thought. It 
was his successful application of algebraic formulae to the 
problems of geometry which served as the cornerstone of his 
physical science and, in freeing the age from the trammels 
of scholasticism, made possible the dream of a universal 
science. His 'cogito' implicitly identified the object as 
thought with the object as existent and thus established a 
trend which, with the exception of Kant°, was to mark the 
history of thought until the time of Hegel. 
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Despite the fact that the single debt which he 
acknowledged was that which he owed to Kepler for his 
mechanical conception of the universe and for his emphasis 
upon the concept of quantity, despite the fact that he 
attempted to explain not only organic life but even the human 
body in terms of purely mechanical laws, Descartes had no con- 
ception of the universe as essentially mathematical in its 
structure or nature. He was a mathematician whose immediate 
and avowed purpose it was 'to master and control nature' and 
who, to that end, like Galileo,' imposed the language and method 
of mathematics upon the' phenomena of nature. And, either 
because, as histories of philosophy are inclined to suggestl, 
he remembered the fate of- Galileo, or, as Kierkegaard holds, 
because he was a "venerable, humble and honest thinker ", 
because he "did what he said and said what he did ", because 
"he did not doubt in matters of faith ",2 he protested that his 
method was not applicable to 'poetry, history and divinity'. 
It was this advice which was neglected by his follow:?,rs and 
explicitly set aside in Leibniz and .iolff. 
Leonardo da Vinci's d 1sclosure by means of his 
mathematical method of the regularities and recurrences within 
nature and, within this method, the dominantly rationalist 
emphasis of Kepler and the em_ iricist emphasis of Galileo, were 
the historical antecedents of the mathematical method of Des- 
cartes. It was the former of these emphases which, having 
captured the imagination of Descartes, led him to strive for 
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the establishment of a science of nature which would be 
essentially deductive in its method. Despite his later con- 
cessions respecting the value of empirical investigation the 
general pattern of thought which he adopted was one of mathe- 
matical and, to that extent, dogmatic rationalism. In the 
flood tide of the mathematical method which followed rational- 
ism appeared as the main current with empiricism as a mere eddy. 
It was Descartes' failure to consider seriously the 
problems of metaphysics, and of ethics, together with the out- 
standing success of his analytic geometry which prompted him to 
deal with nature as with an essentially mathematical object. 
This same success, however, seemed to his followers to indicate 
that his method was nothing less than the key with which to 
discover the very essence of nature itself. The result was 
that for the Cartesians who adopted this new «mechanical 
scholasticism' man, who for Descartes had been conceived purely 
in terms of thought, became but part of an exclusively 
mechanical :universe in which everything was accounted for in 
terms of the geometrical properties of space and the physical 
laws of motion. Ethics, if considered at all, was dominated 
by the reining rationalist temper while metaphysics was given 
over to the justification of physical science rather than to 
the examination of its presupposition. 
Despite the ascendancy of Cartesian rationalism it 
remained for those who preferred the empiricism of Galileo to 
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prepare the way for Newton in whose physics the claims of 
rationalism and empiricism were reconciled. 21trough insist- 
ing upon the necessity of empirical investigation both as a 
means of arriving at principles and of obtaining final 
verification he was able, 'erith his calculus, to provide 
evidence for the claim of mathematics to describe the motions 
of natural bodies. In thus accepting and validating the 
Cartesians' implicit assumution that the universe was ultimately 
mathematical in its nature he at once justified the method of 
Descartes and gave real expression to the highest hopes of his 
followers. Thus by justifying the employment of a mathematical 
logic through the elaboration of a mathematical metaphysics 
and by his synthesis of the rationalist and empiricist emphasis 
of the eatlier scientists newton marked the final triumph of 
sevent tenth century science and equated as coterminous its two 
leading concepts, Nature and Reason, the rational and the 
natural. 
Although the mathematical method was without meta- 
physical basis until Newton's discovery of the calculus it was 
already widely employed before his time. .;hereas Descartes 
had thought it necessary to call upon God as the guarantor of 
his knowledge of the external world, Spinoza felt justified in 
assuming that the mind, because of the affinity of its structure 
with that of the universe, was capable of intuitively recognis- 
ing the truth. To him it appeared as indubitable that the 
surest foundations of truth lay not in an appeal to 
the fallible 
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testimony of sense experience but rather in the clear and 
distinctive intuition of geometrical propositions. It was but 
a short step from Spinoza's attempt to deal With the passions 
and emotions of men as if they w .re but a part of a geometrical 
system to Locke's expressed hope for a deductive system of 
religion and ethics. To him there appeared to be no reason why 
those methods which had been employed with so much success in 
the physical sciences should not be applied with equal success 
to human problems. It was this identification of the rational 
with the natural which, although not yet explicitly confirmed 
even within the sphere of the natural sciences was to character- 
ise the thought of the age. 
Leibniz represents a considerable advance upon both 
Descartes and Spinoza, a marked contrast with Newton and, in 
some respects, an anticipation of Kant. Whereas Descartes had 
merely employed a mathematical logic in his descri,tion of 
nature Leibniz posited a 'divine clock -maker' whose presence 
guarantees the harmony of bodies and souls, of truths of fact 
and truths of reason. In his universe of 'pre- established 
harmony' in which the obj ects of nature act in accordance With 
the pure laws of thought, creation is merely a transition from 
'essence' to 'existence', from 'possibility' to 'actuality'. 
mature is a product of divine mathematics. The eternal truths 
of reason constitute the essence of the divine mind. Ind, 
whereas Spinoza merely modelled his phi- ._osophy upon the science 
of mathematics Leibniz formulated the idea of a universal logic 
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and language which, because of the necessity and universality 
of its primary notions and its evident criterion of truth, was 
to be to philosophy as his calculus had been to physics. In 
contrast to the marked empiricism of Newton and his British 
contemporaries, and in anticipation of Kant's critical thought, 
Leibniz held that the mind has a creative function in the act 
of knowledge. Moreover, having asserted that such scientific 
categories as space, time and causality do not actually belong 
to that which is ultimately real, he was able to establish a 
distinction between those appearances which are presented to 
the sense and the realities which are known by the roa.3on. 
This contrast he formulated in the opposition between the world 
of alleged and that of true scientific knowledge. Of special 
interest with respect to Kant is his concern with the nature 
of time and his essentially aesthetic intuition of existence. 
In Leibniz' theory of monads is to be found also the view that 
ideas are the constituent elements of life and that the 
relative darkness and clarity of these ideas are the deter- 
minative factors in the psychical life. These views, as they 
were taken up and reinterpreted. by Wolff, came to exercise a 
profound influence upon the psychology of the German Enlighten - 
ment. 
rilthough itself neither popular nor influential, the 
philosophy of Leibniz, as it was taken over and adapted by 
Wolff, gave expression to the unformed and inarticulate thought 
of the age and in so doing proved to be the decisive factor 
in 
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the formulation of the thought of two gener...tions of German 
philosophers and theologians. It w.s, in fact, the central 
impulse of the Enlightenment or Äufklärung. Like Leibniz, 
Wolff judged the universe to manifest a perfect and pre- 
established order in which that alone is true which can be 
demonstrated with logical and necessary certainty. The universe 
he held to be the embodiment of a rational principle the logical, 
basis of :which is the principle of sufficient reason. Truth is 
rati:;nally deduced from the innate contents of the mind: ex- 
perience is at best contingent and confirmatory. 'Pure reasons 
is the way to truth and to God. Much impressed by the ' incontro- 
vertible certainty' of the mathematicians Wolff sought to 
formulate his theology after the patterns laid down by the 
science of mathematics. By means of mathematical demonstration 
he attempted to present the Christian doctrine in such a way 
that it could not reasonably be rejected. The possibility of 
a revelation he attempted to prove on the ground that God can 
do anything which He wishes. Yet such a revelation cannot 
contradict reason nor any conclusi)n which may be deduced by 
reason. Thus it was that through ..iolff the Christianity of the 
Enlightenment came to be primarily concerned with natural 
theology and morality. The age of the Enlightenment had now 
begun. pietism had been overthrown at Halle. Natural religion 
became the most popular subject upon which to write. The 
Church became an instrument of the Enlightenment: its offices 
were filled by 'olffinns who regarded as revelation only 
that 
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which satisfied the demands of reason and who held that the 
content of Scripture could be shown to be entirely in accord 
with reason. Christianity was made to conform with the 
religion of reason: its historical revelation was accorded 
the status of a mere announcement.l 
The tremendous influence of the Enlightenment upon 
the thought of the Church was due more than anything else to 
the fact that Pietism, which at the end of the seventeenth 
century had successfully vanuished Lutheran orthodoxy, had 
failed to provide intellectual leadership to fill the vacuum 
which it had thus created. The result was that the field Was 
claimed by the champions of the German Enlightenment who, with 
their emphasis upon critical and constructive work prepared 
the way for a tremendous reconstruction in theology wrllch was 
to spread throughout Protestantism. These men were concerned 
to establish the necessary character of religious truths on 
some bases other than that of revelation and in this attempt 
tended to stress theology at the expense of the spiritual 
aspect of religion. Dogmas came to be viewed apart from their 
spiritual import: philosophy became independent of Scripture 
and, in the form of theology, established the principles for 
its interpretation. Through the influence of Baumgarten 
English Deism, princi-oally in the form of Toland's Thristianity 
Not Mysterious (1696)- and Tindal's Christianity as Old as 
Creation (1730) , had been introduced into German where it 
attained very great favour. These works asserted that 
whatever 
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is beyond the power of reason is superstition and raust accord- 
ingly be abolished. Without denying Christianity they main- 
tained that -all which was valuable within it had already been 
presented in naturl religion. In Germany itself the period 
was marked by the work of the church historian Johann Lorentz 
von Mosheim (16.7 - 1755) and the rationalist Hermann Samuel 
Reimarus (1594 - 1768), w':.o explicitly made morality, 
immortality and the existence of the Creator the concerns of 
reason working purely within the context of natural religion. 
Mention must also be made. of the textual and historical 
criticism of Jean le Clerc (1657 - 1736), Johann Albrecht 
Bengel (1687 - 1752) , Jean Astruc (1684 - 1766) , Edelmann 
(1698 - 1767), and, after the middle of the century, besides 
the work of Reimarus on the life of Christ,. the critical work 
of Johann August Ernesti (1707 - 1781), Semler (1725 - 1791) 
and Johann Gottfried Erchor (1752 - 1827), as well as the' more 
philosophical work of Gotthold Ephriam Lessing (1729 - 1781) 
and Moses Mendelssohn (1729 - 1786) . 
By the middle of the eighteenth century the 
philosophy of ''folff had been largely replaced by Jolffianism 
which was itself an uneasy combination of the systematised 
rationalism of Wolff as it had derived from Leibniz and the 
empirical philosophy of Christian Thomasius as it derived from 
Locke. :- _lthough in the course of its development this 
eclecticism adhered more closely to the rationalist than to 
the empiricist tradition its distinctive contribution lay 
in 
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the direction of empirical psychology rather than speculative 
metaphysics. Although this interest was in part due to the 
advance of English psychology the decisive impulse was 
imparted by Rousseau whose tremendous influence was in large 
measure responsible for the revision of the Enlií 'htenment 
psychology. This advance is symbolised in Tetens three -fold 
division of consciousness into the feeling, the understanding 
and the will, which was later adopted by Kant as the basis of 
his work. It was the clash of tempers between this and the 
succeeding age, between the rationalist and the romantic, 
which accounted for the preponderant importance attached to 
both the feeling and the understanding as opposed to the 
and which, towards the close of the period of the Enlighten- 
ment and the beginning of the Romantic era, led to the full 
recognition of feeling as an independent aspect of the life 
of consciousness. The relevance not only of this distinction 
but of the independence of feeling is declared in the rantian 
distinction between the theoretical and the practicalrear!on 
and in the limitations which he attributed to the former. 
But before it is possible to pass on either to a consideration 
of the Romanticism which replaced the Enlightenment or to 
Kant's justification of the Romantic protest of faith it is 
necessary to turn back in order to d;orisider briefly the thought 
of Lessing, Hamann and Jacobi in whom is prefigured the shape 
of much that is to follow. 
Lessing's was one Of the most significant voices 
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raised against the Enlightenment from within the age itself. 
He rejected orthodoxy, pietism and rationalism. For him 
religion was essentially a matter of the heart, of feeling. 
It remained untouched by either historical or philosophical 
criticism. His religion WL..s to quote Garland, a "peculiar 
blend of faith and rationalism". The various positive 
religions he viewed as .stages in the development of mane "All 
positive religions are true and false in equal degrees. "2 The 
significance of religion for man is fundamentally ethical. 
The forms of the various. religions are a matter of indifference 
as compared with the conduct which they inspire in their 
adherents. It is heroic obedience with which he is concerned; 
obedience to God's laws because they are God's 1 ors and not 
for any accompanying reward or punishment. This attitude was 
reflected in his view of the Christian faith the most important 
part of which, he said, was its exhortation to love.3 Jesus 
he viewed as a moral teacher rather than the centre and object 
of a personal faith: the Scriptures he viewed as the exponent 
of natural religion and its morality. The revelation of the 
Christian faith brought to the human race nothing which human 
reason, if left to itself, could not finally discover. It 
serves only to accelerate the imparting of knowledge and when 
this has been once accomplished the revelation as such ceases 
to have any value.4 
Although he consistently opposed the Enlightenment 
theology which based its proofs for the existence of God upon 
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the purposiveness of natur?. he was, at least on his own 
confession, an adherent of Spinoza. r'o ' him, God, instead 
of being a personal diety, was the soul of the world. The 
'one and all' which he derived from Spinoza was, after his 
death not only the source of disagreement and disappointment 
to ]:endelssohn and Jacobi, but equally a source of inspiration 
and joy to Goethe and Herder. 
Like Lessing, Hamann and Jacobi, who represent a 
pre -Romantic protest against the period, are essentially 
related to an understanding of Kant, of Hegel, and of Kierke- 
gaard. It is Hamann who not only foreshadows the transition 
to the Romantic period but who stands himself as a source for 
both Kierkegaard and Hegel. And it was his 'philosophy of 
faith' which was for Kant the premonition of Hegelian Idealism 
which he finally and completely rejected in his Oriticue of 
Judgment. Jacobi saw that for Kant existence was not a real 
predicate, that it was not known in the same manner in which 
other things are known. He therefore declared that exist- 
ence was known only through 'aesthetic intuition' or faith. 
In opposition to the philosophy of the Enlightenment 
Hamann denied the claim of reason to comprehend reality within 
a logical system. _', xistence is prior to, gre,:.ter than, and 
opposed to discursive thought. The historical revelation of 
the Christian faith is in direct opposition to reason. The 
historical fact of the Cross is the final refutation of the 
terminology of metaphysics. Reason he equated with 
the 
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mathematical thought of Cartesianism and ;olffianism: 
rational thought he characterised by its reliance upon the 
principle of contradiction. But such reason, he held, was 
given to man only in order to make him aware of his ignorance 
and his folly. 
1 
Faith in contrast is a personal relationship 
-ith God which is the gift of God. It is something entirely 
different from morality which, no more than reason, is the 
way to God. It is faith which is the basis of life and the 
groundwork of knowledge. 
Jacobi likewise distrusted the power of logical 
demonstration and denied the final validity of scientific laws 
with respect to man's knowledge of nature. Ultimate knowledge, 
he held, must come through the intuition. This faculty by 
which spiritual truth is perceived he first termed intuition, 
feeling or faith, but later, adopting the terminology provided 
by the Kantian philosophy, he designated it as reason in 
contradistinction to scientific reason to which he gave the 
name understanding. For Jacobi it is this .faith or reason 
alone which aets a man before the Absolute and so makes 
possible the life of the whole man', and it is this reason, 
as opposed to the understanding, which is taken up through 
sichte into Hegelianism where it forms the basis of human 
history and thought. 
Jacobi confessed that he could neither refute 
Spinoza nor prove his own belief in a personal God existing 
apart from the world. As an alternative he took refuge in 
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his 'salto mortale' which, in a now- famous conversation,' he 
advocated to Lessing as an excape from pantheism. But his 
eloquence was in vain: Lessing protested that his legs were 
too old for such a leap. It was the year following this 
conversation that Kant's Critique of Pure Reason appeared. 
But meanwhile the blithe optimism of the Enlighten- 
ment was being sharply challenged from another quarter. Humefe 
sceptical attack upon the validity of the law of causality 
and the principle of necessary connection not only revealed 
the ultimate unacceptability of empiricism but also undermined 
the very foundations upon which. Newtonian science and Volffian 
rationalism had been founded. It was, on his own confession, 
sceptical attack which awakened Kant_from his 'dogmatic 
slumbers' in the school of metaphysical rationalism and spurred 
him on to the formulation of his own critical thought. 
In opposition both the extreme emphasis upon 
deductive reasoning at the expense of empirical investigation 
and the dogmatic metaphysics of Wolffian rationalism Kant 
sought to arbitrate the claims of rationalism and empiricism 
and, at the same time, to free epistemology from its depend- 
ence upon the dogmatic assumptions which characterised the 
`.iolffian philosophy of the Enlightenment. In contrast to both 
the rationalism of /olff and the empiricism of Locke he main 
tained the validity of reason and the concepts of reason in 
so far as these are employed within the bounds of human 
ex- 
perience. In contrast to the metaphysical or 
dogmatic 
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rationalism which involved the contention that the universe 
is the work of an infinite intellect Kant held that the truth 
of experience is self sufficient apart from such assumptions. 
In short, he rejected the metaphysical rationalism of the older 
dogmatic systems and replaced it by a new attitude of critical 
rationalism according to which the limits of the knowledge of 
the theoretical reason are coterminous with the boundaries of 
human experience. e thus was led not only to dismiss as un,. 
tenable the traditional proofs for the existence of God but 
at the same time to furnish the ground for the aomantic protest 
that man is something more than merely intellect, that, in a 
world where scientific knowledge was incapable of penetrating 
reality and existence, faith was finally justified. 
The implication of Kantfs critical philosophy may be 
best illustrated by recalling its actual genesis. Newtonian 
physics had assumed the validity of the law of cause and 
effect: Hume had denied that we can have knowledge of the 
operation of any such law: Kant, in contradistinction, sought 
to reaffirm the causal relationship as both necessary and 
universal. It was his attempt to justify the employment of 
this category which led him to the realisation that, far from 
having the burden of hut one such proof upon it, "metaphysics 
consists altogether of such (i.e. a priori) connections.' 
The required universality and necessity Kant achieved not with 
the demonstration that such universality and necessity inhere 
in the external world of objects but rather with the insistence 
8r, 
that the categories ari the forms under which alone it is 
possible to have k owledge. ihereas he had earlier held 
that the world as known by the senses was merely phenomenal, 
while the world as known by the mind was, in actual fact, the 
real or objective world, he was not forced to conclude that we 
have scientific knowldge of the world of phenomenal experience 
alone. ThLs final co13cestion, and hence the entire critical 
philosonhy, had to wait for the realisation that it is the 
pure concepts of the understanding alone which make possible 
objects as objects of knowledge, _ant's 'refutation' of Hume 
was not, therefore, to show that causality is operative in 
the noumenal or objective world but rather to demonstrate 
that, because these categories are the necessary and universal 
conditions of all knowledge, the objects of the phenomenal 
world appear to us, of necessity, under the forms of the 
categories. 
Kant does not doubt that we have experience, per- 
ception or knowledge. 1ith this as his starting point he 
asks only "./hat are the conditions of such experience ?" In 
this respect he opposes at the very beginning his own critical 
or transcendental method to the rationalist method of Descartes 
and .rolff both of whom seek to deduce the fact of existence. 
Like Hume, Kant holds that the existence of an object is not 
deducible, that it is irreducible to a concept. This is the 
conclusion which is reached in the Critique of Pure Reason 
which maintains that man's theoretical reason enables 
him to 
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know or to have a rational experience of the object as it is 
known but never as it is, of the phenomenal object but never 
of the noumenal, of things as they appear to man's imperfect 
mind but never as they might appear to a perfect mind. In 
short, through the theoretical reason "we can only know a 
phenomenal world which we make in the act of knowing it "l. 
It is this which in effect, Chestov confesses when he claims 
that Kant exiled his wonders into the field of the thing-in- 
itself. 
2 
In contrast to this, the Criticyue of Practical 
Reason maintains that, through the exercise of the practical 
re-son, whi ch Kant identifies with the will or the source of 
dutiful action, man encounters the noumenal :orld, or reality 
itself, in his pursuit of ethical ends. Existence which 
escapes man's theoretical reason is morally experienced by 
the practical reason. God, for the idea of whom there is for 
the first Critique no corresponding objective existence emerges 
in the second as the source of moral law. Man is no longer 
confronted by God in the form of J.n object of theoretical 
knowledge, as the conclusion of a syllogism or as the result 
of a proof but he is instead confronted by God in the form of 
absolute obligation which, under the 'pressure' of the Kantian 
distinction between acting from inclination and from duty, is 
transformed into a mere respect for law. The dissipation of 
this valuable insight, the reduction of the life of man to the 
respectful acceptance of a legalistic formula was, to quote 
Professor John Baillie, "the last absurdity of the eighteenth 
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century "l. In place of the God of the Aristotelian and 
Anselmian proofs he posits a God who is a mere legislator, 
a God who becomes nothing more than the guarantor of private 
morals and public order. 
One of the most significant features of Kant's 
thought is his attempt to seriously come to terms with the 
problem of time. Although, like his valuable insight into the 
nature of man's relationship with God, this insight is, 
partly through its Leibnizian inheritance, partly through 
his own intellectual background, finally dis s ipat ed2: its 
recognition marks a significant departure from the 
distinctively Greek tone of post- Renaissance thought. The 
Hebraic- Christian view of time as given with and existing 
within the soul of man rather than, as in reek thought, 
,iven prior to creation and having its own objective exist- 
ence in nature, is recognised for the first time in :iestern 
thought by Augustine who held that time itself had a beginn- 
ing and was therefore limited.3 This view is partially 
reflected in the Kantian view according to which time belongs 
to and has its existence within the soul of man rather than 
having its existence within objective nature. The importance 
of th_s question may be indicated by recalling that its 
cruciality was recognised and refused by Lessing, that the 
question was rendered meaningless by Hegel, that it was again 
accepted as critical by Kierkegaard and finally, that 
?ietzsche 4;ß..s so impressed by its importance that he 
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endeavoured to re- establish the cyclical time of the Greeks. 
The Icomantic -ovement 
Although the Romantic movement was i finally to de- 
rive its justification from Kant's critical philosophy, it 
was, in its original manifestation, a literary revolt against 
the utilitarian rationalism of the -enlightenment. Rousseaút s 
emphasis upon the importance of the feelings as opposed to 
the intelligence together with ,the Spinmzism of Lessing and 
the quasi- artistic, quasi- biological naturalism of Goethe 
were combined in Herder through whom they formed the basis of 
a strong Romantic movement in Germany which was to overthrow 
the intellectualism and rationalism of the Enlightenment in 
the same way that Pietism, with its emphasis upon the feelings, 
had, a century earlier, overthrown Lutheran orthodoxy and 
scholasticism. It was finally taken up by both Schleiermacher 
C on1F0 -4 
e lefi D 2 
and Hegel in whom it declares its own internal apitta+ . 
In place of the mechanistic universe of the Enlight- 
enment the Romantics saw striving and growth within 1Tature. 
The real world, they held, was striving toward the realisation 
of ideals and was, for this reason, to be known only in terms 
of feeling and personal aspirations. In place of the external 
diety of the rationalists, whether metaphysical or moral, 
they 
saw God as the soul or life of the universe. 
Of this universal 
life of God all things were a part but man 
was essentially the 
89 
highest expression. It w.. s this Romantic identification of 
God with Nature which accounted for the tremendous popularity 
and influence of Spinoza upon the movement. The task of re.- 
interpreting his scientific religion, of translating it fron 
the terms of Cartesian science into those of Romantic poetry, 
was undertaken by Herder who, in his combining of all of these 
divergent elements became the father of German Romanticism. 
Like Rousseau however, and unlike Spinoza, he founded all 
truths upon the feelings. It was, he said, an inner un- 
analyzable certainty which was more akin to faith than reason. 
From Rousseau, Lessing and Goethe he derived his own interest 
in the forms of primitive life and it was from this interest 
that he was led to develop and formulate the idea of an 
historical evolution. 
In addition to the thought of Spinoza and Rousseau 
Christian pietism was, for German Romanticism, as it had been 
for Kant, an important formative element. It was from the 
Pietist emphasis upon "the possibility of a direct and un- 
mediated experience "1 of unity with God that the Romantic 
emphasis upon the individual was ultimately derived. It is 
in the thought of Schleiermacher that this relationship 
between pietism and romanticism became explicit. 
Schleiermacher (1768 - 1834) had been educated 
by 
the foravians, had later come under the influence 
of 'Jolff and 
Semler and finally emerged as the champion of 
Romanticism 
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within the field of religious thought. In opposition both to 
the orthodox view of religion as bw_:sed upon assent to the 
truths of revelation and obedience to the will of God and to 
the r,.,tionalist view of religion as the acceptance of natural 
theology and its universal morality, he held that the sole 
basis of religion is feeling, moro specifically, a feeling of 
dependence, and that this feeling finds its most adequate object 
in the Christian revelation. Doctrines are but the forms in 
which abiding truth expresses itself. Religion is not 
primarily a matter of conduct alth ;ugh right conduct flows 
from right religion. 
German Idealism 
Before it is possible to understand the relationship, 
or to speak more correctly, the lack of relationship, between 
Kant and the German Idealist philosophy it is necessary to 
c istinguish between two alternative interpretations of the 
Kantian philosophy, between the critical interpretation which 
I have attempted to expound and the dogmatic interpretation 
which Fichte adopts and from which he proceeds with the develop- 
ment of his own thought. The special relevance of this dis- 
tinction nay be seen from the fact that, as we shall see,1 
both of these alternative interpretations of the Kantian 
philosophy appear in Kierkegaard's own works. The explanation, 
indeed, the justification, of - ichte's interpretation is to be 
found in the fact that while the 'dogmatic Kant' is tempor<_.11y 
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prior to the 'critical Kant' the older form of his thought is 
present along with, and at times, within the newer or critical 
formulation of his thought. It is this willingness to sacrifice 
consistency in the interest of comprehensiveness which provides 
a show of evidence for those who, on the one hand, claim that 
he was 'still in bondage to the thought which he was contro- 
verting'', and who, on the other hand, see in him merely the 
percursor of Hegelianism. That Kant was fully alive to the 
possibility of the Hegelian philosophy may be seen, as we have 
said, from his opposition.to Hamann's 'philosophy of faith'. 
The historical roots of Gern,an Idealism are to be found not in 
the 'critical Kant' but rather in Fichte's misinterpretation of 
Kant. Again, the real historical roots of German Idealism are 
to be found in Lessing and the Romantic movement and, in 
particular, in the Romantic adaptation of the thought of 
Spinoza. It is from these sources, from Lessing and Spinoza 
particularly, that German Idealism derives its Greek concept 
of time and its Greek mythos of life which was finally and 
fully revealed only in the thought of Hegel. 
,ithin the Kantian critical philosophy the thing -in- 
itself has a real if not a logically consistent function. It 
stands, as we have suggested, within his epistemology as the 
sign or symbol of the beyondness of all merely cognitive ex- 
perience. Although this insight was not lost upon Kierkegaard 
it was for Fichte the 'Achilles heel' of the entire 
system 
upon which he fastened and which he rejected 
as being without 
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explanation or functions As a result, unlike Kant whose 
point of departure was his analysis of the act of perception, 
he adopted as the starting point of his philosophy the Ego 
which itself approximates to the Kantian unity of apperception. 
The Ego is the ultimate reality: it exists because it posits 
itself but it is known only in its positing of, or in its 
opposition to, the non -ego or the world of objects. The Ego 
is, in reality, merely an abstraction from the synthesis of 
opposites by which intelligence exists. The go ,.end the non - 
ego, whose reality is subordinate to and dependent upon the 
Ego, are inexplicably bound together in perception: all 
reality is a reality within consciousness. 
Both2ichte's dogmatic interpretation of Kant and his 
departure from this interpretation are seen in his solution of 
the epistemological problem. As an alternative to dogmatism 
which he judged to be incapable of passing from things to the 
consciousness of things, from the real to the ideal, he pro- 
posed an idealism which concerned itself only with the exist- 
ence of things within consciousness rather than with the 
objective existence of objects as such, with ideal existence 
rather than with concrete existence. It is this implicit 
identification of ideal existence with real existence, this 
failure to distinguish between the object as it is known and 
the object as it is, which finally declared itself in the 
Hegelian identification of the rational with the real. 
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The Romanticism which was latent in the philosophy 
of Fichte boldly declared itself in the thought of Schelling 
who, in contrast to Fichte's provisional distinction between 
consciousness and the content of consciousness, declares that 
it is only by artistic intuition that we are able to conceive 
mind and nature, the subject and object in their inner unity. 
In the later development of his thought which represents not 
only a reaction against Hegelianism but also to an appreciable 
degree, a movement in the direction of the thought of riierke- 
gaard, he explicitly admits the presence of "an irrational, i.e. 
a something which is impervious to thought ...."1 This later. 
development not only marks a reaction against Hegelian specu- 
lation and scientific emphasis but at the same time ag rees with 
critical philosophy in its prescription of the limitations of 
knowledge. 
While Hegel must be viewed in his relauion to Roman- 
ticism and to the thought of Fichte and Schelling. he is not to 
be properly understood apart from what he himself called 'the 
bath of Spinoza' 2. Unlike Kant for whom the problem of 1Q ow- 
ledge was the specific problem of philosophy and like Spinoza 
who denied the ultimate validity of the subject- object dis- 
tinction Hegel explicitly identified the rational with the 
real. Spinoza had assumed that the structure of the mind was 
similar to that of the universe: Hegel declared that reason 
was the basis eaf being. Spinoza looked to the idea 
of a 
passionless truth: Hegel rejoiced in the advent 
of the long - 
awaited scientific truth. Spinoza formula'ed his 'Ethica' 
more geometrico: Hegel insisted that the Vorstellungen 
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(pictorial representations) of religion must be replaced by 
the Begriffe (conce,2ts) of the logical reason. Spinoza in- 
sisted that man must eliminate from his ethics all wishes, 
struggles and passion: Hegel taught that man must raise 
himself above the particular to the universal. Spinoza held 
that the science of mathematics must serve as the model for 
philosophy: Hegel identified man's hi -;hest self with univer- 
sal reason. Spinoza had sought to grove not that God exists 
but that existence was God:1 Hegel attached great importance 
to the proofs, particularly the' ontological, for the exist- 
once of God.- Spinoza explicitly identified essence and 
existence: Hegel implicitly made this identification.3 But 
whereas Spinoza had held that both extension and thought are 
attributes of substance Hegel accepted only the latter of 
these attributions.4 end whereas Spinoza had conceded that 
"God's reaon and will differ toto caelo from human reason 
L.ncl will "5, Hegel urged his 'universal re_. on' as a new con- 
cept for God. He had, as Buber says, "transformed the human 
essence from earth to heaven16. 
Dior Hegel it is this universal or philosophical 
reason, which he identifies with 'Spirit'7, which is the basis 
of being, the rational order of the universe, the a priori 
structure of reality. The medium with -.hich this reason 
operates is that of the c Jncrete universal concept in the un- 
folding of which the inner structure of reality is revealed. 
Bach concept bears within it some aspect of the Absolute 
and, 
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when fully developed according to the pattern of thesis, 
antithesis and synthesis, is seen to be itself a part of 
that Absolute. Individuals and facts, insofar as they are 
merely individuals and facts, remain essentially irrational 
and unreal until they are viewed as aspects of a larger whole. 
The distinction between the created and the mn- created is no 
longer valid. The rational order is only in part revealed in 
the order of chronological events. "History does not 
demonstrate: it merely illustrates." Truth and falsehood 
are no longer sharply differentiated: nothing is wholly 
false, nothing wholly true. Faith and knowledge are essential- 
ly one. Religion and philosophy have the same Object and it 
is impossible that the content of positive religion should 
contradict human reason. Rational or scientific thought 
recognises the true religious content of. Christianity and seeks 
merely to rid it of those imperfections which are inherent in 
the form of its historical development. It is philosophy alone 
which is capable of giving an adequate formulation to the con- 
. tent of feeling. The historical Christ is made to disappear 
and in His place there is n_nosited the enshrinement of "a grand 
metaphysical idea "l, the "od -man as a living person is re- 
placed by a logical construction of the universal reason.' 
Although himself a Romantic and ultimately not far 
from Schleiermacher3 Hegel insisted that feeling was the 
low- 
est form of consciousness while the imagination, 
understanding 
and reason, were the successively higher forms. 
nithough each 
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of these has its role in religion neither the feeling nor 
the iiagin,ation are the proper seat of piety. The task for 
speculative philosophy is to reinterpret religion in the 
light of speculative thought. Thus the inevitable contra- 
dictions in which faith becomes entangled because of its 
absolute distinction between God and man are overcome 
by speculative thought. Faith possesses the right content 
but this content must be given its proper form by speculative 
thought. Hegel's accomplishment in this direction is sig- 
nified in the closing, words of his Philosophy of .Leligiun 
where he says: "These lectures have had as their aim to 
reconcile reason with religion, and to interpret religion in 
its manifold forms as necessary. "1 
Unlike Kant vitae recognised the significance of time 
Hegel knows only a time which is essentially circular in move- 
ment and which is therefore subject to logical predication. 
His failure to appreciate the significance of time is 
reflected in his conviction of the ultimate non -reality of 
history and in his conviction that the meaning of the universe 
is to be detected in an a priori structure which is apparent 
only to the universal reason, which, indeed, is itself the 
universal reason going its undeflectable way through history 
realising itself in the various contingent events of 
terrestial chronology. 
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-:iith regard to the whole of post-Renaissance thought 
T. E. Hulme writes: 
"k11 thought since the Renaissance, in spite of its 
apparent variety, forms one coherent whole... It 
all rests on the same conception of the nature of 
man and all exhibits the same inability to recognise 
the meaning of the dogma of original sin. (In this 
period not only have) its philosophy, its literature 
and its ethics been based upon this new conception 
of man as fundamentally 
l 
good, as sufficient, as the 
measure of things 
What he calls "the essential unity of the Renaissance 
tradition" is described by Patrick in the following words: 
"In a very real sense, Hegel is the fulfillment of 
Descartes. Descartes gave modern European thought 
its two essential qualities of intellectualism and 
secularism, the first by his emphasis upon pure 
thought as the distinctive quality of humanity, the 
second by his ddi.stic relegation of God to a place 
where, though formally recognised at the outset, He 
received no further consideration in the development 
of his system. On this basis, succeeding philosophers 
continued to build and Hegel acheived the most per- 
fect structure of intellectualistic secularism which 
the world has known." 
But while tae :s an essential unity in the Renaissance 
tradition there is at the same time an underlying diversity. 
It was this diversity which declared itself in Descartes, 
passion for certainty, in Spinoza's fear lest the passions of 
man should interfere in the discovery of truth, and finally, 
upon the broader stage of the history of thought, in the 
Romantic movement. Hegel is, therefore, not merely the ful,- 
fillment of Descartes but he is equally the fulfillment of the 
anti -thesis of Descartes: he is, in fact, the fulfillment 
of 
the Romantic protest against Descartes. He brings, 
therefore, 
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to the Renaissance not merely the simple fulfillment of its 
development but rather the transformation of its thought, 
the revelation of its own secret meaning. He brings a new 
significance to the word 'rationalism'. 
"No, the whole concept of objectivity, which has 
been made into our salvation, is merely the food 
of sickness, and the fact that it is admired as 
the cure simply proves how fundamentally 
irreligious our age is, for that saving factor 




KIERKEGAARD' S CONCEPTION OF RATIONALISM 
To those familiar with Kierkegaard's works, and 
more especially to those aware of their real significance, 
it can only appear that we have immediately fallen into our 
own trap. rationalism, be it confessed, is a term which 
Kierkegaard only very rarely employed: the fundamental 
inadequacy of the concept, be it also confessed, is both 
implicitly and explicitly maintained throughout the whole of 
his works. These objections are, however, comparatively 
superficial. The basic objection is to be urged not against 
the terms employed but rather against the approach which they 
signify. The real merit of our title consists in the fact 
that the inappropriateness of its terms serves at the outset 
to call attention to the unsuitability of that entire mode of 
thought of which those terms are but the traditimnal and 
logical expression. The necessity of making explicit the 
tense in which these terms must be understood is itself born 
of the deeper necessity of indicating the sense in which a 
traditionally rationalist attitude must be altered in order 
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to comprehend what, in the case of any other author, we might 
without hesitation designate as his conception of rationalism. 
Or, to state the matter in another way, we are here concerned 
not to expound Kierkegaard's conception of rationalism as such, 
but rather to show in what sense that with which he was con- 
cerned may be regarded as rationalism.1 
The term 'rationalism' appears most frequently in 
the Journal entries of the year 1835. This very fact - --he was 
then but twenty -three years of age -- -means that these entries 
bear little direct relation to his final attitude in the 
matter. The real significance of these entries lies in their 
indication of his early personal interest in rationalism2 and 
of his realisation, although this was perhaps not yet fully 
conscious, of the relationship between rationalism and 
Christianity.3 The word occurs neither in the Fragments nor 
in the Postscript -- -the two works of the pseudonymn assigned 
to the critique of speculative philosophy. It is mentioned 
but once in his later writings and there it is made synonymous 
with "common sense ".4 
The fact that he virtually never employed this term 
is, when properly interpreted, itself an indication of the 
fact that it was rationalism with which he was primarily con- 
cerned. The refusal to employ this or any similar term was 
entirely consonant with his conviction that truth could not 
be directly communicated, that each man must exist in the 
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truth by himself, that, as Climacus said, "the secret of all 
communication consists precisely in emancipating the recipient 
il That emancipation was required not only in respect of 
him who taught -- -and hence his employment of 'indirect 
communication' -- -but equally in respect of the idea which he 
taught. And it was for this very reason that he refused to 
employ designations which would have provided either the 
prattlers with a position or the heretics with something which 
they could understand.2 Instead of this, his task, like 
Socrates and Lessing, consisted in maieutically presenting 
that which he was concerned to impart. Such a mode of 
instruction alone could truly set free the real recipients and, 
at the same time, confound those "rep 2titioners who reproduce 
what is said like a prattling echo.i3 
Nor does he at any time define this term. To have 
done so would have been both superfluous and dangerous. The 
superfluity lay in the fact that, for those who had eyes to 
see, its real nature was being revealed in the personal and 
public life of his country and his generation. The danger lay 
in the fact that its presentation in definitive form,4 like 
the employment of the word itself, presented indifferently 
the opportunity for either a gross misunderstanding or for a 
truly sympathetic interpretation of that which he was attempt- 
ing to convey. In the language of our own day - - -a language 
which itself has Kierkegaard as its inspiration -- -that danger 
lay in the fact that the presence of a definition 
afforded 
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the possibility of conversation without granting an accompany- 
ing guarantee of communication. 
Again, that he should have refused to put forward 
any definition of rationalism in terms of abstract thought 
sprang not from his failure to understand its nature but 
instead from his conviction that he had truly understood that 
naturel: not from his inability to comprehend the traditional 
rationalist conceptions of rationalism but rather from his 
judgment that such definitions were both ultimately inadequate 
and finally irrelevant to the truly human life. 
But if the traditional and abstract definitions of 
rationalism were, from Kierkegaard's point of view, inadequate 
as description they were also, from the rationalists' point of 
view, an impregnable fortress of defence. rind just as he had 
refused to conceive rationalism in abstract terms, he refused 
to attack it in such terms.2 
"A scepticism which attacks thought itself cannot 
be vanquished by thinking it through, since the 
very instrument by which this would have to be done 
is in revolt. There is only one thing to do with 
such a scepticism, and that is to break with it. "3 
Indeed, even to accept the abstract conceptions of rationalism 
was to commit oneself to its ultimate acceptance. To this 
strange plight he gave both poetic and profound recognition. 
"Once they accept the Cartesian scepticism they 
have upon their hands a doubt rrith which not even 
Satan himself could contend. "4 
It was, as KiDrkegaard fully understood, in the very 
nature of 
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the case that either an abstract conception or an intellectual 
refutation led inevitably to but another and yet more cm vinc- 
íng victory for the forces of rationalism. 
The above explanation of Kierkegaard's refusal to 
employ the term 'rationalism, largely anticipates those 
objections which he urges respecting the limitation of con- 
cepts in general. This has its explanation in the fact that 
the nature and extent of that limitation was first revealed 
to him in his own discovery of the complete inadequacy of the 
abstract concept of rationalism. That inadequacy, he was 
persuaded, consisted precisely in the fact that it bore no 
relation to its meaning in terms of the full context of human 
life. with the further discovery that such a life was lived 
in dimensions other than those presupposed by a shallow 
rationalist psychology came the correlative realisation that 
rationalism must be explained not only in terms of the fact 
of human existence but also in terms of the depths of that 
existence. And, with the final discovery that the truly human 
life was lived before God came the realisation that the nature 
of rationalism was not to be understood apart from its relation 
to the spiritual dimension of human existence. It was this 
conviction which was to prompt him to insist that it was not 
doubt but rather despair which lay at the root of the whole of 
contemporary thought.l 
His doubt as to the validity of abstract concepts 
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was based upon his personal experience of their irrelevance 
to the world in which men had their daily existence. His 
rejection of the concept of rationalism followed upon his 
unsuccessful attempt to achieve a truly human existence within 
its terms. His rejection of all such abstract concepts came 
with the realisation that he was an individual standing alone 
before God. .pith the discovery of each additional depth in 
the determin-tion of his own existence came a corresponding 
revelation of the inadequacy of the concept. .iith his dis- 
covery of the final determinatión of that existence -- -the 
paradoxical accentuation of existence as that of a sinner 
'before God' -- -came the justification for the final rejection 
of the validity of the concept as such. That this fatal 
objection against the claims of abstract thought was possible 
only with the aid of Christianity has its explanation, accord- 
ing to Climacus, in the fact that "Christianity paradoxically 
accentuates existence "l, according to Anti -Climacus, in the 
inability of Speculation to "recognise the impotence of the 
concept in relation to reality".2 
From the vantage point of the Christian faith it was 
not difficult for Kierkegaard to see that the strength of 
rationalism consisted in its own self- established immunity; in 
the fact that it had at the outset denied the essential 
determinant of man's existence, his truly spiritual nature. 
It had prudently obtained for itself a peaceful voyage by the 
simple expedient of leaving behind the only possible objector. 
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Here, Kierkegaard was persuaded, lay the strength of abstract 
thought as a whole -- -that it had established immunity from 
attack by surreptitiously abstracting from the fact of exist- 
ence, from the only possible source of its embarrassment. It 
was this insight into the illusory strength of rationalism which 
was to provide the central clue for his attack upon Hegelianism 
insofar as he consented to view it as an abstract philosophy. 
Kierkegaardis refusal to consider rationalism as an 
abstract concept is to be explained quite simply by the fact 
that he had himself been a rationalist.' Of equal importance, 
however, was the fact that in his youthful enthusiasm he had 
embraced rationalism, as he was later to embrace Christianity, 
as the idea "for which to live and die "2. For him it had been 
no abstract intellectual position but rather a living faith. 
For the doubt which lay at the root of modern philosophy he 
substituted a "concrete personal despair "3. For the age's 
frivolous questioning of the existence of God he substituted 
a practical atheism which brought him into marked and painful 
conflict with his own past. With a relentlessness which 
belonged to the spirit rather than the mind, with a zeal born 
of his youthfulness, he lived the life of the rationalist 
through to what appeared to him to be its real and ultimate 
conclusion. It was this concern to test in the arena of life 
the validity of this thought, to give existential expression 
to that which he had understood,4 which made of him such a man 
that he could say: "I have lived more poetry in 
one hour than 
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have most men in their whole lif e- time "l. -;;ith. equal justice, 
and for the.same reason, he might also have claimed to have 
lived more history in his own life -time than had the entire 
age. The justice of such a claim is revealed in his conviction 
that suicide was the fitting sequel not only to his own life2 
but also to the life and thought of his age :3 a conclusion 
which, although originally Greek,4: has become distinctively 
modern. 
Nor is rationalism for Kierkegaard at any time merely 
a formal philosophy. It is, rather, a way of life which finds 
its justification, its apologetic -- -even its expression - --in a 
formal philosophy but it is not itself that philosophy. 
Rationalism, at least in this particular context, may be ex- 
pressed as that which is behind, and at the same time is ex- 
pressed within the concept and the formal philosophy. The 
negative aspect of this relationship may be seen in Kierke- 
gaardts insistence that he was not concerned with philosophy or 
with philosophical problems as such.5 He was, however, intense- 
ly concerned with Hegelianism or speculative philosophy but, it 
should be noted, not as such but rather as an expression of the 
temper of the age or, more accurately, if less obviously, as 
an expression of his own pate. It is necessary to make this 
relationship explicit because, as we shall see, it is possible 
almost upon the basis of verbal equation, to show that Kierke- 
gaard identifies rationalism with speculative philosophy. This 
identification is possible only through the medium of 
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Christianity as the middle term, only when, for Kierkegaard, 
both rationalism and speculative philosophy are seen in terms 
of their meaning for the life of man. This must therefore 
not be construed as an abstract identification of Hegelianism 
with rationalism -- -more particularly, with rationalism in the 
Cartesian or even the 'olffian sense - --but r..ther as an 
indication that ra tionalism expressed itself through Hegelian- 
ism. And it was this rationalism rather than Hegelianism as 
such with which he was concerned. He was concerned neither 
with the speculative abrogation of the paradox nor with the 
Hegelian proposition that truth was an abstract identity of 
subject and object but he was intensely concerned with the 
implications which had such an abrogation and such a view of 
truth for the life of man. Formal philosophy was merely the 
expression of the disease: the philosophers merely those who 
expressed it. Kierkegaard's concern was with the disease it- 
self: with that which was expressed. It is tris which, in 
part, at least, explains his lack of concern with the history 
of philosophy, with logic and metaphysics, with formal statement 
and definition. All these led away from the real problem in 
the direction of abstraction. They suggested that the nature 
of rationalism was to be found in the Jirection of the objective 
of the abstract. But when, as he believed, the problem was 
itself a spiritual one such investigations were, like 
the 
historical introductions to Ch Y'istianity, "a sheer 
waste of 
time ".1 The real meaning of rationalism was 
not to be dis- 
covered in a more precise analysis of its objective 
nature but 
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in a more profound understanding of the rationalist. The 
irection for the search lay !inward' rather than !outward', 
'deeper rather than 'farther'. 
It is possible to neglect the essentially concrete 
reference of Kierkegaard's thought and to describe it merely 
in terms of its relation to formal philosophy :1 with respect 
to his theory of being, to Aristotle and Kant,' with respect 
to the nature of man's existence, to the Cartesian 'cogito',3 
with respect to the relation 6f logic and existence, to the 
Hegelian formula.4 There is; ; as ..I 'lave attempted to suggest, 
at least some apparent justification for such an attempt. fi ut 
Kierkegaard has furnished both ample warning and vehement pro- 
test against such a procedure. It is, he says, "precisely 
from existence that abstract thought abstractsr5. He Was, on 
his own insistence, "first and last a religious authori6.nd, 
more subtle and yet more decisive, he protested that it was 
possible to understand Christianity in such a w:7 that the 
understanding becomes instead a misunderstanding '. To place 
the primary emphasis upon what are ultimately but incidental 
resemblances or differences is to forget that Kierkegaard's 
thought has both its beginning and its end in his own personal 
problems:8 it is to forget that Kierkegaard's critique of 
rationalism is not ultimately an intellectualist critique. 
Nor do the claims of formal scholarship alter the situation. 
To view either Kierkegaard's problems or his 'solutions! 
apart 
from his own personal life is, initially, to make him 
say more 
109 
and, ultimately, to make him say less than is actually the 
case. 
Nor are the traditional or orthodox forms of 
rationalism the concern of Kierkegaard's mature thought. 
The rationalism of the Cartesians he considered only briefly 
in the draft of an unfinished work.1 That of the : nlighten- 
ment,2 as it related to the life and teaching of the Church, 
he summarily dismissed in a short statement in his Journals3 
and again, in his published work, in a proportionally brief 
treatment in the Postscri,t.4 He was not, therefore, 
primarily concerned with rationalism in the sense in which 
that term is commonly understood. This is a part of what is 
implied in the very rare occurrence of that word in his works. 
This may be in part explained by the fact that this particular 
mode of thought had already been largely discredited by the 
Kantian critical philosophy.5 But the real reason for Kierke- 
gaard's apparent lack of interest in the rationalism of the 
Enlightenment was that he had discovered in speculative 
philosophy a much more formidable opponent of Christianity :6 
he had, in fact, discovered in that philosophy the destroyer 
of his own Christianity, of his own humanity. 
Rationalism, in the sense in which it may legitimate- 
ly and profitably be regarded as Kierkegaard's serious con- 
cern, must be understood as his most inclusive characterisatior 
of the age in which he lived or, rather, insofar as 
this is a 
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proper antithesis for his thought, as the distinguishing 
characteristic of his own rebellious past. But whether we 
look to Kierkegaard's own past or to his understanding of the 
a_e we are imediately confronted with his central thought, 
with the conviction that the Hegelian philosophy is the cen- 
tral expression, the most adequate formulation of man's revolt 
against God. It had been as a youth quite overcome by Hegelian - 
isml that he had forsaken Christianity and proposed to devote 
the remainder of his life to a study of the natural sciences.2 
Looking out upon the age. he saw that there too the Hegelian 
philosophy had been responsible for the pablic acceptance of 
the ideal of scientific truth and for that emasculation of the 
Christian categories which had been employed to justify the 
priestly perversion of the faith. That philosophy which had 
made him something less than a human being3 he now condemned 
as the outstanding expression of the age in which he saw his 
own past reflected. It was against this Hegelianism, against 
the Hegelianism of his past and of the age,.that Kierkegaard 
directed the sharpest barbs of his attack. And it is from 
this attack that we must formulate his conception of ration alisn 
Kierkegaard's attack upon the age, upon the Hegelian - 
ism of the age - --his attack upon rationalism -- -was primarily 
an attack upon his own Hegelian past. His life, indeed, his 
works, were directed against the recurrence of that past in 
his own present. His attacks upon Hegel are, in 
the first 
instance, an attack upon that past: a past in 
which, 
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despairing of Christianity, he had dreamed of "a republic of 
science and letters ...."1, a past in which he had chided his 
master Socrates for his lack of positivity2, a past in which 
he had denied Christ. Primarily his battle wL.s not with Hegel 
as the symbol of the age but as the symbol of the age as it 
expressed itself and as it sought to express itself within 
his own life. It was this deeply personal experience as 
opposed to a merely cognitive knowledge of Hegelianism which 
accounted for his real understanding of the nature of 
rationalism. 
It is scarcely possible to overestimate the import- 
ance which both Kierkegaard's Hegelian past and his conversion 
to Christianity had for his understanding of the nature of 
rationalism. It was these two phases of his life which com- 
bined not only to provide him with his insight into the nature 
of rationalism but to make him aware of the import of his 
opposition. This awareness, the fact that he understood his 
thought and that he understood himself in his thought, is 
indicated in his refusal to define or to attack rationalism 
in its own terms, in his refusal to employ the term 
'rationalism' and at the same time to justify that refusal with 
the central formal protest of his critique, in his refusal, in 
an attack which had perforce to question the validity of 
abstract concepts, to give decisive employment to such concepts. 
Again, it was this awareness which, as something quite apart 
from the role which Governance had in the authorship, explains 
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tine deliberateness with which it was undertaken. It was his 
own experience of Hegelianism which was reflected in the 
lucidity with which he formulated and the self- assurance with 
which he urged his charges. It was this experience which 
steeled him in the conviction that rationalism was neither to 
be understood nor overcome rationalistically, that it was to 
be experienced only in the depths of the life of the individual 
and that it was to be overcome only by becoming !the 
individual'.' And it was his conversion to Christianity which 
led him to the conviction that sin is guilt !before God!, that 
the history of the individual is identical with that of the 
race, that philosophy (or, in any event, the philosophy of nis 
own past and that of the age) was but a subterfuge or 
rationalisation for a rebellion which, because man was 
ultimately spiritual, was itself spiritual. 
This must not be misunderstood. To say that Kierke- 
gaard was primarily concerned with his Hegelianism is not to 
say that he was concerned only with his own Hegelianism: it 
is rather to say that he was seriously concerned with the 
Hegelianism of the age. Again, and of equal importance, it 
is to say that he was seriously concerned with the sin of the 
race. Hegelianism was for Kierkegaard the specific immorality 
of the age2 and it was by his experience of this immorality 
that he belonged to the age just as it was by this same ex- 
perience of sin that he belonged to the race. His whole 
life 
was pointed towards becoming not a mere self but a real 
self, 
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not just a man but something closer to Ilan. In that life he 
saw the history of the race reproduced, the transgression of 
the age reflected. In himself he saw the one in whom the 
individual and the race were ultimately one, the one in whom 
the self and the age were not finall.ly distinguishable. It was 
this exprience of Hegelianism as sin which made it possible 
for him to view his autobiography as the history of the race 
and the history of the race as his autobiography. l'Lnd it was 
this same experience which made it possible for him to under- 
stand the age by understanding his ovm past and to attack that 
past by attacking his age. It was in terms of the perennial 
conflict between reason and freedom, between philosophy and 
life, between security and loneliness, between man and God, it 
was in terms of its fundamental opposition to Christianity, it 
was in terms of the sin of the human race that Kierkegaard 
finally understood and attacked Hegelianism. And it was 
because he had understood rationalism in the depths of his oWm 
spiritual existence, because he had experienced its meaning 
at the level of the "essentially historical "1 that he was able 
to urge his personal reflections as universal judgments and 
yet escape the frivolous charge that such judgments were but 
his own projections. 
Of his own age Kierkegaard said that it was "stuck 
in the mud banks of reasoni2. It was, he finally confessed, 
an age of "rationalismi3. Of Hegel, who for Kierkegaard was 
the symbol of the age, he charged that he had made men 
"into 
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a race of animals gifted with reason "1. But Hegel was for 
Kierkegaard also a roriantic.2 This apparent discrepancy h.,s 
a two -fold explanation. On the one hand, as we have already 
suggested, Hegelts conception of reason is itself grounded in 
the romantic movement: it is derived from the 'faith! which 
Hamann opposed to reason in the Cartesian sense and, more 
immediately, from the treasons which Jacobi, adopting the 
Kantian distinction, opposes to the understanding. On the 
other hand this maybe explained by the fact that Kierkegaard 
does not entrust his thought to abstract concepts. Such con- 
cepts, rationalism and romanticism, for example, are for 
Kierkegaard but ideal concepts: they signify ideal rather 
than factual existence: they signify a mode of knowing rather 
than one of being. Kierkegaards s thought is a protest against 
the final validity of such w ncepts: it is the denial of the 
real relevance of those categories and classifications which 
have traditionally been the mainstay of the historians of 
philosophy. It is with much justice that Swenson says that 
these categories "all seem somewhat lame and in need of re- 
vision when they are confronted with Kierkegaardts vital 
thought.... "3 It is, although with very much less justice, 
that.Rayner Heppenstall says something very much akin to this 
with respect to Existentialist thought as a whole/.1 We have, 
indeed, almost become reconciled to this apparently modern 
refusal to accept our carefully planned hospitality. 
But while 
the inadequacy of our traditional accommodation 
is only finally 
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declared in Kierkegaard it is amply prophesied in Hegel who, 
years before Schelling, Kierkegaard or L.arx we e to attack 
his system, himself attempted to formulate the first 
genuinely existential philosophy in modern Jestern thought.1 
The conflict between rationalism and romanticism which is 
often regarded as the particular stimulus of Kierkegaard's 
thought2 was, in actual fact, the problem undertaken and, in 
Kierkegaard's view, finally resolved by Hegel. This struggle 
which is vaguely present in the whole of Hegel's thought 
finally and formally declared itself in his 'Lectures on 
Religion' in which he felt himself compelled to combat the 
rationalists on the one hand and Schleiermacher on the other. 
And this with good reason for if, as Mackintosh says,3 he was 
not ultimately far from Schleiermacher in his interpretation 
of Christianity neither was he ultimately far from the 
rationalists. For Kierkegaard, insofar as he dared to concern 
himself with the history of philosophy, the significance of 
Hegel lay in the fact that he represented both the final ful- 
fillment of the dream of the Cartesians and the full flower 
of the romantic movement. For Kierkegaard, and with this he 
was personally concerned, the significance of Hegel lay in the 
fact that he had combined both rationalism and romanticism, 
that he had transformed the one in the light of the other, 
that he had produced Hegelianism, a philosophy almost different 
in kind from either of the sources from which it had sprung. 
These two divergent emphasis within the post- 
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Renaissance period - -- essentially an emphasis upon intellectual- 
ism on the one hand and aestheticism on the other -- -were first 
decisively joined in Jacobi who conceded the victory to 
aestheticism. From him the struggle passed to Hegel who, after 
permitting the conflict to disturb the peace of his early 
years1 effected a truce wlich promised equal spoils to both 
factions but which, in actual fact, at least according to 
Kierkegaard, gave the larger share to intellectualism :2 Hegel's 
merit lay in the fact that, to use his own terminology, he had 
effected a synthesis between thé claims of rationalism and 
romanticism, a synthesis which accounted for both the thesis 
and the antithesis of the post -Renaissance era, a synthesis 
which was neither the one nor the other but which more closely 
resembled intellectualism than aestheticism, a synthesis which 
was the intellectual expression of aestheticism. It was this 
synthesis which was the formal aspect of the rationalism of 
Kierkegaard or, rather, the rationalism to which Kierkegaard 
was opposed. Thus it was that, prophetically enough, the first 
attempt at a genuinely existential philosophy resulted instead 
in the real rationalism which, insofar as that is possible, 
was the precise opposite of existential thought. 
Kierkegaard was not seriously concerned with any but 
the Hegelian philosophy. It was for him a definite and 
permanent advance in the history of thought.3 It was manes 
most consistent declaration of his own self -sufficiency. 
It 
was the manifesto of mans s adjustment to the 
world. It was 
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the philosophy of his own past. lznd Kierkegaard accepts, at 
least for the purposes of his polemic, this Hegelian synthesis. 
Indeed, he tends even to identify it with philosophy as such.1 
This means that his problems are not the problems of Hegel. 
Their relationship in this respect may be stated in the follow- 
ing manner. The problem confronting Hegel was that of a choice 
between rationalism and romanticism both of which, to speak 
graphically, were positions on the horizontal axis equidistant 
from the vertical axis. The solution which he achieved was it- 
self a position on the vertical axis and it was, for Kierke- 
gaard at least, diametrically opposed to Christianity. Hence- 
forth the real struggle was not that between rationalism and 
romanticism but rather that between Hegelianism and 
Christianity both of which were, to continue the figure, 
positions upon the vertical axis. It is therefore very mis- 
leading when Wahl writes: 
"He (Kierkegaard) triumphs over Romanticism by the 
aid of Hegelianism; then he triumphs over Hegelian - 
ism by the aid of rcyiant is ism. But, in reality, he 
is as far from the one as from the other. 1-iomanticism 
and Hegelianism have both contributed to destroy the 
specific character of Christianity, the one by making 
it an aesthetic adornment, the other by making it a 
logical construction. The one is confusion of feeling, 
the other is confusion of thought...." 
Not only does Kierkegaard not triumph over either one of these 
points of view with the aid of the other but he does not even 
conceive of then as rival points of view. Indeed, much of 
his criticism of the Hegelian philosophy is directed 
against 
its fundamental aestheticism.3 It is Kierkegaardts 
criticism 
of this aspect of Hegelianism which, in part 
at least, seems 
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to justify Hirsch's view that Kierkegaard returns in the 
Postscript to the preoccupations of his youth. rind it is in 
part dahl's failure to appreciate Kierkegaard's understanding 
of the relationship between romanticism and Hegelianism which 
leads him to reserve his judgment on this view.? 
Kierkegaard was not seriously concerned with either 
rationalism or romanticism in the traditional sense of those 
terms. Of his early aesthetic works he said that they Were a 
"necessary eliminationi3, that they were not essentially re- 
lated to an understanding of the authorship.4 They were in 
fact finally but a concession ,to a public which lived "in 
aesthetic, or, at the most, in aesthetic - ethical categoriesi5, 
"who lived in categories quite foreign to Christianity "6. No 
more than these works achieve a resolution of their own prob- 
léms do they raise what is for Kierkegaard the ultimate prob- 
lem, the problem of Christianity. It is not until the Post- 
script, that work which lies between the aesthetic and the 
religious,7 a work which is both a "negative eliminationi8 and 
"the turning -point of the authorship "9 that it is possible to 
"set the problem, which is the Problem xar'i oXSY, of the whole 
authorship, namely, 'how to become a Christian' "10. It is not 
until the reader has teen propelled to the level of Hegelian - 
ism, to the intellectual expression of aestheticism, to that 
which negatively corresponds to the ethical, that this prob- 
lem can really arise. And it is this rationalism 
or Hegelian - 
ism which itself underlies and gives expression 
to both 
119 
aestheticism and intellectualism which is the real enemy of 
Christianity. Or, to state the matter in other terms, it is 
Hegelianism which is the final expression for the destruction 
of the individual. 
But this distinction between aestheticism and 
Hegelianism has a basis also in Kierkegaard's own past. This 
may be seen from the explanation which he gives for his re- 
fusal to condemn "Christian art" despite his opinion that it 
was "a new paganism in the midst of Christendom "l. 
"....just because it is inconceivable to me I refrain 
from any condemnation, lest I do an injustice...i2 
This self- confessed inability to conceive the artist's intention 
lay not in the fact that he had not been an artist but rather 
in the fact that he had not essentially been an artist, not in 
the fact that he had not lived in aesthetic categories but in 
the fact that his personal attack upon Christianity had not 
taken the form of aestheticism. It had rather taken the form 
of Hegelianism and it was from this past that there sprang his 
condemnation of that philosophy in the light of Christianity. 
Christianity is the focal point of all of Kierke- 
gaard's thought3 and it is only when this problem is made cen- 
tral that it is possible to properly arrange the various 
strands of his thought. It is only then that the real dis- 
tinction between romanticism and Hegelianism emerges: 
it is 
only then that the essential continuity between 
rationalism 




Christianity is false; 
speculative philosophy 
does not by any means say that 
on the contrary, it says that 
grasps the truth of Christian- 
The attitude of the rationalists is precisely identical. 
"....(the rationalists) have tumbled upon the idea of 
declaring it (i.e. Christianiy) a minor and in the 
custody of its guardians...." 
It is, therefore, not "irrelevant that Hegel passed through a 
Romantic stage "3 nor is it possible to concede that "the in- 
fluence of the rationalistic period upon Kierkegaard was 
entirely negativei4. Indeed, if these assertions were true, 
there wo;ld be, or so I beLieve, great difficulty in explain- 
ing the particular emphasis of Kierkegaard's thought. 
For Kierkegaard the revolt of the age was expressed 
in the lives and teaching of the priests, in He; = ;el and 
speculative philosophy, and, in a more restricted sense, in the 
ascendancy of the sciences to a place of dominion. Yet it was 
in Hegel that the age found its most central expression, its 
most Adequate formulation. Among the speculative philosophers 
he was pre -eminent: he it was who had prepared the way for the 
priestly perversion of the faith just as he had made possible 
the public acceptance of science. Hence, it was as the symbol 
of the temperament of the age that Kierkegaard attacked him. 
His insistence upon this relationship is implied in his charge 
that "the system is a plebian invention.... "5 In a day when 
men were concerned above all else to escape the burden of 
spiritual existence Hegel had made men "into a race 
of 
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animals gifted with reason." In an age which "made existence 
tantamount- to thinking about everything "1 he formally eqúated 
thou -ht with being.2 In a generation which "tends to put 
natural science in the place of religion "3, which was "desirous 
of a conceptual understanding of Christianity "4 he had com- 
pletely rationalised the Christian faith.5 At a time when 
people ceased to care about the ethical6 he destroyed its 
significance by including it among the relativities of 
history.? In a day when people's remarks were becoming 
anonymous and objective$ when they themselves were becoming 
impersonal and irresponsible,9 he himself lived in categories 
quite different from those in which he speculated.1° In a 
period when people were even too apathetic to attack their 
mortal enemy at the source of its strengthll he found it more 
convenient to continue to employ the traditional Christian 
terminology while he secretly robbed it of all of its meanin geL2 
Many other such parallels might be cited but, for Kierke- 
gaard's thought, none more significantly than his view of the 
meaning of the Hegelian principle of mediation. "It is ", he 
says, "the miserable invention of a man who became false to 
himself.... "13 For an a e which was primarily concerned to 
protect itself against the claims of both God and man the 
philosophy of Hegel seemed the most adequate expression. 
Kierkegaard's descriptions of his age are the best 
possible means of showing what he understands by 
rationalism. 
It is, he says an age "...of understanding...perhaps, 
more 
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knowledgeable than any former generationr1, an age "when 
passion has, been obliterated in favour of learning "2, an age 
which "at most has vitality enough to lay a wager "3. It was 
an age when objectivity was regarded as the highest thing,4 
when, because of "a childish and superstitious overvaluation 
of thought" poetry and religion had been crowded aside as 
transcended phases5, when, "between poesy and religiosity, 
worldly wisdom presents its vaudeville performance "6. It was 
an age of shrewdness,7 of common sense,8 of intelligence.9 It 
was the age of a "universal superstitious belief in reasm ii1 °. 
Under the reign of man's intellect Christianity had been trans- 
formed from an existence -communication into a doctrine that 
asked only to be understoodll: the paradox had been suspended,12 
the element of offence had been destroyed,13 the concept of sin 
had been dissipated.14 Both the "wound" and the saving grace 
had been removed.15 The ethical had gone out of life,16 reason 
had "tyrannised" enthusiasm,17 the whole of man's existence had 
become "labour for a relative end "18. 
"That is more or less where we stand now. Reason 
is everywhere; instead of love - -a mariage de con - 
venance, instead of unconditional obedience, 
obedience as a result of reasoning, 'instead of 
faithL- reasonable knowledge, instead of con- 
fidence clever calculation, instead of .action- - 
events, instead of 'the individual' -- several 
people, instead of personality -- impersonal 
objectivity etc.i19 
rind remembering the meaning of reason's dominion he cried, "Oh, 
the sins of the passion and the heart, how much nearer to 
salvation than the sins of the reason:2Ó 
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This was the ape which, although he rarely used the 
term, Kierkegaard designated as an a._e of rationalism. 
"All religion h to do wit'ci passion, with having 
passion. It will be true therefore of every 
religion, especially in ages of rationalism or 
common sense, that it has only very few genuine 
adherents.i1 
That this has direct reference to his own age may be clearly 
seen in the fact that the quotation appears in "The Instakti2 
and in the fact that it was written at a time when his central 
thesis was "Christianity does not exist "3. But the value of 
this statement lies not so much in the proof that he so 
described the ae as in showing that he equates rationalism 
with common sense and that he opposed both to religion. 
Kierkegaard was, however, much less sparing in his 
use of the terms 'scepticism' and 'sceptical'. Although his 
description of the age is such as to lead one to concur in his 
judgment that it was an age of rationalism Kierkegaard formally 
attributed many of its characteristics to a fundamental 
scepticism. Descartes he regards as a sceptic.4 Scepticism, 
he says, "is inherent in the Hegelian philosophyi5. "The 
notion that pure thought is the positive truth for an existing 
individual, is sheer scepticism....i6 The relationship of the 
scientist to the problem of the' meaning and significance .of ;his 
life is one of scepticism.? The levelling process;_ which is. 
itself the result of the individual's refusal to be himself, 
finally achieves the destruction of that individual.8 This 
process, the "profound significance" of which Kierkegaard 
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holds, "lies in the fact that it means the predominance of the 
category generation over the category individuality "1, is it- 
self sceptical.2 The failure of the age,3 of speculative 
philosophy,4 in respect of the ethical is foreshadowed in bes- 
cartes5 and confirmed in Hegel.6 The age's concern to establish 
the existence of God7 and the immortality of the voul8 were, for 
him, certain indications of the age's real scepticism. Faith 
had begun to lose its passion, it had begun to cease to be 
faith.9 
Yet this scepticism in no wise resembled that of the 
Greeks, who, in order to give existential realisation to that 
which they understood, attempted to abstract from their own 
exiutence.10 The scepticism of the a e was an attempt to 
abstract from the spiritual aspect of man, to deny the spiritual 
as a means of affirming the intellectual. Seen in the light ° 
of their deepest meaning in terms of human life, rationalism 
and scepticism are but two sides of the same coin: they are 
the age's dancing partners. The history of thought is just in- 
sofar as it records their alternate ascendancy. The sceptic's 
denial of the existence of God is the world's answer to the 
rationalist's affirmation. Against both of them, against both 
of them equally, Climacus says ".:.one proves God's existence 
by worship...not by proofs "11. For Kierkegaard both are but 
manifestations of man's indolence, of his worldliness, of his 
desire to defend himself in the comfort of intellectual 
categories, to flee the demand to become a spiritual 
being, an 
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individual 'before God'. 
It is Kierkegaard's understanding of the nature and 
function of reason' which is finally decisive for his con- 
ception of rationalism. And, in the sense that every 
definition of rationalism involves a reference to reason which 
is itself undefined, any single definition of rationalism is, 
for Kierkegaard, as satisfactory -- -and as unsatisfactory - --as 
any other. And, in the sense that the whole of Kierkegaard's 
thought is a critique of rationalism it is itself finally 
determined by his view of the nature of reason. No more than 
he was concerned with rationalism as a mere philosophical doc- 
trine was he concerned with reason as an abstract concept. 
Reason, for Kierkegaard, is essentially related to his own 
past and to the a(e in which that past was reflected: it is 
essentially related to the role which it had played in his on 
past and which it continued to play in the lives of those among 
whom he lived: it is essentially related to the Hegelian 
philosophy which, for Kierkegaard, was the fullest expression 
of the spiritual rebellion of his time. 
Kierkegaard's view of the nature of reason, like his 
conception of rationalism, is to be discovered not in the form 
of a considered definition but rather from his observations, 
and his accusations, respecting its employment in the life of 
the age. 
.. the !in-and-for-itself', the absolute, has gone 
out of life, and reason has been put in its place... 
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"The 'in -and- for -itself' ('the nerve of the 
N. T.') and reason are related to one another in- 
versely; where the one is the other is not. ':hen 
reason has completely penetrated all relationships 
and everything the 'in-and-for-itself' will have 
disappeared entirely from life."' 
This same opposition between reason and the Christian revelation 
is again repeaued in his judgment upon the doubt of the age. 
'Ultimately all doubt has its stronghold in the 
illusions of temporal existence, such as that one 
is several people or all mankind, who can in the 
end thus overawe God (just as the 'people' overawe 
the King or the 'public' overawe the alderman) and 
oneself becomes Christ, i 
The charge that reason is the ally of natural man in his war 
against Christianity becomes explicit in his later works. The 
speculative transformation of Christianity, the "counter- 
feiting of the concepts" is, he says, "precisely in the 
direction of human egoism...i3 2or Kierkegaard reason is man's 
means of adjustment, his principle of worldliness, his faculty 
of shrewdness, his ability for compromise: it is his Weapon 
against Christianity, his instrument for the affirmation of 
'man', for the denial of God. And it is against this self - 
assertion of 'man' as man that Kierkegaard proclaims that 
"religion is the true humanity"4. 
Swenson, who has perhaps understood this matter more 
profoundly than any other, describes this reason as the "con- 
crete expression for what he (i.e. man) initially is, in 
contradistinction to what he strives in faith to becomei5. It 
is, he says: 
"....essentially identical with the passion of self- 
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assertion, self -,justification, so that the conflict 
is between two passions4 not between passion and 
abstract intelligence." 
Reason, although ideally not a passion, becomes such in its 
opposition to passion.2 Or, to state this matter from its 
other side: "...man is planned with a view to being spirit "3. 
His refusal to become such a spirit is itself ultimately a 
spiritual refusal.4 This is the man in whom reason has become 
, 
a passion, the one in whom, in the ab, ence of true spirit, the 
helm is seized by reason or false spirit. For Kierkegaard the 
whole of man t s nature is _ultimately involved in every decisive 
choice:5 rationality, from the side of Climacus, and 
spirituality, from the side of Anti- Climacus, become in- 
distinguishably merged in the life of man. But this conception 
irit or 
of man in terms of,ràtionality immediately breaks up into the 
two opposites which are contained within it, into obedient 
spirit and rebellious spirit, into pious reflection and super- 
ficial reflection,5 into the ulnderstanding which is employed 
in order to believe against the understanding and the under- 
standing which "refuses to understand that there is something 
that it cannot understand "B. The former of these contraries 
describes man as he ought to be, as, under God, he has become. 
is the man in whom reason is first allied with his struggle 
against Christianity and finally identified with man apart from 
Christianity. This is the man in whom "Reason" as that term is 
employed in the Fragments9 is identified with 'man' as natural 
man,10 in whom reason, or understanding, is identified with 
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'man'. And this is the reason which must be crucified,1 which 
must stand aside if man is to see God.2 
This matter may be much more briefly stated in its 
relation to the Hegelian philosophy. Hegel had equáted re_.,so , 
in the form of his universal or philosophical reason, with 
Reason, the Absolute or God.3 For Kierkegaard Hegel was him- 
self involved in that reason: it was, he believed, a pure 
fabrication, a cloak under which to hide the spiritual treason 
of the age. So it was that not at all unaware of the sting of 
parody, he took over the Reason which Hegel had identified with 
God, which he had employed.to destroy Christianity, and, in his 
own works, identified it with natural man, with man in his 
opposition to Christianity. 
It is this essentially broader interpretation of 
reason which is involved in Kierkegaard's formulation of 'the 
absurd' a category which is itself too often misconstrued4 as 
Kierkegaard's attack upon what are, in such misconstructions, 
regarded as 'the laws of thought'. Kierkegaard is entirely 
unequivocal on this point. 
"The absurd is not one of the factors which can be dis- 
criminated within the proper compass of the under- 
standing: it is not identical with the improbablf, 
the unexpected....i5 
Even in his strongest statement of the 'absolute paradox' he 
stops short of making it paradoxical or absurd in itself: it 
is, and this he does not fail to ihterj ect, paradoxical or 
absurd only in its relation to man. 
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that an individual man is God is Christianity, and 
this individual man is the God -man. There is neither in 
heaven., nor on earth, nor in the depths, nor in the 
aberrations of the most fantastic thinking, the possi- 
bility of a (humanly speaking) more insane combination. "1 
Kierkegaard, in fact, refused to do what so many of his critics 
on this point are so anxious to have him do: he refuses to 
identify the thought of man with the thought of God. Indeed, the 
'absolute paradoxt2 is itself the pròtest against such an 
identification. It may not even be amiss to suggest that Kierke- 
gaard has destroyed the very ground of those who are, on this 
point, attacking him. Nor is the paradox paradoxical only for 
a man of lesser intelligence. "The paradox ", he says, "is not 
a concession but a category", it "is related to man as mani4. 
The paradox, the absurd, is not the transgression of the law of 
contradictions which, significantly, Hegel set aside and Kierke- 
gaard affirmed. It is instead the expression for the contra- 
diction between man's true destiny and that which, as 'man', he 
chooses for himself.ó -hen, therefore, Kierkegaard speaks of 
'being nailed to the paradox "7, of "the crucifixion of the under - 
standing"8, of "the martyrdom of faithi9 he is to be understood 
not as denying the validity of thought as such but rather as 
denying its right to pass beyond what he regards as its proper 
bounds. He is, in fact, denying the disinterestedness of 
thought. Likewise, when Kierkegaard insists that Christianity 
is the absurd he is not identifying Christianity with the 
abrogation of thought (an interpretation than which there could 
be nothing more absurd) : he is rather affirming that 
Christianity offends, and must offend, man as Reason or reason 
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as 'man'.1 
Rationalism is a way of life which finds its formal 
expression in the Hegelian philosophy, in man's 'organised' 
opposition to religion,2 in his aggression against Christianity.3 
It is the way in which Kierkegaard had lived, the way in which 
his age continued to live. It is the expression for the sus- 
pension of man in Cartesian rationalism, for the dissipation 
of man in German romanticism: it is the expression for the 
annihilation of man. = rationalism is the true anthropomorphism. 
"The fundamental error of modern times (which 
runs into logic, metaphysics, dogma-cics, and the 
whole of modern life) lies in the fact that the 
yawning abyss of cyuality in the difference between 
God and man has been removed. The result in dog- 
matic theology (from logic and metaphysics) is a 
mockery of God such as was unknown in paganism.... 
, and in ethics an impe_c tinent indifference, 
or better still the complete absence of ethics. 
The trouble in our times is not really 




DISSOLUTION: ?THE CRO'iitD' 
Kierkegaard understood that he was to be a 'corrective 
to an age in which, he said, because of its "vastly increased 
knowledge, men had forgotten what it means to EXIST, and what 
ITWA.RDNESS signifies "l. In that it required a 'corrective' it 
was, he conceded, like every other.age but in that it was pre- 
cisely a corrective which it required it was, he was tempted 
to believe, an age which was somewhat peculiar in the extent 
of its perversion. Not only had the balance between the under- 
standing, the imagination and the feeling been disturbed, not 
only had the understanding become too large,2 but that under- 
standing had included the imagination and the feeling within 
itself. Science had organised "the moments of subjectivity 
within a knowledge of them, and this knowledge is assumed to 
be the highest stage.... "3 It was an age in which the "one - 
sided individual .... has faith and passion as transcended phases 
of his life.... 114, in which "the abstractly all -sided individual 
imagines he has everything through the one sidedness 
of the 
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intellectuali1. It was an age which had transformed Christ- 
ianity into a doctrine, which had included reality within 
logic, which had conceived man apart from God and time apart 
from eternity. It had substituted knowledge for faith and 
thought for existence. In both theory and practice it had 
made man in the image of man. 
The whole of Kierkegaard's thought is ultimately re- 
lated to his conception of the nature of man or, more primar- 
ily, to his experience of himself as a single existing man, 
individual or subject. That man exists sets him beside the 
world of things which also exist but it sets him apart from 
God who, as eternal, "does not exist "2. That he is a subject 
sets him beside God who is also a subject3 but it sets him 
apart from the world of things which are only objects. "... 
man is a synthesis of the temporal and the (ternal... "4 AS 
existing, as an individual within time, as one who is "him- 
self existentially in process of becoming "5 his task is his 
existence and all of his thought must essentially express the 
fact that he is an existing individual. As subject, as a sub- 
ject who has to realise himself in subjectivity, in inwardness, 
in passion, his "essential task...is to concentrate upon in- 
°,rardness in existing... "6 As existing subject his task is 
" ±eally to exist, so as to interpenetrate (his) existence with 
consciousness, at one and the same time eternal and 
as if far 
removed from existence, and yet also present in 
existence and 
in the process of becoming..." 
7 
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For his insistence that roan is essentially an exist - 
ing individual, for his opposition to the age's concern with 
the objective and the abstract, Kierkegaard was able to find 
a precedent in Socrates "whose everlasting merit it was to 
have become aware of the essential significance of existence, 
of the fact that the knower is an existing individual "l. : 'or 
his insistence that man is situated within time, for his pro- 
test that the age completely failed to understand the signifi- 
cance of this fact, he was able to find support in Socrates 
who had personally rejected the eternity of abstract thought 
in order to concentrate upon his own existence. But in an age 
in which everyone was a Christian as a matter of course Kierke- 
gaard was also able Socratically to suggest that the matter 
was no longer one merely of precedent or personal choice. 
"..now existence has stamped itself upon the existing individ- 
ual a second time.i2 "The eternal truth has come into being 
in time...now the eternal essential truth is not behind him 
but in front of him, through its being in existence or having 
existed, so that if the individual does not existentially and 
in existence lay hold of the truth, he will never lay hold of 
iti3. No longer is the individual free to take himself out 
of existence, to wander back into an eternity of recollection 
(and it was this possibility which was signified in the Soc- 
ratic proposition that all knowledge is recollection4): no 
longer is time merely 'optional'. N o longer is the word 
'recollection': it has become instead 'repitition'.5 
Now 
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"the difficulty is greater than it was for the Greek, because 
still greater contradictions are enjoined, existence being 
accentuated paradoxically as sin, and eternity accentuated 
paradoxically as God in timei1. The individual has been un- 
conditionally bound within existence: the bonds of time hate 
been doubly strengthened. To engage in speculation, although 
only highly suspect from the Socratic view, has now become 
"neither more nor less than confusion "2. "The evasion by which 
speculative philosophy attempts to recollect itself out of 
existence has been made impossible "3. 
There is, in iïierkegaardts interpretation, both an 
essential continuity and a definite break between the Socratic 
and Christian positions. This continuity -- -and it was this 
which was the implicit assumption of the argument of the I'raz- 
ments---he expressed by saying that "the Socratic ignorance 
is an analogue to the category of the absurd... "4, that "the 
Socratic inwardness in existing is an analogue to faith...i5 
It was this which he expressed again. by saying that "Christian- 
ity is inwardnessi6, that it'trotests every form of objectivity; 
(that) it desires that the subject should be infinitely con- 
cerned about himselfr7. But the break between these two 
positions is even more important and its extent may be most 
briefly expressed by a reference to their respective accounts 
of the paradox. In the Socratic world "the eternal essential 
truth is by no means in itself a paradox; but it 
becomes para- 
"8 
doxical by virtue of its relation to an existing 
individual. 
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In Christianity however "the eternal essential truth is itself 
a paradox4. The paradox has been replaced by the absolute 
paradox, existence and time have been given an even greater 
significance, the inwardness which is proportionate to the 
paradox of w.-iich it is born will now be the most profound pos- 
sible.2 The transition from the Socratic to the Christian is 
a transition from one existence sphere to another and it is 
to these that we must now turn. 
Kierkegaard ultimately distinguished four separate 
existence spheres: the aesthetic or the aesthetic- metaphy- 
sical, the ethical, religiousness A (the Socratic religion of 
immanence) and religiousness B (the Christian paradoxical 
religion of transcendence). Either /0r raises the problem of a 
choice between the first two of these spheres, the Stages that 
of a choice between the first and the remaining spheres con- 
sidered as more or less related to one another3 and the Post- 
scrint that of a choice between the first and the last of 
these spheres with the second and third included within but 
nevertheless made subservient to the fourth4o These spheres 
are differentiated by the emphasis which they place upon time, 
"in accordance with their interpretation of what it is to 
existi5. "In the same degree that ti -le is accentuated, in'the 
same degree we go forward from the aesthetic, the metaphysical, 
to the ethical, the religious and the Christian- religious. 
"6 
It is upon this same basis, more particularly 
upon the basis 
of the relationship which they establish between 
eternity and 
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time -- - "The apprehension of the distinction 'here' and 'here- 
after' is at bottom the apprehension of what it is to exist. "1 
- -- together with the degree of inwardness which springs from 
that relationship that the last two spheres are differentiated 
from each other. 
"The paradoxical religiousness defines the distinction 
absolutely by accentuating paradoxically what it is to 
exist. 2or as the eternal came into the world at a 
moment of time, the existing individual does not in the 
course of time come into the relation with the eternal 
and think about it (this is A) , but in ti, ie it comes 
into relation with the eternal in time; so that the 
relation is within time, and this relationship con- 
flicts equally with .all thinking, whethgr one reflect 
upon the individual or upon the Deity." 
Although religiousness A "accentuates existence ", although it 
"makes the thing of existing as strenuous as possible (outside 
the paradox- religious sphere) "3 it is nevertheless a religion 
of immanence which "has only human nature in general as its 
assumption "4 and in which, therefore, existence "is a moment 
within my eternal consciousness... "5 Religiousness B however 
paradoxically accentuates existence by marking the existing 
individual as a sinner6 and by so doing takes him out of the 
context of immanence which at most is able to impute guilt to 
the exister.7 Religiousness B proclaims that the Deity has 
entered into the world at a moment in time, that "there is no 
longer any immanent fundamental kinship between the temporal 
and the eternal, because the eternal itself has entered time 
and would constitute there the kinship "8, that man is "between 
time and eternity in time, between heaven and hell 
in the time 
of salvationi9. The individual is prevented 
from relating 
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himself backwards to the eternal and is reLuired instead to 
come forward into being in order to become eternal by relation- 
ship to the Deity in time.l Existence has been ,given its most 
decisive formulation: the greatest possible inwardness has 
been made possible. 
These existence spheres may also be differentiated 
with respect to the dialectical nature of the existing individ- 
ual. This springs from the fact that the individual's relation- 
ship to the dialectical is commensurate with his relationship 
to existence. Dialectic is the result of existence :2 "exist- 
ence...is the dialectical momenti3. d thin time there can be 
escape from neither existence nor dialectic but only inter- 
pretations of these and according to these interpretations the 
various spheres are chosen. "'dhat constitutes the situation 
as aesthetic is the fact that the individual becomes un- 
dialectic in himself. î4 "The specific thing about Christianity 
is the dialectical in the second instance.i5 But the quali- 
tative dialectic of the paradoxical religiousness serves both 
to differentiate this sphere from all of the others and also 
to separate the different spheres from one another. In this 
it resembles the absolute paradox which distinguishes religious- 
ness B from religiousness A and at the same time provides the 
measure or interpretation of existence in the light of which 
the other spheres are judged.5 The sphere of the qualitative 
dialectic, of the absolute paradox, of the breach 
with imman- 
ence, is, for Kierkegaard, index sui et 
falsi. 
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This, in very brief compass, is the framework of 
Kierkegaard's thought, the background within which his judg- 
ments upon both the age and its philosophy must be unde_. stood. 
Before passing on to those judgments it remains on i_y to say 
that in Kierkegaard's view the Hegelian philosophy belongs 
essentially within the aesthetic -metaphysical sphere. It 
lumps together "everything (including the ethical and the re- 
ligious) indiscriminately in the aesthetic- metaphysical "l. It 
is wholly unable to come to terms with exist.nce. 
"eculative -philosophy discounts existence. in its 
eyes the fact of existing amounts to having existed 
(the past), existence is a transitory factor resolved 
into the pure being of the eternal. opeculative 
philosophy as the abstract can never be contemporary 
with existence as existing but can only see it in 
retrospect. "2 
From this fundamental inability to come to terms with temporal 
existence it followed that the Hegelian philosophy was wholly 
incapable of dealing justly with the God -man of the Christian 
faith.3 u i to naturally it conceived faith in terms of im- 
manence, it abrogated the paradox, it equated thought with 
existence, it substituted a quantitative for the qualitative 
dialectic. bo too it was for this same reason that "specu- 
lative philosophy prudently holds itself aloof from ethics, 
and...becom es ridiculous when it makes a trial at it. 
Hegelianism was the intellectual as opposed to the artistic 
expression of aestheticism and it was, Kierkegaard believed, 
the outstanding expression of an age which lived 
"in aes- 
thetic, or, at the most, in aesthetic - ethical 
categories "5, 
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for an age which had'ttransformed Christianity into a philo- 
sophical doctrine that asks to be understood, and turned being 
a Christian in uo a triviality+i1. 
The main thrusts of Kierkegaard's attack upon the 
rationalism of the age were delivered against objective 1arn- 
ing, speculative philosophy and "Christendom ", against the 
natural sciences, Hegel and the priests. The entire attack was 
based upon his understanding of the nature of man, more 
specifically upon his understanding of this nature as it is 
accentuated by Christianity. .That this basis sho ._ld have be- 
come more explicit in its latter phase is, in part at least, a 
result of the method which he employed; a method as much the 
result of the obvious justice of his demands as of the ex- 
igencies of the battle. because the entire attack was made 
in the name of Christianity it can perhaps best be understood 
by turning first briefly to those works in which the assump- 
tions of that attack are explicitly declared. This necessity 
of turning to the final works in order fully to understand 
the earlier has its own interesting and significant parallel 
in Kierkegaard's own seriously expressed view of the Journals 
as a means of "knowing myself later on "2 . 
In "The Instant" both Kierkegaard's view of the 
nature of Christianity and his understanding of the extent 
of 
man's opposition to it are unequivocably stated. 
In the face 
of the phenomenon of "Christendom" he days: 
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"ho, I confront them with the unaltered conviction 
that the Christianity of the Ilew Testament is 
Christianity, the other (i.e. 'the Christianity of 
us men') being a knavish trick, and that they no 
more resemble one another than a square resembles 
a circle.i1 
of the opposition of that Christianity to natural man he says; 
"In the New Testament, Christianity is the profound- 
est wound that can be inflicted upon a man, cal- 
culated on the most dreadful scale to collide with 
everything - --n2 
hat this does not represent any significant change from the 
view which he had held in his earlier years may be readily 
seen from his Journals where he says of Christianity that it 
emasculates man,3 that it is a "radical cure "4, that it is 
"really too holy for us meni5, that it terrifies instead of 
consoling "C. In such circumstances the problem, he says, 
"...for 'man', for the 'human race', for 'society', is to 
protect itself with all its might against Christianity which 
must be regarded as its mortal enemyi7. Indeed, he says, it 
was precisely in order to mitigate the blows of Christianity 
that the priests were brought into existence. 
"This sort of Christianity was never... to man's taste, 
but was distasteful to him in his inmost heart, 
mortally distasteful. Therefore the upshot is that 
from generation to generation there lives a highly 
respected class in the Community whose metier is to 
transform Christianity into the exact opposite. i8 
This function of the priest as the invention and servant of 
natural man he contrasts with his duty as a minister of 
the 
Christian gospel. 
"All the shrewdness of 'man' seeks one thing: 
to 
be able to live without responsibility. 
The priest's 
significance for society ought to 
be to do everything 
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to make every man eternally responsible for every 
hour he lives, even for the least thing he under- 
takes, for this is Christianity. But his signifi- 
cance for society is: to make hypocrisy feel secure, 
while society shoves rTsponsibility away from it- 
self upon the priest." 
His charge against the priests is that instead of proclaiming 
the offence of the gospel, instead of insisting that "the hum- 
an race is a lost race, that every individual who is born is 
by being born a lost individuali2, they have obliged with their' 
accommodating and perverted view of the Christian faith. In- 
stead of proclaiming Christianity in the interest of God they 
have preached it in the interest of 'man'.3 
His ultimate charge against Hegel and the speculative 
philosophers is not essentially different. They too are the 
hirelings of natural man's egoism in his struggle against the 
Christian faith, in his revolt against the task of existence. 
Of the current teaching that 'history is the judgment' he 
says, "...but I know also that tabs is an invention of human 
shrewdness which does away with the God- relationship... "4 The 
real strength of Christianity lay in its early dogmatic 
terminology and to this strength speculative philosophy brings 
about an emasculation, simply by not thinking anything decisive 
in connection with the most decisive categories. 
"To such concepts as faith, incarnation, tradition, 
inspiration which in Christianity must be referred 
to a particular historical fact, it has seemed 
good 
to philosophers to give an entirely 
different general 
meaning.... "5 
Hegel, he says, "has quite consistently 
volatilised every dog- 
matic concept just far enough 
for it to support life in 
reduced 
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circumstances... "1 The concept of sin, "the conditio sine 
qua non' of Christianity,2 had been abolished. The paradox 
sensu strictissimo the speculative philosophers had swallowed 
up in their understanding.3 The distinction between knowledge 
and faith had been neglected.4 The "yawning abyss of quality 
in the difference between God and man "5 had been removed. 
This entire process, like the "counterfeiting of the concepts" 
through which it was made possible is, he says, "precisely in 
the direction of human egoism, so that he who is hoaxed by it 
is (if I may use the expression) the other party in the business 
of Christianity: God in heaven "6. and this process of "turn- 
ing Christianity topsy- turvy "7, of "making a fool out of Godi8, 
itself instigated by the pride of man, had been brought to its 
finest formulation. The human lie, the perennial revolt, had 
achieved a new state of perfection. In the speculative per- 
version of Christianity the age had discovered the means `where- 
by they were able to defy God and to forsake existence and 
nevertheless claim His blessing for their revolt. 
Kierkegaard symbolised the relationship between 
speculative philosophy and the scientific movement of his age 
in his use of the word 'uvidenskabelig' as a descriptive in 
the title of his formal attack upon the Hegelian system. 
Respecting the translation of this word Lo:1rie has written: 
"In English we have no other word to translate uvidenskabelig 
but 'unscientific,. The reference of this word 
is narrower, 
and yet it does not misrepresent the meaning 
of the title. 
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For it was principally against the natral sciences S.Y. in- 
veighed And in support of this view Lowrie quotes 
from the Journals: 
"Almost everything that nowadays flourishes 
most conspiciously under the name of science 
(especially as na ural science) is not really 
science but curiosity. In the end all corruption 
will come about as a consequence of the natural 
sciences.... u2 
It would be possible even further to buttress this view 
simply by quoting Lierkegaard's descrition of the natural 
sciences as "ridiculous ", as "nothing but a lot of jokes ", 
as a "dreadful sophistry ",3 as "scepticism" or "superstition''4. 
But all this, I believe, is to place an unwarranted inter- 
pretation upon Kierkegaard's thought: it is improperly to 
translate that thought into an objective result. Kierke- 
gaard's opposition is not principally against the natural 
sciences but rather against man having his primary concern 
with these sciences. nd this distinction is absolutely 
central for his thought. In actual fact his attack was upon 
the age's trust in objective scholarship, upon their pre- 
occupation with learning, upon their confidence in science 
as a methods and it is within this attack that his opposition 
to the natural sciences as, together with speculative phil- 
osophy, the outstanding manifestations of that preoccupation, 
must be understood. That this is so may be seen from the 
point of departure upon which he bases his criticism of these 
sciences. 
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1ierkegaard's attack upon the natural sciences falls 
within his. attack upon the orientation of life in the direct - 
ion of the objective and the abstract and this attack in turn 
is grounded in his insistence that the knower is an existing 
individual. 
"....it is incredible that man who has thought 
infinitely about himself as a spirit could think 
of choosing natural science (with empirical 
material) as his life's work and aim. ...only to 
dig up things and be brilliant -- -not to understand 
himself....the most frightful way of living: to 
fascinate and astonish the world by one's dis- 
coveries 41,nd brilliance, and not to understand 
oneself." 
"ll such scientific methods become particularly 
dangerous and -pernicious when they encroach upon 
the spiritual field. plants, animals and stars 
may be handled in that way, but to handle the 
spirit of man in such a fashion is blasphepy which 
only weakens moral and religious passion." 
"The subjective thinker is not a man of science, but an artist. 
Existing is an art. "3 l 'ind simply because existing is an art, 
because man's one essential task is to become an existing 
individual, his concern with the objective and the abstract 
represents a retreat from his true destiny. His objectivity 
is in the direction of inhumanity, of impersonality4s it leads 
away from decisions and from faith6: it is irreligious, ' it 
is opposed to Christianity,8 it is a "drunken dream "9, it is 
"madnessi10. It becomes "a kind of inhuman knowing for the 
production of which man's self is squandered "11. It 
is man's 
perversion of his own destiny. 
Of these three main thrusts against 
the age that 
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against the Hegelian philosophy was in every way central. It 
was directed against a philosophy which had furnished the 
apologetic for what its author regarded as the priestly per- 
version of the faith and it had also prepared the way for the 
public acceptance of the scientific or objective attitude to- 
ward human life and existence. furthermore inasmuch as this 
attack maintains that dialectical balance which is lacking in 
the later attack upon the established Church,1 inasmuch as it 
gives more explicit expression to the distinction between 
opposition to science as such and opposition to science as the 
primary concern of an existing individual, inasmuch as it al- 
ways has existence in view it indicates the tone of the whole 
of his thought. -s the central expression of his opposition 
to the age it provides the most suitable framework within 
which to consider his critique of rationalism, his attack 
upon the rationalism of the age. 
Unlike many of those who lived in his age Hierke- 
ward had much too genuine an admiration for the Hegelian 
philosophy to regard it as one which might here be wrong and 
there in need of but a little adjustment. He was quite cer- 
tain that nothing could be gained by a purely intellectual 
critique of Hegelianism (which, for Kierkegaard, was itself 
the epitome of intellectual thought) and even that such an 
attack 'would leave everything essentially unaltered "2. 
He 
attacked it rather as a philosophy which had forgotten 
what it 
means to be a single existing human being and 
those several 
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minute criticismslof the Hegelian terminology which are in- 
cluded are subservient to this end. His attack may be con- 
sidered in the light of the framework provided by the three 
broad existence spheres, the aesthetic, the ethical and the 
religious or rather, according to those judgments which are 
perhaps particularly appropriate to the point of view of each 
of these spheres. This means that the Hegelian philosophy, 
the "objective tendency ", is viewed from the aesthetic as "an 
essay in the comical "2 , from the ethical as "a demoralising 
aesthetic diversion for the "knowing subject 3, from the relig- 
ious and this assumption, implicit in Climacus, becomes ex- 
plicit in :gin- i -Cli acus, as "an ungodly and pantheistic self- 
deification. These are however but separate phases of the 
same attack. '....the ethical is his complicity with God. "5 
Climacus' own thesis is, he says, "that the Hegelian philos- 
ophy, by failing to define its relation to the existing 
individual (and it is herein that it is co "ical), and by 
ignoring the ethical, confounds existece "G. Of these three 
phases the religious and the ethical are for Kierkegaard 
finally the most critical and it is in his cate.jory of 'the 
individual' that these receive their most decisive formulation 
3ut before it is possible to consider even the preliminary 
expressions of these two levels it is necessary to turn to the 
first phase of the attack, to the protest that the Hegelian 
philosophy is "an essay in the comical ", a charge 
which, 
Kierkegaard says, "also lies in the metaphysical 
"7. 
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"Modern philosophy ", Kierkegaard says, is comicall 
it has "forgotten, in a sort of world- historical absent- minded- 
ness, what it means to be a human being "l. The speculative 
philosophers have nade themselves "fantastic ", "comical ".2 
:lnd_ so has Hegel. "...he is merely conic. "3 "I simply cannot 
help laughing when I think of Hegel's conception of Christi-n- 
ity, it is so utterly inconceivable. "4 "One thing always 
escaped Hegel -- -what it was to live. "5 They are comical- -and 
hence potentially tragic -- because they have forgotten the 
meaning of existence. 2or Kierkegaard, in contrast, the fact 
that man exists is that with which all thought must finally 
reckon. It is this existence which prevents the truth from 
being an abstract identity of thought and being,7 which is the 
basis of the distinction between essential and accidental know- 
, wich makes subjectivity to be the truth9 and objectiv- 
ity a misundersta ding10 it is existence which separates sub- 
ject and object,11 which makes an existential system impossible » -2 
which makes reality such that it "cannot be expressed in the 
language of abstraction "13. It is this same existence, it is 
the fact that man exists, which invokes the "aut- auti14 and 
r 
reinstates the principle of contradiction 5, which produces 
the paradox16 and prevents mediation17, which forbids the dis- 
interestedness of abstract thought and the detachedness of pure 
thought1-8. Existence is, he said, "the category upon which 
pure thought must suffer shipwreck "19. 
The first charge which Kierkegaard brings 
against 
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Hegel and the speculative philosophers is that they have failed 
to understand the meaning of existence, that they have falsified 
the nature of reality. In the Cartesian inference of existence 
from thought, in the Hegelian identification of the rational 
with the real, more specifically in his inclusion of a chapter 
entitled "Reality" in his Logic1 he saw a comic forgetfulness 
of existence, a disastrous falsification of reality and, it 
sho .ld be noted, an unjustifiable invasion of the secure realm 
of logic.' Kierkegaard's reply was incisive and unequivocal 
and that reply held that thought cannot think existence, that 
logic cannot conceive reality.3 
Kierkegaard's protest that logic cannot conceive 
reality is his point of departure not for an abstract criticism 
of logic but rather for an attempt to, as it were, buy back 
once again the reality which Hegel had put into pawn. He did 
not underestimate the difficulty of that task; it will, he 
said, "require some time to recall to mind what it is... 
The age had forgotten the meaning of reality because they had 
forgotten the meaning of existence. Like all of Kierkegaard's 
thought these terms refer primarily to the life of man and 
when understood in this connection they are synonymous.5 
- 
"Existence constitutes the highest interest of 
the existing individual, and his interest in his exist- 
ence constitutes his reality. .,hat reality is, 
cannot 
be expressed in the language of abstraction. 
Reality 
is an inter -esse between the to-ients 
of that hypo- 
thetical unify of thought and 
being which abstract 
thought presupposes. 
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The only reality to which an 
existing individual may 
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have a relation that is more than cognitive, is 
his own reality, the fact that he exists.... i1 
That what is reality for man is reality, that it is his own 
existence, does not mean that reality has been fashioned in 
the image of man. (Kierkegaard is not guilty of the ultimate 
charge which he presses against Hegel namely, that his 
"Reality" is shaped in the interest of rebellious man.) 
Kierkegaard is not saying that reality as such is conditioned 
by man; he is not saying that the existence of objects are 
but mere analogies to that of man. He is merely ioosisting 
that what is reality for man, i.e. that what is reality, is 
detemined by what man is, by the fact that he is an existing 
individual, that he is in process of becoming, that he is 
engaged in striving. "`_'he only reality that exists for an 
existing individual is his own ethical reality. "4 
Parallel with and giving further expression to the 
protest that logic cannot conceive reality is that which holds 
that thought cannot think existence. Again it is necessary 
to point out that Kierkegaardt s emphasis falls not upon a 
criticism of thought as such but rather upon a basic distinct- 
ion between existence and the concept of existence, between 
actuality and possibility. By existence Kierkegaard means 
empirical as distinct from ideal existence, he means factual 
as distinct from conceptual existence, he means es_e existent 
- 
iae as distinct from esse essentiae,3 he means 
existence 
which is irreducible to a concept as 
distinct from that which 
l5Cì 
has merely the existence of the concept.- This is of course 
essentially the disti ction set forth by Plato but for Kierke- 
gaard it is the individual, the particular which exists, which 
has reality. By existence he means existence, 11e means that 
for which the "to be --or not to be" is of "duite decisive 
importance "2. "...exitence corresponds to the individual 
thing... "3 "Existence is always something particular, the 
abstract does not exist. "4 
In his insistence that thought cannot conceive 
existence or reality Kieregaard is in essential agreement both 
with Kant's conclusion "that with 'existence no new measta_r_ement 
is added to the concept' "5 and with Schelling's "intellectual 
intuition" of reality which. had employed this Kantian insight 
as a new point of departure.6 But whereas for Kant there is 
merely a cle,vage between thought and existence there is for 
r 
Kierke gaard a definite opposition.? Thought he views as a 
dubious substitute for existence or reality: it knows these 
at the cost of knowing them as a possibility. "...it's (i.e. 
abstract thought's) concept of reality is a false reflection 
,.. "8 _'or him the question of reality, of existence, cannot 
properly arise in connection with thought or the concepts 
with which thought operates. Seeing therefore Kant' s phil- 
osophy as a "misleading reflection which brings reality into 
connection with thought "9, his thing -in- itself as 
the temptat- 
ion to which Hegel had succumbed he gave 
to the original 
Kantian insight a more positive formulation. 
1Tothing is 
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added to a concept whether it has existence or not...i1 "The 
only thing -in- itself which cannot be thought is existence and 
this does not come within the province of thought to think. "2 
But not only h reality no place within thought, not only is 
it merely to be excluded from thought, but it definitely has 
a place, and this not merely by default, within the ethical. 
It is, in fact, the ethical. lgain, "The only reality that 
exists for an existing individual is his own ethical reality "3. 
Now that existence and reality have been wrested 
from its province it May be asked what remains with which logic 
may concern itself. Kierkegaard's reply is that there yet re- 
mains all that properly belongs to its sphere, all that it is 
able to assimilate. Logic, he says, is concerned with that 
which is solely because it is as ppposed to that which is 
because it exists or has existed,4 it is concerned with the 
realm of essence as opposed to that of existence.° "Nothing 
must,,,,be incorporated in a logical system that has any 
relation to existence, that is not indifferent to existence. "b 
Logic is concerned with the necessary but the real or that 
which exists is not necessary as is proved by the fact that 
it has come into being? "i.e. has suffered the change involved 
in passing from potentiality to actuality ( K 1Y Y1 o-IS ) "8 . iTor 
do "contradiction, movement, transition, and so forth9" 
have 
any place in logic. 
"In logic no movement can cone about, for logic 
is 
and ' everything logical simply is, and this 
impoT7nce 
of logic is the transition to 
the s h8re of being 
-,There existence and reality appear. 
1 
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Those transitions which do take place in reality, in the 
sphere of the actual, appear in logic, in the sphere of the 
1 
possible, as a leap from one concept to another. Concepts 
do not change: it is reality which makes the transition. All 
transitions are actual rather than loical.2 Logic is wholly 
separate from the world of reality and to raise the question 
of existence in connection with logic is merely to confound 
discourse. Each of these realms has its own dialectic. 
"Everything depends upon making the difference between 
quantitative and qualitative dialectic absolute. The 
whole of logic is quantitative or modal dialectic, . 
since everything is and everything is one and the same. 
(,ualitative dialectic is concerned with existence." 
This distinction is, and for the sake of both reality and logic 
must be absolute. Reality is existence: "The eternal expres- 
sion of logic is...Nothing comes into existence, everything is." 
:Lncl it was this latter expression which "the Eleatic School 
transferred by mistake to existence.... "4 
To logic and thought Kierkegaard grants validity but, 
he says, "why confuse the validity of thought with reality ? "5 
"Abstract thought considers both possibility and 
reality, but its concept of reality is a false 
reflection, since the medium within which the con- 
cept is thought is not reality, but possibility. 
Abstract thought can get hold of reality only by 
nullifying it, and this nullification of reality, 
consists in transforming it into possibility. All 
that is said within the language of abstraction and 
within the sphere of abstract thought, is really 
said within the sphere of the possible.r6 
"Existence is always something particular, the 
abstract 
does not exist. From this to draw the conclusion 
that 
the abstract is without validity is 
a misunderstanding: 
but it is also a misunderstanding 
to confound discourse 
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by even raising the question of existence, or of 
reality in the sense of existence in connection 
with the abstraet.ii1 
Logic operates with concepts the medium of which is the pos- 
sible.2 "All knowledge about reality is possibility. "3 
Thought and logic therefore give "validity in the sense of 
possibility" rather than "reality in the sense of actuality "4. 
And this is precisely as it should be because aesthetically 
and intellectually possibility is higher than reality which 
is what Aristotle implies by saying that poetry is higher 
than history.5 The intellectual is and ought to be indifferent 
to reality or existence. As soon as this is forgotten, as 
soon as a teleology is imposed upon thought, the ethical is 
immediately present forbidding a conclusion which is "ethically 
deceitful and metaphysically unclear "6. The ethical however 
does away with the disinterestedness of the possible and insists 
upon the actual, upon existence or reality. "Ethically 
regarded, reality is higher than possibility. "7 
Before passing on however we may turn briefly to 
several conclusions which have their basis in the general 
point of view just described. From the denial of logical 
necessity to the realm of the actual, from the insistence that 
transition is actual rather than logical it follows that real 
movement is once again introduced into existence, that the 
actual is no longer to be viewed as necessary, that history 
is a realm of freedom and meaning, that ethics 
becomes pos- 
sible.8 Nor should it be forgotten that by 
this same 
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distinction Kierkegaard intended to free logic from the burden 
of reality in order that it might be free to pursue the lofty 
disinterestedness of the possible.1 again, from the conclusion 
that thought cannot reach through to existence it follows that 
existence cannot be inferred from thought. "The attempt to 
infer existence from Nought is...a contradiction. "2 The 
Cartesian cogito is a mere tautology in which the first 
proposition says even more than the second.3 Spinoza's essent'ia 
involvit existentiam is also a tautological proposition.4 Ivor 
can any of the proofs. for the éxistence of God succeed in 
establishing anything more than his merely ci ceptual existence 
which is however necessarily presupposed in the beginning.5 
'with respect to reality logical thought operates within an 
hypothesis and it is impossible to make the conclusion inde- 
pendent of that hypothesis.6 The confusion which surrounds 
the attempt to prove the existence of God, or, since "degrees 
of reality" within factual existence are really a bisurid,gr- 
standing,7 of anything else for that matter, "is the same as 
that involved in explaining reJlity within the realm of pure 
thought "S. So too from the fact that aesthetically and 
intellectually possibility is higher than reality it follows 
that understanding is the highest relation to a doctrine even 
as from the fact that ethically reality is higher than 
possibility it follows that to be a disciple is the highest 
relationship to an existential communication. The task is to 
understand Hegel: it is to become a Christian.9 
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The protests which we have just considered are 
essentially logical and metaphysical protests and so fall 
within a realm which is outside of or rather, an "abbreviation+' 
or "priority" for the three existente spheres.1 The categories 
of logic and metaphysics belong rather to that realm which is 
indifferent to existence - --a fact carefully suggested by the 
absence of any specific work upon these subjects -- -they do 
not in themselves, strictly speaking, exist as such. Such 
judgments can therefore as well be made, or at least theoretic- 
ally so, from the aesthetic as the religious point of view. 
But the real attack cannot fall within this realm for it is 
not here that man has his existence. The significance of 
these protests consists rather in that fact tht, as tB have 
seen, they are themselves a prior expression for the real 
attack.. Nor can this attack occur within the aesthetic sphere 
for it is not here that man has his real existence. (The 
charge, it will be recalled, is that the Hegelian philosophy 
is itself essentially aesthetic -metaphysical in nature. The 
choice posited, it will also be recalled, is that between the 
aesthetic and the religious containing the ethical within it- 
self.) It had rather to be urged from the ethical, and 
finally from the religious, and it was this which Kierkegaard 
suggested when, referring to the Hegelian 'Idea of universal 
history' he said: "It is not my intention to show how comical 
this is, but rather to try to make it clear...what objection 
Ethics and the ethical have to raise against this entire 
order 
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of things. "1 Basically this objection was that "the absolute 
ethical distinction between good and evil tends for the 
historical survey to be neutralized in the aesthetic -meta- 
physical determination of the great and significant....i2 
It is within the ethical that reality is first truly 
encountered :3 it is here that existence is first definitely 
accentuated :4 it is here teat the real subject, the ethically 
existing subject,5 is discovered. The ethical is that sub- 
jectivity which is the truth, it is that inwardness which "is 
precisely the fountain which springeth up unto eternal lifei6, 
it is itself "the very breath of the eternal "7, it is in the 
direction of the only true certitude. 
"'The ethical alone is certain; to concentrate upon 
the ethical yields the only knowledge which may not 
possibly in the last moment transform itself into an 
hypothesis; to exist in the ethical constitutes the 
only secure knowledge, the knowledge being rendered 
secure by something else.' "8 
Such certitude cannot come through the pursuit of the objective 
sciences: "...objective security cannot be thought in con - 
junction with existence "9. It "can only be attained by and 
exist in action "10. The ethical is the sphere of action: it 
is created. in action and can maintain itself only in action. 
"Once a man acts in a decisive sense and comes into reality, 
existence can get a grip on him and providence educate him. "11 
It "can be had only in the infinite, where he cannot as an 
existing subject remain, but only repeatedly arrive "12. 
The 
ethical consists in realising the eternal in 
the temporal,13 
in translating the possible into the 
actual. It is the precise 
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opposite of knowledge which "consists in translating the real 
into the possible"1. 
Prom within the sphere of the strictly ethical 
Kierkegaard urges two quite definite charges against Hegel 
namely, that he had formulated an ethic within the framework 
of a fundamentally aesthetic philosophy and that, by equating 
the rational with the real, by transforming the historical' 
into a realm of necessity, he had made any proper ethic im- 
possible. In his transformation of Christianity he had of 
course also destroyed the true God- relationship which for 
Kierkegaard is the basis of the ethical but this we shall con- 
sider from the sphere of the religious. First we must turn to 
these two charges and, before proceeding to the religious, to 
his criticism of the Kantian rationalist ethic. 
That, like Descartes,' Hegel had completed his 
System without the inclusion of an Ethics Kierkegaard regarded 
as a serious error but he regarded as even more disastrous the 
fact that he had elaborated an ethic within the framework of 
his essentially aesthetic -metaphysical philosophy. 
"The Hegelian philosophy culminates in the proposition 
that the outward is the inward and the inward is the 
outward. , iith this Hegel virtually finishes. But 
this principle is essentially an aesthetic- metaphy- 
sical one, and in this way the Hegelian philosophy is 
happily finished, or it is fraudulently finished by 
lumping everything (including the ethical 
and the 
religious) indiscriminately in the 
aesthetic -meta- 
physical.i3 
Hegel had made the ethical commensurable 
with the world - 
historical, he had, by means of 
his principle of mediation 
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(which, for Kierkegaard was the core of Hegelianism)1, denied 
the absolute relationship of the existing-; individual to the 
absolute telos, 2 he had related the individual to the absolute 
through the universal rather than to the universal through the 
absolute.3 (In this respect compare Kierrkegaard' s insistence 
that the individual is related to the a., e through his primary 
relationship to God, to Christ, to the race.`) He had formu- 
lated an unethical ethic.:. 
"The derelict Hegelian ethics, with its des- 
perate attempt to make the Mate the court of last 
resort, is a most unethical attempt to reduce the 
individuals to finitude, an unethical flight f rom 
the category of individual personality to the 
category of the race...." 
This Hegelian ethic Kierkegaard expressed by saying that "The 
ethical is the universal, and as such it is again the divinei6. 
rind it was against this formulation of ethics, against this 
mediation of the absolute through the universal, against this 
positing of the world- historical as the ethical task for the 
individual, against this impersonally objective rather than a 
truly personally subjective determination of the ethical that 
he rebelled. For Kierkegaard the ethical borders upon the 
religious, upon the truly personal. It is related to faith;7 
it is "his complicity with Godi8. The ethical must be sought 
for itself;9 it is the protest against the immorality of the 
"results" criterion,10 against those who would become "world - 
historically significant "11. The ethical is action:12 it is 
freedom.13 There is nothing between the truly existing 
in- 
dividual and God but the ethical.14 .Lnd, Kierkegaard 
says, 
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"If our age had not the distinction of simply ignoring the 
duty of existing, it would be inconceivable that such wisdom 
as the Hegelian could be regarded as the hi.hest, as maybe it 
is for aesthetic contemplators, but not either for ethical or 
for religious existers."1 
But it was with a much more serious charge which 
Kierkegaard finally confronted Hegel, the charge namely that 
by his false interpretation of history he had rendered ethics 
impossible. l s we have already noted the basis of this 
objection2 we shall here be primarily concerned to understand 
its relevance in terms of the ethical. His criticism of that 
"anti- Christian evolution "3 which had already made its appear- 
ance in his own time is founded upon this basis. hat ", he 
said, "will be the consequence for life of a theory which con- 
ceives the world as a necessary evolution? Must it not 
paralyze all activity ?i4 It was this same ethical emphasis 
which afforded the basis of his criticism of the Hegelian 
interpretation of history which he regarded not as a philo- 
sophy of history in the meaningful sense of that term but 
rather as a lei ilosophy of evolution which having attributed 
necessity to the -ast had denied freedom to the future and 
which, having confused God with man and Eternity with time, 
had quite naturally transformed Christianity (for Kierkegaard 
the proper juncture of God and man, of Eternity and time)5 into 
a transcended phase in the history of the human race.6 Vor 
Kierkegaard, as we have already seen, the historical 
is not, 
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and cannot be, necessary. 
",...nothing comes into being by necessity, because 
becoming and necessity contradict -one another.... 
still less, therefore, does anything become necessary 
by coming into being. The one thing that it is im- 
possible to become, is to become necessary; because 
the necessary is always presupposed as being." 
When, as in the case of the Hegelian philosophy, the historical 
is interpreted as necessary, when history is viewed from a 
point within time, the becoming which belongs to history is set 
aside and the possibility of ethical activity, of freedom, is 
denied. 
"....everything said in Hegel's philosophy about pro- 
cess and becoming is illusory. That is why the system 
lacks an Ethic, and is the reason why it has no answer 
for the living when the question of becoming is raised 
in earnest, in the interest of action. In spite of all 
that Hegel says about process, he does not understand 
history from the p-oin3t. -off view of beecasing, but with - the -hélp 
of the illusion attaching to pastness understands it 
from the point of view of a finality that excludes all 
becoming. 
The Hegelian philosophy had conceived man apart from God, time 
apart from eternity. It had made history the judge. It had, 
and this v1L,s the charge, it had made ethics impossible. 
For Kierkegaard it is the ethical which binds man to 
God; it is in his ethical activity that man expresses both 
himself and his God -relationship. The Hegelian philosophy he 
attacked because it did not permit expression of either the 
true self or the true God -relationship. And it was for both 
of these reasons that he also opposed the earlier rationalist 
ethic as it was given formal expression in the Kantian philo- 
sophy and practical expression in the age in which he lived. 
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Kant had insisted that man must act in accord with the dictates 
of reason, that he must act from a sense of duty or obligation, 
that he must act in such a manner that he could consistently 
will that his standard might be universally applied. This, 
Kierkegaard believed, was to conceive the ethical apart from 
God, it was to make God play a subordinate role,1 it was to 
understand both God and the ethical as wholly abstract.2- It 
could, he thought, lead finally only to "lawlessness or 
experimentationi3. The practical consequences of this type of 
theory he observed in his own age, in the fact that men had 
ceased to express themselves in their activity and had sought 
refuge in a principle. nor such a perversion of the ethical 
Kierkegaard's condemnation is unequivocal. 
....a principle is something purely external for the 
.sake of which he does one thing as willingly as 
another and the opposite of both into the bargain.... 
A principle, in that sense, becomes a monstrous some- 
thing or other, an abstraction, just like the public.i4 
"'On principle' a man can do anything, take part in any- 
thing and himself remain inhuman and indeterminate.... 
one can do anything ton principle' and avoid all per- 
sonal responsibility. People pull to peces ton prin- 
ciple' what they admire personally...." 
The Kantian ethic was, he thought, together with the Hegelian 
philosophy, the appropriate expression of an age of anonymity,6 
of objectivity,7 of impersonality,8 of irresponsibility,9 for 
a day of disobedience,10 of gregarious noisiness, of empty 
comraderie, for an age in which reason reigned as had once the 
law,11 for a day in which man had chosen his own abolition. 
It is from the point of view of the strictly 
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religious, ultimately from that of the specifically Christian 
religious, that Kierkegaard makes his final attack upon the 
Hegelian philosophy. And the charge which he urged was that 
it had completely transformed Christianity, that it had fal- 
sified the true framework of human existence, that it was the 
ally of natural man in his struggle against God and against 
his true self. The judgments which he urges are spiritual 
judgments; they are based upon Christian insights and they 
employ Biblical categories. They are judgments which assume 
that man let prefers. the Law to the Gospel, the security of 
justice to the mercy of love, the comfort of knowledge to the 
risk of faith, the ease of thought to the demands of existence. 
They are judgments which assume that rants is a rebellious 
spirit and that his intellect is in the service of that rebell- 
ion. They are judgments which assume that Hegel was popular 
not because of the greatness of his philosophy but rather 
because he provided a refuge against the task of becoming a 
singly existing individual, 
1 because his is the philosophy of 
inhumanity, of the mass, of 'the public', of 'the crowd'. 
The religious, like the ethical, accentutes exist- 
ence but it is distinguished from the ethical in thE..t the 
believer, as opposed to the ethicist, is infinitely interested 
not in his own existence but rather in the existence of 
another, in the factual existence of the God -man.2 He is 
infinitely interested in the fact that God became man, that 
the Eternal came into time, He stakes his life upon this 
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absolute paradox, upon that which c :institutes the break with 
all thinking, upon that which can be believed only by virtue 
of the absurd. The absolute paradox cannot be understood, it 
will not be understood: ...in connection with the absolute 
paradox the only understanding possible is that it cannot be 
understoodi1. ". it...thrusts the understanding away in the 
interests of inwardness in existing. "2 "...the essential para- 
dox is the protest against immanence.r3 It is God's defence 
against man, it is Eternity's defence against time, it is 
Christianity's defence against speculation. It is the final 
defence of existence against the deceit of the understanding. 
The absolute paradox Kierkegaard regarded as the 
characteristic expression of Christianity, the Hegelian 
abrogation of this paradox as the decisive expression for its 
complete transformation. This transformation was given paralle] 
expression in the Hegelian insistence that faith is prior to 
immediacy, that it can properly be replaced by the understand - 
ing.4 For Kierkegaard such a transformation was treason almost 
without equal.5 Hegelianism had related the paradox to the 
relative difference between man and man rather than to the 
absolute qualitative difference between God and man and in 
thereby destroying the absolute nature of the paradox it had 
hopelessly confused the separate existence spheres. It had 
transformed Christianity into a doctrine, it had transferred 
it to the sphere of the intellectual, it had set the wise man 
against the simple.6 Against t is Kierkegaard holds 
that the 
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absolute paradox cannot be understood, that Christianity does 
not belong to the sphere of the intellectual, that faith, in 
the proper sense of that term, can never be replaced by the 
understanding. Faith properly belongs to the sphere of the 
paradoxical religious; it is, together with the paradox, the 
mark ofnols existence in time, it is the means by which he is 
properly related to God. It is "not a class for numskulls"' 
nor does it even belong within the realm of the intellectual. 
Indeed, "the maximum of attainment within the sphere of the 
intellectual....is in the sphere of faith at the opposite end 
of the scale "2. What is demanded in the sphere of the 
intellectual, in relation to a doctrine, is to understand but 
what is demanded in the sphere ¡if faith, in relation to an 
existence -communication is to exist.3 Christianity belongs 
to the latter of these spheres and "every misunderst ;...nding of 
Ch'i stianity may at once be recognised by its transforming it 
into a doctrine, transferring it to the sphere of the in- 
tellectual. "4 This was of course precisely the charge which 
he laid against the Hegelians and he did not fail to add that 
they had transferred Christianity to this sphere ttiat, they 
might gain the advantage of seeming to understand it.5 4.nd 
that, Kierkegaard says, is "merely an evasion of the task "6. 
It had been with the assistance of th_, principle of 
mediation that this transformation of Christianity had 
b _ en 
accomplished and the result thereby achieved was 
fundamentally 
analogous to the havoc wrought within 
the sphere of the ethical 
by this same principle. .iithin the ethical mediation had 
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proved, to be the rebellion of relative ends against the 
majesty of the absolute; within the religious it was the ex- 
pression for the yet more fundamental rebellion of man against 
God. It is the means whereby the paradox is annulled, where- 
by faith comes to be but a transcended phase, whereby the 
existential rec;uirements of Christianity are set aside. _,nd 
it is, when all of these fortifications have been removed, 2, 
finally the device with the help of which man imagines himself 
upon a level with God. This principle was, hierkegaard believed, 
the typical expression of Hegelianism and of autonomous philo- 
sophy as such, of the a.;e in which he himself lived and of 
every other age in which under the guise of intellectual 
doubt,1 man rebels against God. It is the means whereby man 
endeavours to "fraternize with God "', to make Him commensurable 
with himself,3 it is his attempt to deprive God of his 
authority," it is his insistence that He shot id. be directly 
coo isable.5 Lll this Kierkegaard implied when he wrote: "The 
idea of philosophy is mediation--- Christiewi tÿ' s is the paradox" 6. 
To natural man's effeminate self- love,7 to his 
sensuous reluctance to be spirit,8 to his innate desire for 
security and certitude Kierkegaard attributed the age's con- 
cern to achieve a "lei :al security "9, to maintain God's exist- 
ence by objective proofs10, to act 'en principle'11, 
to be 
"instead of a self, a number, just one man 
more, one more 
renitition of this everlasting Einerlei "12. 
o also it Was to 
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this that [ae attributed their complacent satiif.:.ction with the 
objective vie of man,1 their willing acceptance of the abstract 
conception of truth. It was, he believed, this cowardliness 
which was the basis of the popularity of the objective sciences 
and Hegelianism. The latter of these Kierkegaard regarded as 
the shrewd expression of the revolt of natural man, as the 
formulation or rationalisation of he who in order that he might 
live in ease and security had chosen a world of death -like 
stillness, in order that he might be free from choice had 
chosen a world without choice, in order that he might always 
live in society had chosen a world without selves, in order 
that he might be 'man' had chosen a world without God. It was, 
he thought, the statement of man's impatience with time, of 
his rebellion against existence, of his abolition of his own 
true self from the universe. To this philoso_)hy, and to that 
for which it is the expression, Christianity is unalterably 
opuosed. It relates eternity to time within time, it para- 
doxically accentuates existence, it repudiates the security of 
the world of man, it rejects the false safe: juards which in- 
dolent and superstitious 'man' sets against "the omnipresence 
3 
of the dialectical "2. It insists that man is a spirit,' that 
he must become 'the individual' alone before God. It is the 
mortal enemy of natural man, _end it is the framework of true 
humanity. 
'Tot only does Kierkegaard himself assume that "it is 
the God- relationship which makes a man a man "4 but 
he also 
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assumes that natural man himself understands this fact and 
that, understanding this, he has secretly resolved to achieve 
for and by himself that which God has promised to him in 
eternity. In this attempt to give the life of man a completely 
temporal orientation Hegelianism had been uniquely successful. 
It had succeeded in making over Christianity from what it 
really was, from the one really serious threat to the security 
of man's world, into an apparently indubitable guarantee of 
that security. It had refused the insecurity of history,' it 
h a d destroyed the necessity for decision, it had substituted 
knowledge for faith, it had established its own false eternity 
within time. It had spurned God's affirmation of man and had 
substituted for it man's affirmation of himself. It had made 
of Christianity "a superficial something which neither wounds 
nor heals profoundly enough.... 112 It was, he said, "the false 
invention of human sympathy which forgets the infinite 
qualitative difference between God and man "3. 
In Hegel's substitution of knowledge for faith, in 
his promise of certitude, in his guarantee of security - --in 
the fact that he had made the world over to man's own speci- 
f ications--- Kierkegaard saw the essential revocation of ex- 
istence.4 In all this he saw an impatient flight from 
time 
to an eternity which for from being the fullness 
of time was 
instead the negation of real time. Kierkegaard's 
judgment 
upon this artful substitution -- -and 
hence his final judgment 
upon rationalism - -- follows from 
his adherence to the Biblical 
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view of sin as the onnosite of faith. 1 This same absolute 
op oosi.tion he posited between knowled` ;e and f.,ith, Knowledge 
is the secured possession, it is the blessing of eternity: 
faith is the mark of man's existence in time. _an ' s desire to 
live by knowledge, with guarantees, with 'probability, with 
certainty---with security -- -was sin: it was his anxiety to be 
Lone with time and to escape to eternity. It was impatience. 
That this receives yet more decisive formulation can be seen 
from Kierkegaardts own conclusion respecting the nature of 
that dread which he had earlier described as "the presupposition 
of original sin "2. "Dread ", he says, "is r ally nothing but 
impatience. "3 
The age' s 'demand for security expressed itself in 
its reform of the monarchy, in its plea for democracy and its 
passion for societies, in its concern with self- protective 
legislation and social guarantees4 but it was in "Christendom ", 
in its attempt to identify culture with religion,5 that this 
demand achieved its fullest expression. It was here that man 
secretly confessed that he really wanted to abolish God; it 
was here that he whispered softly in His ear that the human 
race was, perhaps, after all the inventor of Christianity.6 
"Christendom" its "precisely this deification of the established 
order which constitutes the constant rebellion, the permanent 
revolt against God "7. It is the complete abs ante 
of inward- 
ness, it "is the invention of the indolent 
worldly mind, which 
would put itself at rest and imagine 
that all is sheer security 
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and peace, that now we have reached the highest attainment "1. 
It is the final implication of objectivity in the sphere of 
the relligious, it is that shrewd wisdom, that "empty external - 
ism"2 the outstanding historical example of which is the con- 
duct of the scribes and Pharisees.3 It is, in fact, Pharisay 
ism, it is "just contempt for God "4, it is "the secularisation 
o' evrything"5. It is that "baptised paganismr6, which, 
simply because it is baptised, simply because it has judicious - 
ly arranged to have 'God' on its side, simply because it has 
remembered to have recourse to the traditional phrases and 
usuages' is, like that attitude for which it is the expression, 
"the true corruption, making every saving relationship im- 
possible... i8 "The established order is the rational "9 and-- - 
listen:-- -the deification of that order is, in the sphere of 
the religious it is, rationalism. Such an illusion could not 
easily be overcome: it could certainly never be intellectually 
overcome. Indeed, looking back upon his task Kierkegaard con- 
cluded that it was "intelligence and nothing else that had to 
be opposed "10. It could, he had always known, be overcome 
only through religionll and that, for Kierkegaard, finally 
meant Christianity. It could be overcome only by setting 
himself against it: 'the crowd' could be overcome only by 
'the individual' .12 
"rind every one who has even a little dialectic 
will perceive that it is impossible to attack the 
System from a point within the System. But out- 
side of it there is only one point, truly a sper- 
matic point, the individual, ethically and 
religiously conceived and existentially accentuated," 
Point of View, p. 131n, 
Chapter V 
17C 
RECONSTRUCTION: 'THE INDIVIDUAL' 
'The individual''(hiin Enkelte) is the direction in 
::ihich Kierkegaard's entire life was oriented, it is the sub- 
ject with which the whole of his writings were finally con- 
cerned, it is the point upon which all interpretation must 
ultimately be based.' He did not claim to have achieved this 
category nom does he anywhere explicitly define its nature 
but yet it is of absolutely central importance for his life 
and thought. "With the category of 'the individual' is bound 
up any ethical importance I may have. "2 "'The individual'; 
now that the world has gone so far along the road of reflection 
Christianity stands and falls with that category. "3 It is that 
'The anticipation of whichîis set forth in the pseudonymous 
works, the final formulation of which in the specifically 
Christian. It is the concern of the "Two 'Notes' Concerning 
My Work as an Author" which are appended to The Point of View. 
It is the way which Kierkegaard symbolically indicated in his 
relationship with Regine, it is his opposition to 'the crowds. 
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It is the central category, the focal point for the whole of 
his thought. 
The progress of the authorship from the aesthetic 
through the philosophic to the religious has already been 
described and we may therefore now briefly trace this move - 
ment with reference to 'the individual' which is itself 
essentially a religious category. The preface of the first' 
and each subsequent volume of the Edifying Discourses called 
attention to the fact that they seek "'that individual' whom 
with joy and gratitude I call ma reader "1. In the recurrence 
of this 'stereotyped formula' Kierkegaard found support for 
his contention that this category "is not a later invention 
of mine but first thoughti2. But was not upon this 
alone that he based this insistence. 'The individual', he 
held, had been present throughoút the whole of the authorship. 
"In every one of the pseudonymous works this theme 
of 'the individual' comes to evidence in one way 
or another; but there the individual is pre - 
dominantly the pre -eminent individual in the 
aesthetic sense, the distinguished person,& c. ... 
..The starting -point of the pseudonymns is the 
difference between man and man with respect to in- 
tellect, culture, 4c; the starting point of the 
edifying works is the edifying thought of the 
universal human. "3 
This category was in fact present in the pseudonymous works, 
particularly in the pseudonymous aesthetic works, in the same 
sense in which the religious was present in these works: it 
was negatively present. The Postscript in contrast - --it was 
the "turning- point" of the production -- -was at the same 
time 
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essentially related to his formulation of this category. 
Kierkegaard saw clearly that both 'the individual! and !the 
public' to which it was opposed was "a thought in which is 
contained an entire philosophy of life and of the worldi1. 
And he saw too that before it wa possible even to begin to 
expound the final religious implications involved in becoming 
'the individual' - - -a task which he did not attempt until the 
specifically Christian works - --it was first of all necessary 
to bring into sharpest possible focus the opposition between 
these two thoughts. This 'was the task which was undertaken 
in the Postscript and it was this task which Johannes Climacus 
described as that of discovering "where the misunderstanding 
lies between speculative philosophy and Christianity "2. 
Kierkegaard's 'the individual! is traditionally 
accounted for in terms of the indignities which he suffered 
at the hands of the public following his clash with the 
Corsair.3 There can be no doubt that this incident was in- 
strumental in _prompting him to give to this category a more 
specific formulation but as he has himself insisted, and as 
the Journals4testify, this category had already been conceived 
years prior to this affair. His clash with 'the crowd' is 
merely the moment at which this thought was brought to birth 
and in order to fully understand its nature it is necessary 
to trace back to the moment of its conception, to his relation- 
ship to Regine. It is in his renunciation of the woman he 
loved that, as Buber has rightly insisted,5 !the individual' 
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has its beginning and while we may not rest with his inter- 
pretation of that relationship, with his understanding of 
Regine, it is here too that we must begin. 
Buber accounts for Kierkegaardls 'the single one! in 
terms of his renunciation of Regine and from this identification 
he concludes that !the individual! is a category of exclusion,' 
that it is the sign of Kierkegaard's renunciation of the world 
of human beings,- that it is a "merely religious category "3. 
This is, I believe, a most feasible misinterpretation and be- 
cause it is based upon a typical, I should say, natural mis- 
understanding of Kierkegaard's relationship to Regine a ref- 
erence to it can scarcely be avoided. For Buber Regine is 
men ely a young girl of seventeen, a girl who is beautiful and 
in love, a girl for whom there seems scarcely any conceivable 
end but that of marriage. This is perhaps very close to the 
Regine of the young Kierkegaard, of the Kierkegaard who is 
prior even to the writing of Either /Or but it is also very far 
from the Regine of the mature Kierkegaard, of the Kierkegaard 
who even after Regine was engaged to another did not cease to 
hope that she would yet become his 'that individual!. end it 
is, I believe, in terms of the Regine of this later Kierke- 
gaard that !the individual' must be understood. 
It ought perhaps to be confessed that 
Regine seems 
to present the interpretor with even more 
p,.oblems than !the 
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individual', that a reference to her seems often to obscure 
rather than to illuminate this category but it remains never- 
theless true that she constitutes the central problem of 
Kierkegaard's life, that she is related to the early author- 
ship at its end as is 'the individual' at its beginning, that 
if we are rightly to understand this category we must accept 
her ::.s a necessary if ambiguous point of departure. :Kierke- 
gaard has however provided considerable assistance in Fear 
and Trembling and, perhaps less consciously, in the movement 
of the authorship from the aesthetic through the ethical to 
the religious. This movement was, in actual fact, the 
shadow of the progress of his relationship with Regine and 
it was this in part which he implied when he said of the 
authorship that it was the reflection of the education which 
he had himself received at the hands of Governance. This 
relationship is also suggested by the many obvious parallels 
between his account of his acuivity as an author and his 
relationship to Regine. It was during the course of the 
production that Kierkegaard came finally to understand himself 
in this relationship and it is in the end of this production 
that we will find the Regine in terms of whom his 'the 
individual' ought properly to be conceived. 
The progress of the authorship is forecast in Fear 
and Trembling in which, under the guise of treating Abraham's 
willingness to sacrifice his son, Kierkegaard considered the 
problem of the justification of the breaking of his own bond 
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with Regine. The resolution of this work, for it is not too 
much to. call it that, is that ethics are not supreme, that 
Abraham is not lost ;1 it is that the religious is supreme, 
that Abraham and, or at least by implication, Kierkegaard him- 
self is justified. For neither however can there any longer 
be refuge in the ethical, in the universally valid: both have 
acted by virtue of the absurd, of that which constitutes a 
break with all thinking and for such there can be no justificatio 
other than that of faith. All such actions are away from 
human standards and judgments, they are away from human thought 
and philosophy,2 they are away from immanence and immediacy. 
They are in the direction of transcendence and spirit. It 
was a religious justification which Kierkegaard gave to 
Abraham even as it was a religious interpretation which he gave 
to his own relationship to Regine. 
In the pl blic account of the authorship Kierkegaard 
insisted that the aesthetic works had been a deceit employed 
in order to meet the age upon its own terms, that, in reality, 
he was a religious author from first to last. It was a similar 
interpretation which he had already given to his relationship 
to Regine: his courtship, he acknowledged, had itself really 
been a deceit, he was, he confessed, really a religious lover 
after all.3 It was, however, with great care that he employed 
the word 'deceit' with reference to the authorship4 and that 
term must be understood with the same degree of care with 
respect to Regine. It was, he believed, in both instances a 
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deceit in the interest of the deceived. lend this inter- 
pretation of the word is perhaps not less applicable to itegine 
than to the re:der. To us she must appear as she to whom 
Kierkegaard was ethically false: to Kierkegaard she was the 
one to whom he was eternally responsible, to whom he was 
completely faithful.1 She was the one in respect of whom he 
dared to set the absolute against the universal, the eternal 
against the temporal, God against man. She is, when thus 
understood, the Regine who corresponds to the strictly 
religious, the specifically Christian end of the authorship 
and she is, when thus understood, the Regine in terms of whom 
'the individual' ought properly to be interpreted. 
One more word in this same connection. Regine is 
the one whom Kierkegaard lost in this world; she is the one 
about whom the authorship was written. She is also the one 
whom Kierkegaard wooed for eternity; she is the one to whom 
the authorship was written. She is the first, the primary 
"'that individual' whom with joy and gratitude I call ma 
reader "2. No more however than his refusal to marry her pre- 
vents him from seeking her as 'the individual', no more than 
it prevents her from becoming 'the individual', does the fact 
that he seeks her first mean that he does not also seek 
another. He does in fact seek another and it is through 
Regine or rather through 'that individual' which is his veiled 
reference to Regine, that he seeks that other. It was through 
its concrete concern that the authorship achieved its wider 
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significance and so too it is through its intimate address 
that it achieves its universal relevance . . . to individuals. 
It was as a result of the affair of the Corsair, of 
his own collision with !the crowd' that Kierkegaard came 
finally to understand the extent of the dissolution of the 
age, that !the individual' was brought to birth, that it was 
raised to the level of a category claiming a universal rather 
than a merely personal significance. Henceforth !the indi- 
vidual! takes its emphasis from !the crowd! rather than from 
Regine but before it is possible to have reference to this 
new point of departure it is necessary to see what it is that 
Kierkegaard means by !the crowd!, to see, for example than he 
does not and cannot possibly mean what the spiritually proud 
and the politically aristocratic mean by this term. 3y 'the 
crowd' Kierkegaard understands first of all the crowd of his 
own day and his own city, the mob led by the irresponsible 
journal of satire, the abstraction into which at the time of 
its attack his many friends had vanished. But at the same time 
he understands this crowd as any other crowd, as !the crowd!, 
as an anonymous, irresponsible, vulgar aggregate of individuals. 
And it was against this 'crowd!, this anonymity, this 
irresponsibility, this vulgarity that his category, his !the 
individual! was set. 
"A crowd - - -", writes Kierkegaard, "in its very con- 
cept is the untruth, by reason of the fact that it renders 
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the individual completely impenitent and irresponsible ...."1 
It is the untruth because it makes the truth something which 
is decided by a ballot, because it constitutes itself the 
truth. It is the untruth because it seeks to establish dis- 
tinctions within human life2 -- -and on the pretext of affirming 
equality. It is the untruth because it alone could crucify 
the Truth.3 "By 'truth! ", Kierkegaard says, "I always mean, 
!eternal truth' ".4 !The individual' is the truth. 'The 
individual! is the truth because he is "akin to deity ",5 
because his love for the other as !neighbour' is "the 
absolutely true expression for human equality ".6 He is the 
truth because he has his own hands and can repent of their 
deeds, because he is not impersonal and irresponsible. The 
task which is set for every man, the one task which is set 
for every man is to become such a one, to become'the 'individuals. 
It is the task which is given to and possible for every man, 
for absolutely every man. "....every man, absolutely every 
man, inasmuch as he is a man, can be, indeed must be, an 
individual.i7 "'The individual! is the category through which, 
in a religious respect, this age, all history, the human race 
as a whole, must pass. "8 "From becoming an individual no one, 
no one at all, is excluded, except he who excludes himself 
by becoming a crowd. "9 
No more than Kierkegaard's 'the crowd! will satisfy 
the spiritually vain (there is always the possibility, indeed, 
the hope that its individuals will yet be redeemed) will his 
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!the individual' satisfy the individualist.l Indeed, !the 
individual! is the exact antithesis of individualism and that 
precisely because it is always 'before God!, because it affirms 
the spiritual nature of man, because it conceives all 
responsibility in terms of that nature. So too this category 
will be repudiated by the 'practical man', by the politician, 
by the leader of the crowd.2 And that quite naturally because 
"'the individual' is the category of the spirit, of spiritual 
awakening, a thing as opposite to policy as well could be 
thought of ",3 because it is the witness to eternity from within 
time,4 because it is the true expression for what it is to be 
a man,5 because it is the orientation of life in the direction 
of the altar rather than of the ballot -box. 
It was in its opposition to !the crowd!, to that 
which he regarded as the ultimate implications of Hegelianism 
that Kierkegaard finally viewed his category.6 There is per- 
haps but one other who has half so clearly understood the 
real meaning of Hegelianism and that, of course, is Marx. And 
it is through his work, through his deification of !the crowd', 
that we stand to -day in the ambiguously fortunate position of 
being able to= .understand Hegelianism in those same terms. A 
very brief comparison with his thought will serve to relate 
Kierkegaard's !the individual' and its "entire philosophy"? to 
Hegelianism in the very terms in which he himself understood 
and finally attacked it. 
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The question of reality, of what is ultimauely real, 
is of course the question of philosophy and the answer given 
to that question is the index to the philosophy which gives 
the answer. For Hegel it is the Idea or the rational which is 
the real, for Marx it is society or rather the economic 
structure of society, for. Kierkegaard it is the individual. In 
neither Hegel nor Marx is the individual granted reality; in, 
neither is he given responsibility or freedom. Por Hegel the 
individual is and must remain incomplete and unreal, for 1Iarx 
he is but the instrument of a vast ongoing process. Kierke- 
gaard's judgment is that the Idea of Hegel and the society of 
Marx is an abstraction, that they do not exist as such, that 
they are a fabrication. For him it is the individual and the 
individual alone which really exists, which has reality in the 
sense of existence. 
The nature of the dialectic presented in each of 
ihese philosophies itself reflects that reality of which it 
purports to be the dialectic. The Hegelian dialectic is one 
of thought, of the universal reason going its undeflectable 
way through history. 
1 
The Marxist dialectic is one of society, 
of the transformation of society through its various economic 
structures culminating finally in the socialist society. 
2 
The 
dialectic of Kierkegaard is the dialectic of the individual, 
of the development of the individual from the aesthetic (from 
light- heartedness), through the ethical (through striving), to 
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the religious (to maturity). Hegel assumes the independence 
of thous ;ht, Karx assumes that thought is merely the product 
of the economic structure of society, Kierkegaard holds that 
it is neither wholly autonomous nor merely rationalisation. 
"In existence thought is by no means higher than imagination 
and feeling, but coordinate. r1 "The task is not to exalt the 
one at the expense of the other, but to give them an equal 
status, to unify them in simultaneity; the medium in which 
they are unified is existence. "2 It has taken Marx to show 
what Hegelianism really means, to show that Kierkegaard was 
unmistakably correct when he termed Hegelianism the System, 
when he understood that it could be overcome only by 'the 
individual'. By the same token it has taken Kierkegaard to 
show that Marx merely turned Hegel "upside down ", that he did 
not fundamentally break with him, that his materialism is not 
essentially different from Hegel's idealism, that 'the crowd' 
is still 'the crowd' when it is called the proletariat. 
The moment is another of Kierkegaard's conceptions 
the importance of which ranks with that of 'the individual'. 
The momenta is that alone which bestows real significance upon 
both time and eternity; it is the proper juncture of time and 
eternity; it is that in which history be;Eins. It was due to 
the lack of this conception or, more primarily, due to the 
lack of spirit to which this conception is related that the 
Greeks were not able to do justice to either time or eternity.4 
The moment is a Christian conception. It looks to the Moment, 
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to the God -man, to the appearance of the Eternal within time' 
and thrdugh this appearance it sees in each :aoment the possìL 
bility of the transformation of a moment of time into one of 
eternity. It is "the finite feflection of eternity in time, 
its first effort as it were to bring time to a stop "2. It is 
"the fullness of timei3, "the concept around which everything 
turns in Christianity, the concept which makes all things new.. 
... "4 It is uhe defense which guards the concepts of 
Christianity from "heretical and treasonable admixtures "5. It 
is heaven's gift to the believer.6 The moment is when the right 
man is there.? -Lnd in an age of reflection that "right man" 
is 'the in dividual'. 
Kierkegaard was anxiously concerned for the 
authenticity of his category. Socrates and Christ he regarded 
as its standard and he was seriously disturbed lest it should 
seem that he had forced this category higher than they.8 $is 
remark that Socrates "had no responsibility for his contempor- 
aries but only towards the truth and towai ds himself "9, still 
more his confession that "even a deeper man may have moments 
when it seems as if Christianity were hostileto man "1G must be 
understood as at least in Dart questions directed toward himself 
ith respect to his own 'the individual'. Buber holds that 
this category "is no longer of Socraues....it is of Christ. "11 
Leaving aside this antithesis for the moment - --it is with 
respect to this category no proper antithesis -- -let us ask 
only whether or not it is true that "his category is no longer 
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Socratic "l. The most obvious contrast between Socrates and 
Kierkegaard is, of course, that with respect to marriage. 
This is directly related to 'the individual' and, if properly 
understood, will serve both to indicate the real significance 
of Kierkegaard's relationship to Regine and also to suggest 
the nature of the union of the Socratic and the Christian 
within his 'the individual'. 
The essential contrast between Socrates and Kierke- 
gaard with respect to marriage is not however the very obvious 
one that the former was married while the latter remained un- 
married but it is rather what it is that each of these under- 
stands by marriage. For Kierkegaard marriage means responsi- 
bility for the other as spirit, it means encounter with God, 
it means complete self- revelation, it means absolute faith.2 
For him marriage is conditioned by the establishment of 
essential communication and this in turn is conditioned by 
the presence of the Truth, of God as the middle term. Against 
such a scale poor Socrates fares rather badly. He lived in 
paganism where there was neither the Truth nor the possibility 
of essential communication founded upon the Truth. This he 
hins elf expressed in his profession of ignorance and in the 
fact that he had by this ignorance, "essentially nullified 
communication with.all ".3 And it was in virtue of this 
ignorance and this expressionthat he was once again in the 
truth....within paganism where there is not the Truth. It 
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would seem then that in the light of Kierkegaard's criterion 
Socrates had married alm3st thoughtlessly, that either he had 
not permitted his ignorance to interfere with his marriage or 
that he had completely lacked any conception of marriage which 
would have suggested that essential communication ter its 
prerequisite. that Kierkegaard was correct in holding 
that paganism had no true conception of marriage, that 
Socraues' was a merely biological union was decisively 
expressed in the fact that when in Plato the Greek mind first 
thou ht seriously about marriage it decided upon its dissolution. 
In Socrates Kierkegaard saw an anticipation of 
Christianity; in Christianity he saw the fulfillment of 
Socrates. In the authorship his Greek master was made not 
only to indicate the direction in which Christianity must be 
interpreted but also the point along that road beyond which 
Christianity must pass if it is to be more than a mere bap- 
tised paganism and so too in the authorship the faith of 
Ch:.. istianity is represented as both the fulfillment and the 
overcoming of the Socratic ignorance. 
1 
This was again the 
reflection of the interpretation which he had placed upon his 
renunciation of Regine. This renunciation he viewed as the 
fi ; _jmp lication of the Socratic ignorance and it is against 
this Socratic dissolution of personal relationships that his 
"Had I had faith I should have remained with Regine"2, must 
be understood. That faith was the basis upon which to 
185 
establish personal relationships, that it was the -jeans where- 
by at once to overcome and to fulfill the bankruptcy of 
immanental paganism Kierkegaard did not understand soon 
enough to save Regine that she might be his wife but this he 
shortly came to understand and it was then that he attempted 
to save her - --and through her all those who would come from 
out of 'the crowd' - --for eternity. The authorship is itself 
a work of faith, of faith that there would be one who would 
he there, who would himself have faith and that through that 
faith essential communication coula be re- established. 'The 
individual' which that authorship presents is a 'the 
individual' which is at once Socratic and Christian, which 
accepts the radical Socratic dissolution of the basis of 
personal relationships, which accepts this dissolution yet 
more radically than Socrates, and which nevertheless attempts 
through faith to overcome that dissolution. 
'The individual' is a category born of its time. 
It was begotten of a refusal of marriage in an age in which 
there were no marriages, it was born as a witness to eternity 
in an age which no longer believed in eternity, it was a pro- 
test against 'policy' in an age which believed only in 'policy'.1 
'The individual' is the category of he would introduce 
Christianity once again into Christendom,' of he who would 
remove every trace of objectivity, of secularisation, of 
worldliness from the Church, of he who would tear that Church 
from the hands o_f men and give it back once again into the 
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hand of God. It is the attempt to found the Church again 
within the Church. 'The individual' is the category for the 
rehabilitation of man and, through that rehabilitation, for 
the reconstruction of society. It is a religious category 
but it is not a "merely religious category "; 'the individualt 
is "the transfigured rendering of that which the politician 
has thought of in his happiest moment.... "l, It is first of 
all a category of refusal because it belongs to the age of 
Christendom, to an age of dissolution, because it understands 
that in such an age a difficult 'No' is the prerequisite of a 
meaningful 'Yes', because it recognises the distinction between 
love and sentiment, because it understands the place of 
silence in all speaking.2 It is the category by which it is 
hoped to win back marriage .by not marrying, to re- instate 
the ethical by refusing it 'The individual' speaks against 
àn age which will not understand it, against an Le which 
establishes its ethical standards upon the basis of statis- 
tical averages, against an age in which the problem of marriage, 
of real marriage, is and continues to be one of its most 
fundamental problems. 'The individual' speaks against our age. 
'The individual' cannot be understood without 
reference to Kierkegaard's life but neither can it be under- 
stood merely with reference to that life. This is, I believe, 
part at least of what he himself implied when he said that his 
life had expressed this end "with tolerable precision "3, that 
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'That Individual' was to mark his grave,1 that he was not him- 
self 'the individual' but that he would be such for his poet, 
"when he comes ".2 'The individual' must be understood with 
reference to his life but it must not be understood merely 
with reference to that life. It must be understood with 
reference to my - --to your -- -life. 
'The individual' is Kierkegaard's offensive 
against rationalism. 
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n'est pas encore arrivé a elle." Journals, II C 57, 
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3 This he himself expressed in his profession of 
ignorance and in the fact that he had by this 
ignorance, "essentially nullified communication with 
all". Postscript, p. 502. 
184 1 Cf. Postscript, pp. 183ff. 
2 Journals, 444. Cf. Ibid, 383. 
185 1 Point of View, p. 109. 
2 Point of View, p. 138. 
186 1 Ibid, p. 109. 
2 Cf. Age, p. 51. 
3 Point of View, p. 133. 
187 1 Ibid, p. 131. 
2 Cf. Ibid, pp. 100 -102. 
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